In what is surely a step-up from recent administrations, today President Obama directly addressed those who have criticized the Wall Street bailout because it did not temporarily nationalize some financial institutions along a Swedish / S & L scandal model. Taking left-wing arguments seriously may not be the same as progressive governance on the bailout, but it is still a nice step forward. From the President's speech:
On the other hand, there have been some who don't dispute that we need to shore up the banking system, but suggest that we have been too timid in how we go about it. They say that the federal government should have already preemptively stepped in and taken over major financial institutions the way that the FDIC currently intervenes in smaller banks, and that our failure to do so is yet another example of Washington coddling Wall Street. So let me be clear - the reason we have not taken this step has nothing to do with any ideological or political judgment we've made about government involvement in banks, and it's certainly not because of any concern we have for the management and shareholders whose actions have helped cause this mess.
Many of the arguments that President Obama addresses here sound as though they are in direct response to Open Left (I know they aren't, of course). For example, we have argued in the past that the administration is ideologically opposed to nationalization, and that the administration is being led around by Wall Street in designing their bailout plan. However, President Obama assures the country that the decision to avoid temporary nationalization had nothing to do with either ideological opposition or with coddling Wall Street. Or, as President Obama explains in the next sentence, at least it isn't ideological opposition:
Rather, it is because we believe that preemptive government takeovers are likely to end up costing taxpayers even more in the end, and because it is more likely to undermine than to create confidence.
If nationalization isn't about concern for the shareholders who caused this mess, then why is undermining confidence listed as one of the two main reasons to avoid nationalization? Apart from shareholders, it is extremely difficult for me to imagine whose confidence President Obama is referring to in this sentence. One plausible speech is that "we didn't avoid nationalizing because we care about shareholders themselves, but instead because we care about shareholder confidence."
Even leaving aside the difficulties of interpreting such a vague statement by President Obama, the net effects of the bailout program demonstrate that it has largely been designed to shore up shareholder confidence. Even though unemployment is still rapidly increasing, and even though bailout recipients like Wells Fargo will still need tens of billions more in order to remain solvent, stocks have shown a net increase profit in 2009. About the only thing the bailout program has successfully accomplished is shoring up confidence among shareholders. Which is really what the original purpose of the bailout was back in September anyway. Modern governance is all about helping shareholders.
In the end, temporary nationalization was likely avoided by the Obama administration because there wasn't enough money available to pull it off, and the current political climate makes it impossible to get more. Any chance of pulling off temporary nationalization probably collapsed back in October, when the $700 billion was approved for the original TARP plan without any strings attached. Now, we are in a situation where we have no new regulations, and most of the $700 billion has been burned up by the same people who caused the crisis. And oh yeah, they will need billions more to stay solvent.
I still argue that the money should not have been handed out at all unless it came with strict conditions, including temporary nationalization and / or new financial regulations. There was never going to be more than one or two chances to acquire the money necessary to deal with the problem, and if we wasted the money the first time, there wasn't going to be another chance. Handing over $350 billion to Bush administration appointees pretty much guaranteed they would waste the money, and thus squander whatever opportunity there was to fix the situation. This is why it was important not to hand out the money at all unless there were strict legal guarantees on how it would be used. We never had those guarantees and, as such, we should have never handed out the money. As such, instead of just being screwed, now we are screwed and our hands our tied, too.
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