Industrial Capitalism Has A Black Book, Too

by: Chris Bowers

Thu Apr 23, 2009 at 16:15


Brad DeLong and Matthew Yglesias are both correct that any introductory discussion of Marx needs to foreground the murderous regimes, such as Stalin's or Pol Pot's, that operated, at the very least, in the name of Marx's ideas. In fact, I would go a step further, and argue that it is even more important to foreground the destructiveness of Lenin and Trotsky, who have stayed relatively fashionable within academic circles over the years, even though they were also mass murderers on a truly epic scale. Failure to recognize this is, at best, highly disturbing.

However, it is nearly as disturbing that introductory discussions of the rise of industrial capitalism almost always fail to mention the massive industrial de-evolution that it caused outside of Europe and the Americas. The rise of industrial capitalism in Western Europe and the United States is concurrent with the dawn of a horrifying dark age in most of the world. For most humans alive during the industrial revolution, per capita industrialization rates actually declined at a scale never witnessed before or since. The following chart from Paul Kennedy's classic The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, puts this in stark relief:

Per Capita Levels Of Industrialization in Selected Regions, 1750-1900 (UK in 1900 = 100)

It is virtually impossible to look at this chart and not conclude that the industrial revolution within 19th Western Europe and the United States was made possible in large part (though of course not entirely) due to the forced industrial devolution of most of the rest of the world. This chart shows that, in 1750, continental Europe was roughly as industrialized, on a per capita level, as the rest of the world. However, as Europe and the United States began to experience a massive per capita growth in industrialization during the 19th century, most of the rest of the world experienced an enormous drop in per capita level of industrialization. This is not a coincidence, given that Europe was conquering most of Africa and Asia during this time (and the USA was doing quite a job to North America).

For example, during the industrial revolution of the 19th century, China experienced a decline in per capita industrialization of over 60%, and India experienced a decline of over 80%. By contrast, Japan, one of the only areas in the world that was neither conquered nor carved up into "spheres of influence," experienced no decline whatsoever. Further, European states such as Italy and Austria, which had smaller to non-existent overseas empires in the 19th century, experienced much lower levels of per capita industrial growth than the rapidly expanding states of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States. The connection between 19th century industrialization, and the acquisition of a 19th century foreign empire where you could close off markets and force your home-produced goods (and people) into those markets, is difficult to ignore even for the most compartmentalizing of minds. (Of course, Russia's relative failure to industrialize during the 19th century does show that territorial expansion was clearly not the only factor in the 19th century industrial revolution).

My point is that introductory discussions of both Marxism and industrial capitalism need to be cognizant of the horrors conducted in the name of both those ideas. The capitalist industrial revolution would simply have not happened on a scale anywhere approaching the levels it achieved unless the industrializing nations had not conquered huge tracts of land and, through the use of force, either heavily exploited, or entirely cleared out, the native populations. The capitalist industrial revolution, and the worst economic devolution ever experienced by the peoples of Africa and Asia, are two sides of the same coin. Further, even beyond the greatly expanded poverty of this time period, numerous acts of mass murder and genocide were committed to enforce this industrial devolution.

Broadly speaking, my conclusion from all of this is that the pre-1950 world is not a particularly good place to find positive, humanizing political and economic models. It is important to remember that even the New Deal functioned in what was, at the time, basically an apartheid state that relied upon the continued economic exploitation of a large minority ethnic group. Not to mention that the New Deal began to collapse when the pro-New Deal party began to support an end to that apartheid. What pre-1950 history shows us is that humanity has come nowhere close to getting it right in the past, and we instead need to be striving to achieve a level of society well above and beyond anything previously experienced.

Chris Bowers :: Industrial Capitalism Has A Black Book, Too

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missing (4.00 / 2)
Interesting to look at, but I would consider it significantly more damning of capitalism simply because the mass murder committed under Lenin, Stalin, Pol Pot, Trotsky were all corruptions of Marxism (breaches of that ideal due to human fallacy) whereas the massive destruction implemented globally by industrial capitalism is inherent to and encouraged (albeit usually not openly) by that system.

eh (0.00 / 0)
I don't know if that's necessarily the case.  And it's a hard argument to make anyway, as Marxism is a well-definied ideology written down by one person, while the Capitalist system kind of isn't.  If you took Locke or someone like that as the standard bearer for industrial capitalism, then you're just wrong.

[ Parent ]
hmm... (4.00 / 3)
I think that your comment betrays a lack of familiarity with Marx's texts. Of course, this entire article does. Marx simply- and this was the only thing, called for a society where the means of production would be held in common. This of course, is the same meaning as a "dictatorship of the proletariat." If you would like to further understand atrocities that occured under say, Stalin, then you should read the theory written by Stalin, not Marx.  

[ Parent ]
No, this is not Marx's claim (4.00 / 1)
Marx didn't call for anything.  Marx claimed that history followed a dynamic that is wholly determined by economic situations, and that this dynamic will inexorably lead to worldwide revolution, a devolution of the captialist state, and a somewhat vaguely defined final end state where workers rule.

But this doesn't get to the problem that Marx is a single, well defined writer, and so it's easy to talk about "pure" Communism, while there is no single, well defined "pure" capitalist writer or thinker.  That was the point of my comment.


[ Parent ]
It really isn't true (4.00 / 7)
To talk about Marxism in its proper historical context, you have to begin by talking about other radical leftist political theories of the mid-nineteenth century. I'm talking of things like Jacobinism, Blanquist socialism, Proudhonite anarchism, Lassalleanism and the like.

Then you have to talk about what Marx said, and how this changed throughout his life. The Communist Manifesto is one thing, but then there's Das Kapital, countless polemics and a quite immense amount of letters, and it's not easily systematised.

Then you'd have to talk about how Marxism was received, and the degree to which it obtained hegemony over competing leftist ideologies. In this context, it's worth remembering that Marx didn't die on the barricades in Paris in 1870. He died in 1883 in London, haranguing the German SPD to be more purely Marxist to his last.

Then you have to factor in Bernsteinian Revisionism on the one hand, and the related (although not philosophically dependent) ideologies that go on to make democratic socialism. On the other hand, you then have to consider the attacks upon Bernstein's positions and the rise of Lenin as a Marxist theorist. Then you have to factor in divisions amongst the Russian Communists, the influence of Bolshevik, Menshevik and mixed modes of thoughts on the principal figures of the early 20th century in socialist thought.

Then you have to factor in the reception and mutation of Leninism in Soviet Russia, its mutation into Stalinism, and those variants which made their way into exiled dissident groups (of which the most notable would be Trotskyism).

And that only taxes us up to about 1931. Factor in Maoism, Eurocommunism, Liberation Theology, Hoxhaism and the habit of most communist organisations to twist their ideological texts to conform to present geopolitical realities (and of course their tendency to have schisms any time more than four of them meet) and we get some way towards the complexity of the picture.

Marx is, if not the Father of Communism, at least its first codifier in an internally consistent way. But he wrote so much, inspired so many and was properly read by so few that he spawned all manner of variants, and any notion of "pure" communism is a fantasy.

Forgotten Countries - a foreign policy-focused blog


[ Parent ]
Sadly, many resist the notion (4.00 / 1)

...and any notion of "pure" communism is a fantasy.

that one might say the same thing about capitalism.


[ Parent ]
Which was my point all along (0.00 / 0)


[ Parent ]
Yes, and (0.00 / 0)
Paul Goodman's above. When I'm late to a thread and don't read carefully enough before opening my mouth, I often regret it. Anyway, a hat-tip to you all. A very enjoyable discussion, even when read in haste.

[ Parent ]
Yes, but certain strains stayed around (4.00 / 2)
and the economic determinism, "stages of history" strain was one of the more stubborn ones--Lenin and Mao clung to it, even though it kind of undermined their revolutions.

[ Parent ]
Hi all. New here (4.00 / 1)
We Americans tend to view Marxism as if it were an ideology.  It's really not.  It's a method of analysis.  Marx wrote next to nothing about socialism or what it would look like --- nearly all his writings centered around CAPITALISM, around how it worked and what those workings would lead to.  And at the center of that method of analysis is the idea that economic class interests are the framework around which all other social reality is built.

To really understand the USSR and other Leninist states, you need to understand the economics behind them.

I humbly suggest:

http://www.geocities.com/lflan...

or, if you don't want to wade through lots of text on a computer screen, the printed and bound version:

http://www.amazon.com/Leninist...

================================================
Lenny Flank
"There are no loose threads in the web of life"

Editor, Red and Black Publishers
http://www.RedandBlackPublishe...


Editor, Red and Black Publishers
http://www.RedandBlackPublishe...


[ Parent ]
Not sure (4.00 / 1)
I'm not convinced that contemporary social democracy is closer to Marx's vision than the totalitarian communist models of the 20th century. It might be, but I'm not convinced.

Also, capitalist countries do not have to go out an conquer other nations. The USA still seems to do it with alarming regularity, but even our adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan pale in comparison to what was "normal" imperialism 100 years ago. And we are one of the worst offenders nowadays.

I guess what I am saying is that I'm not sure if your statement is accurate. It isn't clear to me that imperialism is anymore inherent to capitalism than mass murder is to Marxism. We just have a lot of examples of both.


[ Parent ]
almost necessary (4.00 / 2)
You start to hint at the necessity of imperialism in your piece: the surplus contradiction is certainly inherent to capitalism with war and dependent colonies being the easiest method of disposing of excess product (without dumping it in the ocean.) Imperialism is simply a convenient combination of these two methods.

[ Parent ]
Marx and social democracy (4.00 / 3)
Marx said in the Communist Manifesto - and I'm really, really paraphrasing here - that part of the cleverness of capital is its ability to coerce consent by, essentially, buying off the proletariat. My take on Marx is that the main thing he got wrong was just how flexible capital could be in accommodating the proletariat; standard-issue European social democracy is just one way for capitalism to buy the allegiance of the working class. So it's not that social democracy is necessarily further from Marx's vision than like Stalinism; nor is it that Marx was wrong, even. It's just that he wasn't imaginative evough to realize how flexible capitalism could be vis-a-vis its would-be proletarian antagonists. (By the way, I don't consider it a knock on social democracy to say it's nothing more than capitalism that has bought off labor; it's definitely the most successful and just political system that's yet been invented, and something to aspire to.)

[ Parent ]
This is key (4.00 / 2)
Marx never believed capitalism could ever really give its proletariat enough to stave off revolution indefinitely. The guy who first argued that it could from a Marxist viewpoint was Eduard Bernstein (a protege of Engels) who might reasonably be considered the intellectual (if not the political) father of social democracy.

Marx would have gone for the totalitarian states every time, because as far as he was concerned the democratic system would always be rigged such that the proletariat would always be kept down and in a pre-revolutionary state.

Forgotten Countries - a foreign policy-focused blog


[ Parent ]
One could easily say the same about capitalism (4.00 / 1)
"The Unknown Ideal", and people do.

Let's examine what is the secret ingredient of "good" societies; I'm alleging that the secret is the suppression of the human instinct to just do whatever they want to do. Those societies that limit the behavior of all their members (through taboo rather than police) tend to do well.


[ Parent ]
Absolutely! (0.00 / 0)
It is virtually impossible to look at this chart and not conclude that the industrial revolution within 19th Western Europe and the United States was made possible in large part due to mass exploitation of the rest of the world.

And now the tide has turned.  The circle is now complete, once, we were the masters and everyone our slaves.  With China purchasing all our debt and taking most of our manufacturing, we have become their vassals and they the masters...  Oh, how the world has changed!

REID: Voting against us was never part of our arrangement!
SPECTER: I am altering the deal! Pray I don't alter it any further!
REID: This deal keeps getting worse all the time!


I think you have the causality backwards (4.00 / 1)
German and the US, for example, were very late to the imperialism game, not starting until the 1890's and never having empires large compared to their homelands. They had stellar growth all the same. On the flip side China had little interference with its internal economic growth until the Japanese invaded. The effect, since it's worldwide, is likely more the effect of competition, in that the Western nations had commerce, science, and the legal system integrated in a way that promoted growth. Once made, products could be shipped anywhere and their prices would suppress local production. By contrast, China's inability to commercialize inventions is very striking and goes all the way back to the Ming dynasty.

Generally speaking, colonialism and imperialism were detrimental to an economy's growth; the costs of war and garrison exceeded the trade benefits. Note that Germany, with a small empire acquired in the very late 1800's, blows past France, which had a large empire. The main exception is India, which was, to be fair, a whopper of an exception. I saw an estimate long ago (sorry, no reference) that exploiting India produced 1/3 of England's growth during the industrial revolution.


USA wasn't late, and Germany used intra-European imperialism (4.00 / 5)
The USA wasn't late to the imperialism game at all. The 1783-1853 period was the peak of its imperialism, as it grew to the size of the current continental United States. Its rapid economic growth started taking off after the Civil War, when it was able to thoroughly use the previously acquired territory to its advantage (once the natives had been cleared off).

The USA would simply not have become the dominant economic power in the world without its vast, pre-Civil War imperialism. In that case, I don't have the causality wrong at all.

Also, in 1860, Germany wasn't even at Britain's 1800 level of industrialization. However, from 1860 forward, as Germany expanded rapidly both within and outside of Europe, is also when its spectacular growth occurred. During those 40 years, it experienced a 250% increased in per capita GNP, whereas its growth during the previous 60 years was slightly less than 100%.

Much of Germany's economic growth in the 1870's, which you note allowed it to blow past France, was actually acquired directly from France in the form of reparations after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. During the 1870's, Germany just took a huge portion of the French economy, by force, for itself. Surely, that played a huge role in allowing Germany to surpass France in overall growth.

Again, I don't think the causality is backwards.


[ Parent ]
Why was what Germany did imperalism (0.00 / 0)
and what Italy did wasn't?  Or Austria-Hungary, for that matter?

Also, while you are correct on what happened after the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon III was the one that declared war on Prussia, not the other way around.


[ Parent ]
The regions the US took (4.00 / 1)
had no manufacturing to speak of. The US growth had nothing to do with taking production away from the inhabitants of the conquered West.

The reparations from France to Germany seem large, and were in relation to governmental budgets, but at 22% of the French annual GDP they were pretty trivial in relation to the amount of capital you need to finance major industrialization. The long-term effect would be to boost German GDP by about one percent. The Germans would have needed about 50 Franco-Prussian wars to finance their industrialization.


[ Parent ]
Too simplified about Germany (0.00 / 0)
I´d argue that the unification of Germany played a much larger role. As in, a unified law system and tariffs and customs just to mention a few things.

The first phase of industrialization in the German states started in the 1830/1840s with railroads. Coupled with coal mining and iron production (Ruhr region). And it was helped by the founding of the Custom Union which however didn´t include all German states.

But you still had 30+ sovereign states with their own laws, currencies and measurement systems. And even veto rights inside the Custom Union.

The second phase started in the 1860s. Modernizing laws regulating mining rights, cooperations etc. Plus the founding of the "North German Union" in 1866.

From what I´ve read the French reparations were only responsible for a minor boom which crashed in 1873 IIRC.
The real growth after that came from heavy industries (iron and steel), machinery, chemicals and optics. A lot of them were already founded in the 1860s or earlier.

And I´d be surprised if the German colonies (first one in 1884) actually produced a profit. According to the Internet, only Togo (shortly before the start of WW1) produced a slight surplus. All other colonies were money losses.


[ Parent ]
India provided raw materials (4.00 / 2)
However, it (and before it Ireland) was very definitely de-industrialised, because its cloth manufactories were considered to be a threat to the British cloth industry. There's a wide scholarly consensus on this. For a good example, try Hobsbawm's [i]Age of Revolution[/i].

France's 19th century empire, lest we forget, was to a large extent made up of the Sahara and the jungles of central Africa (and was generally acquired quite late). Many of their most prosperous colonies had earlier been seized by Britain. Their possessions in Algeria, however, were certainly of benefit to their exchequer.

I'd also flag up Congo as an example of a profitable colony. Yes, Leopold II had to be bailed out by the Belgian state, but that's because in his barbarity he established no infrastructure and had no fall-back but more brutality when the rubber price fell in the early twentieth century, whereas most colonies were not so dependent upon one good and one good only.

Forgotten Countries - a foreign policy-focused blog


[ Parent ]
More than colonies (4.00 / 4)
The whole is more complex than colonies and non-colonies and seriously predates the industrial revolution although it was only then that things started happening at a scale and a pace that the numbers leap off the charts.

England's traditional economy, certainly back to the time of Henry VIII was very much driven by cloth and textiles.  In that time the cloth was wool and British woolens were a much export leading to a slightly higher standard of living and slightly more trade (shipping).  English woolens went zipping across the Low Countries into Germany along established trade routes for many hundreds of years.

British wool may have been a staple product but Chinese silk and to a lesser extent Egyptian and Indian cotton (and probably Indian silk) were also peroducts with a regional and occassionally world wide demand.  Chinese products were in fact a major drain on both the Greeks and particularly the Roman Empire leading to devaluation of Roman coinage.  

When the original weaving machines were invented by spot out brilliant Brits in the 1700s a whole lot of linkages took effect.  Argentina, for example, although a Spanish colony became a key point in the British Empire.  Argentine leather was used to make the leather tool belt drives used in factory after factory.  Originally the cattle were slaughtered and only the hides exported an incredibly wasteful process.  Eventually canned and corned beef were invented and tins of Argentine beef were a staple for Brits long after the leather became less essential.  Rubber mostly replaced leather.  The connection that led to a brief British invasion in the 1700s lasted strongly past WWII.  British capital paid for and owned the Argentine railroads and those railroads were developed to export beef products to Europe and not to serve domestic needs with all the RR routes leading to Buenos Aires (the central hub of exports but also everything else).

The demand for wool led to the enclosure of British fields rather than free grazing much like our own westerns and the barbed wire.  In England's case, enclosure literally meant that millions of Brits were driven off the land and in to the cities to become labor for the new textile factories.

When Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin while on a visit to Georgia, English wool was given a rival: American, specifically southern, cotton.  The Civil War was based in part on the premise that England would be forced to intervene to keep their economy going.  The English economy took a huge hit initially but during the war England switched to other cotton sources, including Egyptian.  

I would argue that the cotton mills of Lancashire and the demands they placed for markets were far more important than colonies, the cause of colonies and a whole series of shifts within the economies and societies of countries outside the English colonies.  Yes Clive and India were an important market for British cloth (Recognized by Gandhi and combatted by a boycott of British cloth and the substitute of "handspun" Indian cloth.  That is why the spinning wheel is on the Indian flag.)  China and some of the other areas were more a supply source for silk and other products well in to the 19th century.

The behavior of England in China, creating a market for opium and seizing Hong Kong by military conquest in the Opium War in the 1840s was a terrible act, mostly outside the colonial system.  Capitalism, in my mind, over rode colonialism at every turn.

Other factors in addition to colonies played a huge role.  Russia and Austria Hungary, lest we forget, had internal empires not external, colonial ones.  Which countries had surplus labor generated by changes in the world/local economies: not just England but Germany and Ireland (due to the use of potatoes as the new staple crop).  Well, there was more than Weber's protestant capitalism working in Germany.  The products of Spanish colonies effected Germany and Ireland.


Do you have an explanation for the devolution? (0.00 / 0)
First, I am not arguing that overseas exploitation was the only cause for the industrial revolution. Rather, I am arguing that the rapid pace of industrialization in the 19th century would not have been possible without the overseas exploitation. Exactly who large a role the exploitation played is difficult to measure.

Secondly, your great comment does have a glaring absence--what caused the 19th industrial devolution in Africa and Asia? If it wasn't a massive shift of wealth away from those areas, and toward the colonizers, then I don't know what it was. That wealth transfer undeniably played a huge role in the industrialization of the colonizing nations.

I guess I am arguing that the colonization and overseas exploitation (not to mention occasionally intra-European exploitation, as per my comment above) played a larger role than even the technological or institutional developments of the time. Much of this was directly caused by just one country, Great Britain, which from the 1800-1860 period brought a huge amount of capital from overseas into the European theater, capital which then was used by investors to industrialize nearby European economies.


[ Parent ]
Devolution (4.00 / 4)
India clearly was de-industrialized by the presence of English manufactured goods.  China probably less so.  Foreign countries for their own short term gain deliberately destablized China playing office politics.  Whether England, germany, Japan, France.

What England needed, and forced, with its navy, was the absolute access to markets without protection for the locals.  A yard of English cloth was cheaper thasn its equivalent local.  It worked whether it was selling in the pre-Civil War south, India, or China.  What the US North and most of the rest of the world meeded was tarriffs or export limits.  At least for a while.

Colonialism was part of the access to those markets but not the whole story.  The Suez Canal, Egypt, Singapore and the rubber plantations  (and earlier the leather) were central.  Colonialism also allowed for the development of a safe source of supplies.

Africa, with the exception of Egypt/Suez Canal came very late and was never the market that India was or China was/could be.  I expect that aside from South Africa and Egypt/Suez it was not that important.  

So, I'd say capitalism first, colonialism, second.  


[ Parent ]
Causal direction (0.00 / 0)
Rather, I am arguing that the rapid pace of industrialization in the 19th century would not have been possible without the overseas exploitation. Exactly [how] large a role the exploitation played is difficult to measure.

Secondly, your great comment does have a glaring absence--what caused the 19th industrial devolution in Africa and Asia? If it wasn't a massive shift of wealth away from those areas, and toward the colonizers, then I don't know what it was. That wealth transfer undeniably played a huge role in the industrialization of the colonizing nations.

So wait -- did the pillaging of the colonies play a large role in the boom in wealth for the European powers, or not?  The question is causal direction: clearly it seems like a large coincidence that the rise of one group was coincident with the decline of the other, especially since no one argues that the decline of the latter was caused by the pillaging of the former.  The question is whether that pillaging caused the wealth boom in Europe, or whether the wealth boom allowed Europe to engage in all of its colonial pillaging.  I don't know the answer (presumably it was feedback, though the question is about the relative roles of colonial wealth or technology in driving the engine of the industrial revolution), but my point is just that the devolution of one group and the industrialization of the other is not prima facie evidence that the causation went from A to B, rather than from B to A.


[ Parent ]
The cause was competition (4.00 / 3)
Industrialized procedures produce a wide variety of goods either more cheaply (cloth) or with higher quality (tools). Industrialization requires a large suite of social structures which were initially present in only a few Western countries, spreading to many (but not all) by the end of the 19th century. Non-industrialized production in the rest of the world couldn't compete, and without the right social structures, they couldn't industrialize either.

[ Parent ]
According to Paul Kennedy (4.00 / 1)
p. 148:

The root cause of these transformations, it is clear, lay in the staggering increases in productivity emanating from the Industrial Revolution. Between, say, the 1750s and the 1830s the mechanization of spinning in Britain had increased productivity in that sector alone by a factor of 300 to 400, so it is not surprising that the British share of total world manufacturing rose dramatically-and continued to rise as it turned itself into the "first industrial nation".
...
But the story for China and India was quite a different one. Not only did their shares of total world manufacturing shrink relatively, simply because the West´s output was rising so swiftly, but in some cases their economy declined absolutely, that is, they de-industrialized, because of the penetration of their traditional markets by the far cheaper and better products of the Lancashire textile factories.
...
Finally-and this returns us to Ashton´s point about the grinding poverty of "those who increase their numbers without passing through an industrial revolution"-the large rise in the populations of China, India, and other Third World countries probably reduced their general per capita income from one generation to the next.

That would mean:
- huge increases in productivity in Western countries once they industrialized.
- Western products crowd out domestic products.
(Kennedy mentions textile exports to India rising from 1 million yards in 1814 to 995 million yards in 1870.)
In case of India that was probably British policy.
- Population growth
Chinese Population and Land Acreage, 1600-1850
If that source is right, the Chinese population almost doubled between 1750 and 1850. Without productivity growth, their per capita share had to go down.

If I understand him right, he argues that the Industrial Revolution came first and exploitation of for example India followed.


[ Parent ]
Don't Just Look Abroad (4.00 / 2)
There's a reason Marxism found its adherents, and that other earlier (less systematic) leftist gospels helped to propagate revolution throughout the nineteenth century.

As important as overseas exploitation was, it was only a second stage after internal exploitation. The industrial behemoth of the British Empire would never have arisen if land consolidation and enclosure hadn't pushed millions of people off the land and into the cities, where associates of the land barons would be happy to offer them horrendously paid work with long hours and great dangers.

Capitalism is exploitation. The only reason it shows up more clearly on national lines today is because it was economically more efficient (and more profitable for the great financiers) for the workers of the industrial world to acquire the money to spur consumption, whilst the rest of the world was merely exploited for its resources.

Forgotten Countries - a foreign policy-focused blog


Agreed, But (4.00 / 2)
Marxism already tells us this, no?

Still it's good you reinject this, and I'd even like to expand on it, but without forgetting the original purpose of Chris's argument, which was to counter the "mass murder must be considered first" meme with respect to Marxism.

What Chris has done is to respond without in any way depending on what might be called a "Marxist analysis."  Rhetorically/pedagogically, this is a sound move, even if historically/ontologically internal exploitation came first.

In fact, I'd argue one could even go further and speak of intra-personal exploitation, "the Protestant work ethic" in one of its positive-spin forms.  I think it's hard to argue this wasn't a form of self-exploitation, which Freud later reified by labeling the exploited self the "id"--a depersonalization that actually justified the process that a truly critical psychotherapy would have critiqued--as, indeed, Wilhelm Reich actually did at one point.

Getting down to the intra-psychic level once generally  appeared to be narcissistic, indulgent or escapist, but as we face the impending physical limits represented by global warming and other less-well-recognized eco-limits, I don't believe it's at all improbable that the stress of exploitation will manifest increasingly at multiple levels of the process more and more simultaneously, as a thousand failure modes bloom.

In the perverted logic at work here, it's self-exploitation that gives the primitive capitalist self the original moral authority to legitimize the exploitation of others.  But global warming and broader forms of ecosystem collapse (such as the collapse of various fisheries) represent the ultimate failure of this logic as it runs into the material limits of our planetary existence.

There is nothing airy-fairy about it.  If the planet were actually infinite, the contradictions would never be forced back on themselves.  But, of course, it's not.  The limitations of physical reality have the last word--unless we are wise enough to reorganize how we live with one another and ourselves to leave a wide margin of safety, a common surplus once called nature--both inner and outer.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
do you have a link for the trotsky and lenin comment? (4.00 / 1)
are you referring to kronstadt?  the war?  i'm not really sure if "mass murderers on a truly epic scale" is accurate.  it's not that i'm particularly invested in their respective reputations, but as someone interested in the history of the left, i'm both curious about your claim and skeptical.  

I don't know whether to snicker or to cheer. (4.00 / 3)
A serious discussion about the history of the left by people who consider themselves leftists? Honestly, I haven't heard the like in more than forty years -- not in the U.S. anyway.

After decades of half-baked slop from our free-market morons, I think I'm actually encouraged, but only just, and only if I hear a lot more like this in the coming days.

While you're at it, though, you might riddle me this, folks: We had Marx and Gramsci; they had Friedman and Laffer -- how the hell did we lose? (I don't think you can blame it on Stalin, Chris. It's much more likely a result of forgetting who we are and where we came from.)


Stupidity Is Far More Powerful Than Wisdom, Obviously (4.00 / 1)
It's not enough to be wise about one or two things.  You've got to be wise in many different ways, or you can be defeated by stupidity in just one.  That, in a nutshell, is what I would say has happened.  And we're just starting to figure it out now.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3

[ Parent ]
Beyond The Chart Above (4.00 / 3)
The chart Chris presents only covers half the story at best.  Kennedy's book covers the time frame starting around 1500, which includes the an earlier 250 year period in which the Atlantic slave trade and Spanish exploitation of the Americas had an enormous impact in laying the foundations for the patterns that followed.

There were substantial civilizations in sub-Saharan Africa prior to 1500, by many accounts surpassing Europe at the time. This is a part of world history that most European peoples are utterly ignorant of, so it's easy to simply exclude it from our story.  But in the centuries before Renaissance Italy became the spark for Europe's long, slow awakening (thanks to imported Muslim culture) all the centers of civilization worth speaking of were outside Europe.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


Machinery vs. tools (4.00 / 1)
Before 1750, the technology in England or China or France or India was not that much different.  The spinning wheeel was the best and dominant way to make cloth.  In rapid succession, the spinning jenny seriously improved the spinning wheeel and a larger machine was invented by Arkwright that was too large to be powered by humans and required water power, the so called water frame.  Arkweight's macjine led directly to the creation of factories at the so called fall line.

Water power was quickly replaced by coal.  The industrial age was on.

Pre 1500 comparisons of cultures are really difficult.  The standard "system" is based on the production and use of primitive agriculture (neolithic), bronze tools (bronze age) and then iron.  It works in Europe and sort of works in the ancient mid east.  Does it work in the Americas?  Probably not.  The Mayas and Incas grade out as "stone age" because of the lack of metal tools although each had large cities, roads, trade networks,  and the calendars and mathematucs of the Maya were far more advanced.

The British victory with the longbow at Agincourt over armor clad knights was preceded by a Mongol victory over Hungarian and German armored knights with compund bows (both a long bow and a short bow for cavalary) a century earlier.

If Europeans and Americans (US) write the histories, they wind up as eurocentric.


[ Parent ]
Where exactly are we now? (4.00 / 1)
I just finished an interesting book about the wars between the Christian kingdoms of Western Europe and the early Ottoman Empire. People who focus on our Graeco-Roman inheritance and the wonders of the Renaissance do generally miss how iffy the dominance of the West once was, and how recently the issue was decided.

We remember the defeat of the Spanish Armada, but not the defeat of the Turks at the battle of Lepanto, even though in retrospect, the latter may have been more significant in securing the gains of the Renaissance, and in setting Europe on the path of economic and technological dominance which have shaped our history until, figuratively speaking, the day before yesterday.

The struggles between left and right were inevitable once the capitalism and its technologies completed the task of turning us into the servants of a unified social and economic machine. Early reports generally portray the machine as winning, but there's still considerable doubt, I think, whether or not the victory will survive its own contradictions -- and as you've said elsewhere in the thread, Paul, you don't have to be a Marxist to see those contradictions.


[ Parent ]
discussing the black book (4.00 / 2)
If you want to discuss the black book specifically of industrial capitalism, the place to start is with the New Imperialism of the late 19th century. This includes, IMO, the U.S. sweep across the Great Plains and the physical destruction of Native Americans, as well as King Leopold's colonial venture into the Congo, the removal of Bantu speaking peoples in S. Africa, and on, and on.

If you want to discuss the black book of capitalism more generally, of course one of the things you have to do is define capitalism clearly. But at a minimum the famine in Ireland of the 1840's certainly requires discussion as does Britain's use of military force to defend its right to trade freely in opium.

Or, you could broaden it to focus on all the atrocities committed in the name of Europe's commercial expansion starting from the 16th century Spanish Conquest of the Americas and the rise of the Atlantic Slave Trade (though I would argue Spain and Portugal were decidedly not capitalist per se in this period).

I do agree that discussion of Marx and Marxism requires discussion of the atrocities committed in Marx's name. I'm also inclined to grant that there is at least a distant, albeit clear line of descent from Marx to Lenin to Stalin, and that Trotsky should not get any humanitarian of the year awards either. I still think you need to focus on the extensive revisions Lenin made of Marx and all the other conditions. Finally, it helps to distinguish between Marx's analytical core (his description of what "is" and how it developed and how it functions) from his prescription of what we "ought" to do, and his incorporation of Hegelian mysticism. The latter is helpful, the former is not.


Don't you mean (0.00 / 0)
the former is helpful, the latter is not?

sTiVo's rule: Just because YOU "wouldn't put it past 'em" doesn't prove that THEY did it.

[ Parent ]
Yes (0.00 / 0)
Very well said, Chris, and I could not agree more.

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