Following up on today's earlier article on the future racial / ethnic makeup of the electorate, here are three possible projections for future election results. The projections include a Democratic high-end track (2008 margins among whites, Asians, and others, plus 2006 margins among Latinos and 1984 margins among African-Americans) a competitive projection (2004 margins across the board), and a Republican high-end (1984 margins among whites, plus 2004 margins among all other groups).
Three-track Democratic Margins Among Racial / Ethnic Groups
| Group |
Dem High |
Competitive |
Rep High |
| White |
-12% |
-17% |
-32% |
| Black |
+82% |
+77% |
+77% |
| Latino |
+39% |
+9% |
+9% |
| Asian |
+27% |
+13% |
+13% |
| Other |
+35% |
+14% |
+14% |
Three-track Democratic national margins, 2012-2032
| Track |
2012 |
2016 |
2020 |
2024 |
2028 |
2032 |
| Dem High |
+8% |
+8% |
+8% |
+10% |
+11% |
+12% |
| Competitive |
0% |
-1% |
0% |
0% |
1% |
2% |
| Rep High |
-11% |
-12% |
-11% |
-10% |
-9% |
-8% |
The purpose of these three tracks is not to forecast what will happen, but rather to show what needs to happen for Democrats to remain nationally dominant, for elections to once again become competitive, or for Republicans to gain national electoral dominance.
Further explanation in the extended entry.
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Democrats can stay dominant in electoral politics simply by keeping together their current coalition. Already, that coalition perceives the country as headed in the right direction, so they are laying the foundation for achieving this goal. However, if the economy does not show tangible improvement between now and October of 2010, it is unlikely that they will be able to hold all of their new supporters. As such, the obvious conclusion that successful governance is the key for Democrats in holding onto their electoral dominance.
The competitive track is a return to the 2004 coalitions. It requires across the board Republican improvements, but particularly strong resurgence among Latinos, Asians, and "others." The major obstacle Republicans face in returning to the 2004 coalitions in what has happened after 2004. Four years ago, Republicans were not blamed for crashing the economy, the war in Iraq was not viewed as a Republican-engineered debacle, and the Schaivo--Social Security--New Orleans debacles had not made serious dents in the national Republican image. About the only path back to 2004 that I can imagine for Republicans in the short-term would be for the Democratic trifecta to be viewed as frakking things up just as badly, combined with some sort of perceived over-reach on one or more hot button issues (perhaps a scandal or a major terrorist attack?). Note that immigration does not count, since Republicans need to make exceptional gains among Latinos and Asians in this scenario.
The Republican high-end scenario shows a return to Reagan's dominance among white voters, plus Bush's 2004 inroads among non-white voters. About the only way this could happen is, after we have passed through the "competitive" scenario described above, and Republicans have managed to take control in D.C. again as a result. From that point, the major problems the country faces would somehow have to recede, and Republicans need to be credited for it. One way this could happen is if, ala 1993-1994, President Obama's economic policies take a few years to start showing real progress, and in 2010 both be and Democrats in Congress are tossed out of office for the lack of economic progress combined with some sort of major scandal and / or terrorist attack (voters concerned about terrorism still tend to vote Republican, so an overall increase in concerns about terrorism should cause an electoral shift to Republicans). However, the very next year, the economic policies set in motion during 2009-2012 finally result in turning the economy around, but newly empowered Republicans are credited for it.
Importantly, even this overall negative scenario for Republicans is made more difficult because younger whites and Latinos are significantly more Democratic than their older ethnic cohorts. As we will see tomorrow, this is not simply due to youthful idealism, but rather to younger generations being significantly less Christian and significantly more (openly) LGBT than older generations. Further, there is probably no way back to competitiveness for Republicans among non-Christian and the LGBT communities for multiple generations, saving a swift and total collapse of their theocratic and anti-gay rights agendas in court rulings and legislative policies. It is likely that the social issues currently championed by the dominant conservative wing of the Republican Party must be viewed as highly unlikely to ever become law before Republicans can start winning these voters again.
The series will continue tomorrow, and in the coming weeks. Here are some methodological notes on these forecasts:
- Total turnout statistics, national population projections, and exit polls were used in creating these figures, while census data on voter turnout was not. This is because census turnout figures show a substantial over-reporting of actual turnout (58.3% of the VAP according to the census, versus 55.4% turnout in reality).
- The "other" category on race / ethnicity exit poll cross tabs presents a significant challenge to future projections. This is because many people who report their race / ethnicity to the census as one race and white, black, Hispansic or Asian are reporting themselves as "other" on exit poll questions. If this were not the case, then actual "others" in the census would be experiencing turnout rates of close to, and sometimes exceeding, 100%. To compensate for this self-reporting problem, I assumed that the self-reporting as "other" was a consistent 3% of the population for whites, blacks, Latinos and Asians, and that this population would not increase over time. Of course, it probably will increase, I just can't think of a way to predict exactly how much it will increase, since this is more of an issue about how people respond to surveys rather than demographic projections.
- Turnout was projected to increase for all ethnic / racial groups between now and 2032. The increase was assumed to be consistent. It was primarily based on the expected increase in the median age of each racial / ethnic group between now and 2032, given that age, up until 45 years, is a significant indicator of how likely someone is to vote. Unfortunately, predicted turnout rates are the most arbitrary part of this forecast, despite their centrality to the overall forecast. As such, in the coming days and weeks, I will continue working on predicted turnout rates in order to improve the overall quality of the forecast.
Even the methodology to this analysis remains a work in progress. However, it is done in good faith and with an open mind. Any input is both welcome and valued. |
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