This is the first in a three-part series today that compares political conditions in 1993-1994 to our current environment. I argue that the current situation is much more favorable to Democrats than the one 16 years ago--Chris
Background Perot voters were an essential part of the 1994 Republican turnaround--perhaps the essential part. Forming 12% of the congressional electorate in both 1992 and 1994 (40% of Perot voters skipped the House vote in 1992), they swung from evenly split between the two major parties (see 38%-38% in the presidential and Rep 37%--32% Dem in the House) to voting 67% for Republicans in 1994.
By itself, this swing formed an overall 3-4% Republican gain in the national House vote. Given that the GOP went up a total of 5.1% from 1992 to 1994 in the national House vote (from 44.8% to 49.9%), their gains from Perot voters represented roughly two-thirds of all their gains that year.
The NAFTA Disaster The role of NAFTA in this swing difficult to overestimate. As I noted yesterday, just before NAFTA was passed in the House in late 1993, a plurality opposed it, 38%--46%. Notably, Perot voters opposed it overwhelmingly, 26%--63%. As Thomas Frank argued in What's the Matter With Kansas, Democratic support for NAFTA might have made both parties seem just as bad on economics to Perot voters. With equivalence on economic matters, Perot supporters may well have turned to Republicans because they tended to be populist, American-exceptionalist, cultural supremacists.
Granted, a much lower percentage of House Democrats voted in favor of NAFTA than House Republicans (40% for Dems, 75% for Reps). However, given that NAFTA was championed by the Clinton administration for months in the media, passed through a Democratic Congress, and climaxed with a famous CNN debate between Vice-President Al Gore and Ross Perot himself, Perot supporters would have had a justifiable sense of equivalence between the two major parties on NAFTA. Heck, given that Democrats were the public face of NAFTA, many probably blamed only Democrats for it.
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Are we in for a repeat? I consider this possibility in the extended entry.
Can this happen again? There are enough similarities between 1993 and 2009 to at least be concerned.
For one thing, there is a policy equivalent to NAFTA: the financial bailout. Like NAFTA, it was a rare moment where an unpopular piece of legislation passed through Congress. Also, like NAFTA, it passed with an unusual, bipartisan coalition. This could potentially prove troublesome for Democrats in the same way NAFTA did by providing a sense of economic equivalence between the two major parties. Further, even though the bailout was proposed by the Bush administration, passed with significant Republican support, and signed into law by Bush himself, Republicans are now voting and campaigning as though they were 100% against the bailouts from the start.
Fortunately, there are differences with 1993-1994 in this area as well. Most importantly among these differences, we live in a more polarized nation with far fewer dislodged voters than we did 16 years ago. Currently, third-party performance is below 3% and on the decline at both the congressional and presidential levels, even though turnout is up. Further, there has been a steady, long-term decline in the number of undecided voters in the weeks immediately preceding elections. So, while Perot had already peeled 19% of the electorate from the two-parties, voters are currently more attached to one of the two major parties then at any time in the last twenty years.
Further, Democrats have actually already won a post-bailout election. This raises doubt about not only the existence of a Perot-style undecided bloc, but also the viability of the cause of such a bloc to swing were it to suddenly manifest.
Overall, a repeat of the Perot voter swing does not appear possible for Republicans in 2010. If the downward movement in Democratic poll numbers continues, I might be persuaded to revise this assessment. For now, there are good reasons to think it won't happen again.