The first part of this series discussed how Perot voters formed roughly two-thirds of the Republican gains in the national House popular vote from 1992 to 1994. While certainly there were multiple factors, including the 1994 health care debacle, polls strongly suggest that NAFTA was their primary source of Perot voter dissatisfaction with Democrats. While the bailout could potentially serve a similar function in 2010, we live in a more polarized era with nowhere near the same percentage of the electorate up for grabs as 1992-1994. As Such, a similar swing in 2010 is unlikely.
In the second part, we looked at how dissatisfaction with President Clinton among the American left was substantial, and led to low liberal and labor turnout in 1994. So far, the American left is significantly more satisfied with President Obama and the current incarnation of the Democratic Party. However, there are still worrying signs that Democrats will experience significant drop-offs in turnout in 2010.
This article looks at the third main piece of the puzzle for Republicans in 1994: southern whites. That year, for the first time, Republicans extended their strong performances among southern whites from the presidential level to the congressional level. Not only was this an essential in helping Republicans find enough seats to take over Congress in 1994, but it also gave their "revolution" enough stability to last for twelve years.
In terms of seats, 1994 was not dominated by the South While the current incarnation of the Republican Party is heavily associated with the South, at least in terms of seats won, the Republican wave in 1994 was not disproportionately southern.
In 1994, the eleven states that once formed the Confederacy represented 28.7% (125 of 435) of the seats in the House. That year, 29.6% of the Republican net gain in House seats (16 of 54), came from those eleven states. In the Senate, only three of the nine Republican pickups were from former Confederate states. Fueled by southern whites in the South, and Perot voters everywhere else, 1994 was a national victory for Republicans, not a regional one.
Much more, including a cool historical graph, in the extended entry.
In terms of the popular vote, the South wasn't dominant in 1994, but did provide a big assist As I emphasized in part one of this series, in 1994 Republicans gained more from Perot voters than any other group (roughly 3.5% of the overall 5.1% Republican percentage vote increase). However, southern whites were a close second. Making up 24% of the House electorate, Republicans won 65% of the southern white vote in 1994, up from 53% in 1992. Even considering that there was surely some cross-over between the Perot voters who went Republican in '94 and the southern whites who did the same, jointly these two groups must have formed virtually all of the Republican popular vote gains in 1994.
Long-term southern stability for Republicans While Republican seat gains in 1994 did not come disproportionately from the South, that their popular vote gains did come disproportionately from southern whites (in addition to Perot voters) made it clear there was further room for the GOP to grow in the region. This extra room to grow provided the 1994 Republican takeover enough stability to last for over a decade.
To demonstrate this, the following chart breaks down partisan representation in the House of Representatives, both inside and outside of the South (defined as the eleven states that once formed the confederacy, and with Bernie Sanders counted as a Democrat):
Partisan Composition of the House, South and Non-South
Non-South
South
Election
Dem
GOP
Dem
GOP
1992
182
128
77
48
1994
144
166
61
64
2004
154
150
49
82
2006
179
125
54
77
2008
199
105
58
73
Despite the ongoing Democratic obsession with trying to "win back the South" in the 1994-2006 era, Republicans actually continued to gain House seats (and Senate seats, and electoral votes) in the region. In the South, Democrats are still significantly underperforming 1994.
Both now and when Republicans were in the majority, this should not have come as a surprise to anyone. Both Nixon and Reagan (and, in 1998, Bush Sr), had been disproportionately successful in the South. Eventually, this success at the top of the ticket for Republicans was going to trickle down. For the first-time in 1994, Republican performance at he congressional level among white southerners (65%) and white evangelicals (76%) achieved the same heights they had already been scoring for two decades at the presidential level. Further, once it did trickle down, it wasn't going to reverse itself anytime soon. This was the completion of a political trend three decades in the making, starting with the Civil Rights Act. No short term strategy could possibly reverse a trend of this scale.
Could this happen again? In a word, no. Even if Republicans were to make major gains in the 2010 elections (not impossible), the possibility of another stable, decade-long majority is not currently possible. Compared to 1994, the situation is different for a few key reasons:
There is no large demographic group or region where Republicans are significantly underperforming at the congressional level, compared to their presidential performance, as there was with southern whites in 1994. For example, Republicans actually have a larger advantage in the South right now than they did after the 1994 elections.
As I (and many others) have argued on a regular basis, demographics are turning against Republicans. As such, barring a significant realignment, any Republican majority will be tenuous and unstable over the next decade or two. My favorite way to exemplify just haw far, and how quickly, demographics are moving away from Republicans, is to point out that Dukakis would have narrowly won in 1988 if the country had the same ethnic and religious profile that is has right now.
Overall, while major Republicans gains in 2010 are possible, they are just not very likely. Further, in the unlikely event that Republicans do make major gains, those GOP advances will not be as stable and long-lived as they were in 1994. Whether their leaders like it or not, Republicans are locked into a white Christian voter strategy, and don't have an option to turn back. Such a strategy is not entirely futile, especially when combined with a potential Democratic defeat on health care, depressed Democratic turnout, plus anger at bailouts and vagaries like "big government." There is just no chance it will be a viable Republican strategy for another twelve to sixteen years, because the political landscape has changed significantly since 1994.
