more or less idiotic (0.00 / 0)

Folks can be said to embody the mannerisms of an idiot when:

1] they pursue the right ends with the wrong means over and over again

2] the pursue the wrong ends with the right means over and over again

Which is worse?

But the true idiot in my estimation is one who believes that, with repsect to political and moral value judgments, an idiotic end can be defined.

It can't. An agenda can only be advocated and than pursued successfully or not.

With intellectuals, however, there is also a third consideration: How successful are they at articulating an idiot's point of view---without sounding like an inarticulate idiot themselves?

This is always political though. If you call someone an idiot...someone I think is an idiot too...you can never really be too inarticulate. You nail the bastard just by calling him an idiot right?

Intellectuals calling others idiots have to be careful to avoid collapsing their arguments into the wizened world of the lincoln log words. They have to be careful they don't stack them up into prefabricated sky hooks that defend an authoritarian set of values. Otherwise they become idiots too.

I have always believed the worst path a pundit can take is one where he reaches the point he no longer owns the words he alleges to love; instead, the words own him. Every new day he has to twist each new experience, each new relationship, each new headline into the rigid framework that is his Whole Truth. The words become slaves to an ordered reality, a received reality that has, in turn, long since forgotten it is the words themselves that have largely created it.

And....these supposed leading lights of the intelligentsia, these professional thinkers, are overtly preaching anti-intelligence. They are quite clearly insisting that the proper course of action for a president is to avoid applying intelligence and avoid thinking at all. And both of them aren't even being subtle about it.

This might be argued to be sophistry. It presumes that with respect to Afghanistan there is an intelligent agenda that is somehow divorced from the actual decision itself. Yet we all know that had Obama made the choice we support weeks ago it would be construed as intelligent....and if weeks from now he makes a choice we don't support it will be constured clearly to be lacking in intelligence.  As, say, an idiotic decision.

No one but an idiot though would presume there is a way to think carefully about Afghanistan without taking into consideration that Obama is thinking like the Bilderberger he is. This is not about the right or wrong policy. American imperialism is the "right" policy, of course. This is instead about whether the cost of waging the Bilderberg agenda in Kabal is still worth it.

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by: george walton @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 15:30:53 PM UTC

By now I doubt (0.00 / 0)

they'd be capable of seeing it that way.

By now the baseline ideology of the MSM, and that of the WaPo most of all, is that America simply should be at war, permanently, for the rest of its history. If there's ever any doubt about a war, escalate. In this they reflect Pentagon "thinking" on the matter.

This is now established wisdom, in the "sphere of consensus" as Daniel Hallin would call it. They regard all the thinking on the subject as long since having been settled.

So when a tool like Broder says this, what he really means is: "We've been thinking this over forever, we know it's the rationally right thing to do, so your only choices are to bow to reason or don't, but either way do something already".

Since he knows Obama already at mostly agrees with the permanent war ideology, and at any rate has an ideological preference for the status quo, he thinks an argument like this is more likely to precipitate escalation than not.

Broder's mindset is also: Since we've already achieved consensus on this, if you're against escalation, it's your responsibility to give new reasons, not mine to keep giving the same reasons for permanent war.

That serves the purpose of absolving him from having to meet arguments which obliterate the old reasons for this war, like that there are very few Al Queda in Afghanistan; that it's only our very presence there which is primarily driving the insurgency and militancy itself; that counterinsurgency can't work without a partner government seen by the people as legitimate, and Karzai's regime will never have that legitimacy....

Neither broder nor any other jingo can meet these arguments, so he declares them out of bounds, the argument equivalent of unpersons. His pristine self-evidency of infinite war remains blissfully intact.  

When someone like Irving Kristol or Fred Kagan, to the delight of the likes of Broder, muses on the "spiritual" grandeur of war, they doesn't even think they're being anti-intellectual. Regarding the rationality of it all as self-evident, they think they're only adding some pleasant ornamentation.

So whenever anyone outside this consensus attacks them, whenever anyone demands a trukly rational assessment and deliberation, that's simply the voice of dispossessed, discredited uncouthness, to be ignored.

And if Obama deliberates, that's really dithering, the Peter Principle in action, and he has to be jolted into either getting with the program or facing the wrath of "reason" itself, reason as ideologically defined and carved in stone forever by the corporate system.  

http://attempter.wordpress.com

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by: Russ @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 15:32:15 PM UTC

Regarding the cause of the conflict.... (0.00 / 0)

that it's only our very presence there which is primarily driving the insurgency and militancy itself;

In this poll, Afghans cite quite a different set of causes. The presence of international forces is considered fairly minimal compared to other conditions. Not only that, on that particular score Afghans are evenly divided between whether the conflict is caused by an actual presence of forces or not enough international support.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sou...

Therefore, the view that international forces are causing the insurgency is not shared by the Afghan population by quite a significant margin. The poll was conducted by Oxfam.  

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by: frankenheimer @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 16:55:29 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

That only reinforces (0.00 / 0)

the anti-war argument.

Most of those factors explain why there's any conflict at all, and have nothing at all to do with Islamic fundamentalism as a cause as opposed to an effect.

On the contrary they strengthen the arguments of those who say our basic conflict is not with "the Taliban", that we can engage in diplomacy, or just withdraw, but that there's no compelling reason to stay and keep fighting.

BTW, since "Afghan government" certainly, and "warlords" probably, and perhaps some of the others, would be confounded in respondents' minds with the invader, it seems if you add them up that the occupier together with his minions is indeed the most popular answer.

http://attempter.wordpress.com

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by: Russ @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 17:27:08 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

The US can't do much about the first two (4.00 / 2)

and sending more soldiers is not likely to positively influence any of the others, so you make a good argument for getting out as soon as possible.

"It sounds wrong...
     ...but its right."

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by: SpitBall @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 18:53:24 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

What do you guys think of Steve Coll's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committe? (0.00 / 0)

He thinks that stability in Afghanistan is both achievable and desirable, and goes on to address many of the arguments and criticisms cited in the comments above with fairly cogent counterarguments.

http://www.newamerica.net/publ...

Even if one disagrees with his prescriptions, you will appreciate the thought, detail and honesty he puts into this analysis of Afghanistan. Ultimately, he agrees with maintaining a military presence there.

As for the diary's criticism of those two reporters/commentators, I agree, but notice how Coll arrives at a position of advocating a military presence, and even an increase in troops, from an entirely different direction.  

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by: frankenheimer @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 16:18:49 PM UTC

Agree, Somewhat (0.00 / 0)

This is my only criticism of David's piece today: how to you determine if Obama is waffling for no good reason OR debating the issues thoroughly in an intelligent manner? The "get on with it" meme from Broder et al is amazing but somewhat predictable. The real issue is how to tell incompetence from thoroughness. From what I've seen, Obama is highly competent (even if I totally disagree with him on most policies so far and even if his leadership to date is lacking).

To your point about Coll and your chart about Afghan perceptions of what is wrong in their country, for me, the US is structurally incapable of doing the right thing in Afghanistan. The right thing would be to dial down our payments to warlords for security (which is unwise given the lack of security in the country) and put that money into job creation programs in Afghanistan, to really help them build a civil society with a small to modest amount of corruption.

While Coll probably is right in the abstract, at least, conditions on the ground most likely prevent the US and its allies from addressing the real root causes.

I'd like to believe differently. But every article I read about US and Afghan corruption, about funneling millions to warlords for security (which they probably invest in weapons and drug trade), about the US funding of poorly implemented projects through Halliburton and the like, every article makes me wonder if this is unfortunately a fool's errand. That we would be better off cutting our losses and working with countries in the region, including Afghanistan, to minimize the damage from Al Qaeda and others who would hurt our interests in that part of the world.

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by: TSlavin @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 17:21:54 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

He gets points for being reasonably honest, but demerits for being a fool or a tool. (4.00 / 1)

He starts off well enough with his opening grafs. But similarly, he also paints himself as a delusional fool:

The United States has two compelling interests at issue in the Afghan conflict. One is the ongoing, increasingly successful but incomplete effort to reduce the threat posed by Al Qaeda and related jihadi groups, and to finally eliminate the Al Qaeda leadership that carried out the 9/11 attacks. The second is the pursuit of a South and Central Asian region that is at least stable enough to ensure that Pakistan does not fail completely as a state or fall into the hands of Islamic extremists.

More than that may well be achievable - in my view, most current American commentary underestimates the potential for transformational changes in South Asia over the next decade or two, spurred by economic progress and integration.

Ah, those "compelling interests." This, of course, is the whole problem with this misadventure. The DoD itself estimates all of 200 AQ operatives in all of Afghanistan, yet 100K troops isn't enough to deal with this problem?

More importantly, he says the second priority is to create a South AND Central Asia that is stable enough to prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state. This is particularly odd, since it's also well known our occupation of Afghanistan is one of the most destabilizing problems for Pakistan. He also thinks a two decade commitment of blood and treasure will do the trick, even though there simply isn't any real evidence that is the case.  Indeed, one has to wonder if these tools are taking powerful hallucinogens, given that all the historical evidence with respect to home grown insurgencies defeating foreign occupiers all goes in one direction: the eventual defeat of those foreign occupiers (India, Algeria, Vietnam and so forth).

How this alleged "liberal" thinks it's possible to "transform" other societies to our liking through the barrel of a gun is simply not addressed in real terms. Of course, why would he do that? He knows it's a silly idea.

After praising McChrystal's "strategery", he then hedges with this:

While I cannot endorse or oppose McChyrstal's specific prescriptions for the next phase of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan because I do not know what they are, I do endorse the starting point of his analysis, as well as his general emphases on partnering with Afghan forces and focusing on the needs of the Afghan population. I believe those emphases are necessary but insufficient.

Indeed, he does not know what McChrystal is actually talking about, because no one has bothered to enlighten us as to what he's really talking about. The reason for this is simple: there is no strategy. They simply want to stop the hemorrhaging by throwing more troops and treasure at the problem. Additionally, all this completely overlooks the simple fact that Hamid Karzai, besides being a corrupt kingpin of the opium trade, is little more than Mayor of Kabul. Their "army" is so pathetic, they don't deserve to be called that. Their so-called "police" force is known more for extorting villagers and raping their women and girls than anything else.

He then does a little tapdance around counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) in which he says it's "too abstract" and then contradicts himself in his decent explanation (though lacking any real detail) of US COIN doctrine. He explains why the Soviets failed, failing himself to realize we've made all the same mistakes, for the most part. He also fails to recognize that US COIN doctrine stipulates that in a country the size of Afghanistan, we actually need 300K-500K troops to control the turf. That isn't going to happen.

He also overlooks the fact that COIN requires an actual central government of local origin to carry out said doctrine. The US can only assist and enable those ops. Because even the US Army recognizes that without local legitimacy, foreign occupiers are still foreign occupiers... and are thusly not legitimate.

Of course, all this ignores the simple fact that Afghanistan is strategically irrelevant. There are no vital American interests involved here, beyond providing a giant, deficit-exploding, money funnel to DOD and it's various contractors. Put simply, this occupation exists for it's own sake.

My guess is that Coll will be receiving some very large paychecks from certain interested parties for his "work."

We have the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression and he wants to spend Trillions in deficit spending and thousands more American lives (not to mention all those hapless civilians caught in the cross-fire) and for what?

Transforming not just one society, but a large collection of societies across a vast region... into something more amenable to our tastes?

Besides expressing a set of silly, unattainable goals, they are also completely unsustainable. These hawks would bankrupt us all, just to soothe their own strained egos.

What we started with was a mission to destroy AQ, kill Bin Laden and his staff and take out the Taliban. What we have now is a god-sent mission to transform an entire region of the world into something or other we find more "acceptable." Talk about mission creep.

What's worse is these tools won't bother to tell us how they intend to pay for this, much less raise the troops necessary to the task, since they are currently destroying the Army and Marines from within... decimating the non-comms and junior field grade officers.

For all this, they're going to have to wipe out all our social spending to pay for it. And that still won't be enough, most likely. And for what?

"More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly." -Woody Allen, My Speech to the Graduates

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by: Emocrat @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 18:43:50 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

That's a very unfair reading of his analysis, imo (0.00 / 0)

I'll just take one example.

You said:

He explains why the Soviets failed, failing himself to realize we've made all the same mistakes, for the most part.

Ok, now lets look at what Coll says:

Instead, after years of neglect of U.S. policy and resources in Afghanistan, and after a succession of failed strategies both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States, as McChrystal put it, has an "urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate."1

That's quite an acknowledgment of failure. Now what what about in the actual section you're referring to:

It is right to be skeptical of the abstract slogans of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and the enthusiasms of those in the West who define success in Afghanistan through their own political science terminology of legitimacy, rights and development. The Soviet Union defeated itself in Afghanistan by demanding, absurdly, that the country conform to its preconceived theories of revolution and state development. As the editors of a review of the Soviet war composed by the Russian General Staff put it, "Despite the Soviet Union's penetration and lengthy experience in Afghanistan, their intelligence was poor and hampered by the need to explain events within the Marxist-Leninist framework. Consequently, the Soviets never fully understood the Mujaheddin opposition nor why many of their policies failed to work in Afghanistan." 3 Similarly, the United States should be cognizant of its own potential blinders of ideology and preconceived interpretation. For example, while the development of counterinsurgency capacity and principles by the United States Army, as outlined in the recently ascendant field manual FM-34, is a generally positive development in U.S. Army doctrine, and those capacities clearly have a role to play in U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, it would be self-deceiving to believe that the Afghan war can now be "won" simply by "applying the manual," as the most ardent counterinsurgency advocates sometimes seem to argue.

I'm not going to go through it point by point, but you get the idea. You want to dismiss everything because that makes it easier to arrive at your predetermined conclusions. I just don't find that type of argument or analysis does much to advance our understanding, certainly no as much as Coll's analysis.

Most advocates of "full US withdrawal" never, ever provide a thought experiment of what would happen in Afghanistan and the region.

So to those advocates I ask a simple question:

What do you think will happen in the region if the US (and other International forces) withdraw from Afghanistan?

That should be a necessary part of our thinking at this point, but I don't see it much from those who advocate withdrawal.

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by: frankenheimer @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 19:23:49 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

Pretty much the same thing that will happen if we stay (4.00 / 2)

What do you think will happen in the region if the US (and other International forces) withdraw from Afghanistan?

The Afghan central government will remain weak and ineffective while the warlords and tribal leaders control their own regions. Alot of money will continue to be made from selling opium and that money will go toward corrupting the government and buying arms for the insurgents.

The Taliban will likely try to retake the capitol and this may degenerate into civil war.

To some extent, this may relieve pressure in Pakistan because the Talib might just figure that fighting to control Afghanistan is enough trouble without taking on the central government in Pakistan.

Of course, we are all being far too narrow-minded. None of us has raised anything but military issues and military "solutions". Look at the poll results you posted. How many of those issues can be solved by military might? NONE. Certainly not the top two. So if the "re-thinking" that McChrystal is talking about is just more of the same military might approach, what do we gain? Just because the US has such a strong, well-engineered, military hammer does not mean that pounding a new set of nails into Afghanistan is going to solve anything.

On a more personal note, I truly dislike this kind of attitude.

Most advocates of "full US withdrawal" never, ever provide a thought experiment of what would happen in Afghanistan and the region.

Why do you hold advocates of full withdrawal to a higher standard than those that foisted the invasion on us in the first place? Did anyone ask GWB to conduct a "thought experiment" on what would happen in Afghanistan and the region as a consequence of the policy he proposed? Does any one ask that of Obama? NO! They just started waving flags and flashing lapel pins.

"It sounds wrong...
     ...but its right."

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by: SpitBall @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 20:52:39 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

Good questions (0.00 / 0)

Why do you hold advocates of full withdrawal to a higher standard than those that foisted the invasion on us in the first place?

But that doesn't make sense. Just because Bush made a series of very wrong decisions doesn't mean that the opposite decision -- withdrawing -- is the right decision today. I really don't know what you mean by holding the Bush administration to a higher standard. First of all they are out of power and not in a position to make a decision with respect to Afghanistan, and secondly they are complete failures and their opinions are irrelevant.

I think the question is better posed as: why don't I hold advocates of staying in Afghanistan to the same standards as those who advocate withdrawing? In that regard, I do. Coll presents a very thoughtful analysis of what could happen in Afghanistan if a different strategy were implemented. He doesn't make any appeals to "American exceptionalism", "patriotism", "militarism" or "dithering" or any other neoconservative precepts to make his case, and he fully admits that the chances of failure are very high. Neither does he approach the argument from the other direction, by appealing to universal notions, such as Grasyon's "people just want to be left alone".

So to answer your question, I do hold any argument -- whether for or against an American presence --  to the same standards. I'm interested in the consequences of the actions, not just in the righteousness of the action, and that means examining all the plausible alternative scenarios. My hope is that Obama is doing just that, and my hope is that once he finally makes a decision that he will explain his rationale to the American people, along with the expected consequences.  

What I don't accept is a de facto position that the right decision is to withdraw, either because it was a mistake to go there in the first place, or based on some other universal principle. My primary concern is the fate of Afghans and the innocent lives that have had to endure war and tyranny for the last few decades, therefore the best decision will be a decision that makes this it's primary concern, even if it is politically unpopular.

I'm not an expert on Afghanistan and I base my decisions on the thoughtful analysis of others, that's why I'm always looking for interesting views, including here at Open Left. But I will say there's very little thought given to the consequences of withdrawing, other than to say, as you do, that the effects will be the same. I mean, how do you know? Surely the situation is more complex than that? Another argument is that nothing will ever be achieved through the use of military power. I'm not convinced about that argument either. Yes, there have been tremendous failures in the past, but that doesn't mean it necessarily applies to every situation in the future as a de facto rationale, especially not in a situation where it is fairly easy to predict that the Taliban will take power, destabilize the region and make everyone's life a living hell.  

And before anyone says it's all the same...let's give Obama a chance to make his case before making a final decision.

Here's what Coll thinks would happen if the US withdraws:

Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?

First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I've argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda's ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear-armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan-a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen-nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast:

The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids: Even if the international community gave up on Afghanistan and withdrew, as it did from Somalia during the early nineties, it is inconceivable that the Taliban could triumph in the country completely and provide a regime (however perverse) of stability. About half of Afghanistan's population is Pashtun, from which the Taliban draw their strength. Much of the country's non-Pashtun population ardently opposes the Taliban. In the humiliating circumstances that would attend American failure, those in the West who now promote "counterterrorism," "realist," and "cost-effective" strategies in the region would probably endorse, in effect, a nineties redux-which would amount to a prescription for more Afghan civil war. A rump "legitimate" Afghan government dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks would find arms and money from India, Iran, and perhaps Russia, Europe and the United States. This would likely produce a long-running civil war between northern, Tajik-dominated ethnic militias and the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Tens of thousands of Afghans would likely perish in this conflict and from the pervasive poverty it would produce; many more Afghans would return as refugees to Pakistan, contributing to that country's instability.

Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan: If the Quetta Shura (Mullah Omar's outfit, the former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, now in exile in Pakistan) regained power in Kandahar or Kabul, it would undoubtedly interpret its triumph as a ticket to further ambition in Pakistan. Al Qaeda's leaders, if they survived American drone attacks, would encourage this narrative and support it as best they could. The Pakistani Taliban would likely be energized, armed and financed by the Afghan Taliban as they pursued their own revolutionary ambitions in Islamabad. In response, the international community would undoubtedly fall back in defense of the Pakistani constitutional state, such as it is. However, the West would find the Pakistan Army and its allies in Riyadh and perhaps even Beijing even more skeptical than they are now about the American-led agenda. In this scenario, as in the past, Pakistan's generals would be tempted to negotiate an accommodation with the Taliban, Afghan and Pakistani alike, to the greatest possible extent, in defiance of Washington's preferences. The net result might well be an increase in Islamist influence over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, if not an outright loss of control.

Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War: The Taliban and Al Qaeda are anti-American, yes. But they are equally determined to wage war against India's secular, Hindu-dominated democracy. The Pakistani Taliban, whose momentum would be increased by Taliban success in Afghanistan, consist in part of Punjab-based, ardently anti-Indian Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the spectacular raid on Mumbai a year ago. The probable knock-on effect of a second Taliban revolution Afghanistan would be to increase the likelihood of irregular Islamist attacks from Pakistan against Indian targets-not only the traditional target set in Indian-held Kashmir, but in New Delhi, Mumbai, and other cities, as has occurred periodically during the last decade. In time, democratic Indian governments would be pressed by their electorates to respond with military force. This in turn would present, repetitively, the problem of managing the role of nuclear weapons in a prospective fourth Indo-Pakistani war.

Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States: Deliberately, I would list this problem as fourth in severity in my initial straw-man forecast. Al Qaeda's current capability to carry out disruptive attacks on American soil is very low. Still, it is absurd to think, as some in the Obama Adminsitration apparently have argued, that Al Qaeda would not be strengthened by a Taliban revolution in Afghanistan. Of course it would. Whether this strengthening would directly or quickly threaten the security of American civilians is another question. London might well be more vulnerable than New York during the ensuing five or ten years after an Afghan Taliban revolution. The Afghan Taliban are essentially inseparable from the Pakistani Taliban. Because of the size and character of the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, currently, there are about six hundred thousand annual visits by civilians between the two countries, a flow of individuals that is almost impossible to police effectively. Therefore, as recent terrorist-criminal cases in Britain document, bad guys periodically get through the border. By comparison, the post-9/11 American border is much harder for Pakistani- or Afghanistan-originated terrorists to penetrate. Still, in a civil war-ridden, Taliban-influenced Afghan state Al Qaeda's playbook against the United States would expand. As 9/11 and the current creativity of the regionally focussed Taliban amply demonstrate, their potential should not be complacently underestimated. If they did get through and score another lucky goal, it is easy to imagine the prospective consequences for American politics and for the constitution.

http://www.newyorker.com/onlin...

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by: frankenheimer @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 22:57:42 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

I take your point on my strangely worded question (4.00 / 1)

I'm not certain that the most recent quote changes much of anything, however. Yes, Coll does a good job detailing "failure" but I don't see how the result is changed by sending more US soldiers, unless one cares to commit to a long-term project in nation-building. If that's what you are pitching, then pitch it. Then maybe we can have a discussion about whether its better for the US to build Afghanistan or our own infrastructure and society.

Most of the consequences Coll spells out describe a situation that's pretty much like before 9/11. Except, now, the US intelligence agencies are not asleep at the wheel. We can keep an eye on the situation and keep flying in drones and launching the odd Cruise missile from time to time. Call me what you will, a bad end is the best one can hope for from a war that was not only a mistake, but badly implemented mistake from the get-go.

get out. let chips fall. make the best of it.  

"It sounds wrong...
     ...but its right."

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by: SpitBall @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 04:24:47 AM UTC

[ Parent ]

get out. let chips fall. make the best of it. (0.00 / 0)

Believe me, I'm very tempted to support this position, as I think most anti-bellicose Americans are, but I do think that after 8 years of living through the Bush administration, Afghans deserve a chance of seeing what Obama has to offer. It just sounds cruel, somewhat, to make these people go through 8 years of the Bush administration, and then woop, now back to the Taliban. Sounds like pure hell to me. I'm interested in seeing what Obama has in mind, but you're right, the alternative is some form of nation-building, that's the bottom line.  

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by: frankenheimer @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 06:52:12 AM UTC

[ Parent ]

Bingo (0.00 / 0)

Why do you hold advocates of full withdrawal to a higher standard than those that foisted the invasion on us in the first place?

Precisely. They (the pro-occupation contingent) feel completely free to ignore the moral, legal, political and economic consequences of their own "predetermined conclusions."

All they can answer with is, "What will happen if we leave?" Feh.

"More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly." -Woody Allen, My Speech to the Graduates

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by: Emocrat @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 05:49:13 AM UTC

[ Parent ]

Predetermined conclusions? Feh. (0.00 / 0)

After all your typing, you ask the simple Pottery Barn question,

What do you think will happen in the region if the US (and other International forces) withdraw from Afghanistan?

While it's certainly a fair question to ask, it's also irrelevant. What will happen if we stay for two decades and blow another $3 Trillion on what most honest people agree is a complete waste of blood and resources? That's the more pertinent question to be asking.

The rest is all Clausewitz.

The point that I was trying to make is that what Coll thinks is somehow a cause naçional, is just a silly business venture of no real strategic value.

You tell me: what are we doing there? What is the desired political outcome? How do we get there? When do we leave and under what circumstances? How many lives and how much loot are you willing to flush down the completely corrupt national loo that is the Afghan "government?"

Judging by the way you finished your comment, I'm guessing you can't answer these questions. Fact is, neither can Coll, McChrystal, Gates, the entire Kagan Klan, all the very contractors and other business interests... or even the White House.

Keep in mind that you're setting up camp in the neo-con/liberal interventionist camp.

This "engagement" does not serve any rational function in terms of US national interests. We can't create something that doesn't already exist. We simply cannot "transform" societies so completely foreign to us at the barrel of a gun. In other words, it won't work, it doesn't serve any rational purpose and it's completely unsustainable.

These aren't simply "predetermined conclusions." You name one competent strategist that thinks this whole experiment is somehow "worth it." I can name a few who (Kilcullen, Krepenovich and others) would very much like it to be worthwhile, but honesty prevents them from making the very same, overly clever-by-half prognostications being made by Mr. Coll. I can also name some really, really good ones who are completely despondent about the horrible waste of human life in the name of something so stupid (Bacevich, Yingling and quite a few others). And ultimately, these people aren't bleeding over wasted American lives as much as the harm this misadventure is doing to what used to be known as The National Interest. Not even Bacevich, whose own son was blown up in his tank in Iraq.

The simple fact is that none of this is going to be worked out in a nice fashion, with bows tied on top. We overextended, totally screwed the whole thing up and gave into a terrible, bureaucratically driven mission creep that makes anything resembling "success" totally impossible.

I don't think you have any real understanding of this mess. There is no good way out of this. It's only a question of how many more Americans (and many others too foreign to warrant attention from Americans) we kill in the mean time.

We cannot create what doesn't exist. We cannot make competent democrats out of the narco-gansters otherwise known as the Afghan Government. We have no legitimacy, as an occupying force, in any country whose people would rather shoot at us than comply with our directives.

The Pottery Barn Rule does not even begin to address that reality. Period.

"More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly." -Woody Allen, My Speech to the Graduates

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by: Emocrat @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 05:45:00 AM UTC

[ Parent ]

You could have at least acknowledged you misrepresented Coll's argument. (4.00 / 1)

No?

Truthfully, once you said this:

While it's certainly a fair question to ask, it's also irrelevant.

I stopped reading (closely). We don't share enough common ground to have a discussion about this unfortunately. Had you said, as an example, that the consequences are going to be that the Taliban takes over, that many innocent people are going to suffer and die, and that the region as a whole will be destabilized, probably to the detriment of many, but that compared to being in an unjustified war, or compared to the suffering our presence is already causing, or that because nothing good will ever come from military force, is still not sufficient reason for staying ... ok, I could accept that. I'm not sure I would agree with it in the end, at least not until I see whatever the new strategy is, but it recognizes the consequences of our actions.

Because let's be frank. If we leave Afghanistan, there's going to be a lot of bloodshed, torture, and suffering with no leverage to do anything about it, along with creating very favorable conditions for Al Qaeda. That's undeniable. But just because I take this as a relevant matter in evaluating the situation, doesn't mean I don't agree with many of your points. I'm mistrustful of any position that arrives at a final answer without acknowledging how the opposing argument is compelling and meaningful to some degree. That's why I liked Coll's argument and thought it was worth considering. It was very honest in looking at both sides of the issue and didn't arrive at any easy answers. It reflects the mindset of someone struggling to make sense of a complicated situation. That type of thinking transcends ideology, or at least, from my vantage point, is grounded in progressive conduct with respect to treating reality.  

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by: frankenheimer @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 06:39:41 AM UTC

[ Parent ]

Actually, I do share your concerns about leaving. (0.00 / 0)

So we're not that far off, actually.

I do take issue with Coll's honesty in this regard, for the simple reason that he seems to be ignoring much of what we've already done there. The torture, indiscriminate bombings and all that have been a staple of life there for a very long time. It started before we got there, intensified a great deal upon our arrival and will likely continue, to some extent or another, after we leave. Coll completely ignores our continued human rights  abuses at Bagram and elsewhere. In a sense, these are fairly static realities which will only vary by degree.

But where I ultimately get upset with the COIN-dinistas is their basic lack of honesty concerning our purpose there. They can't say what it is, exactly, or perhaps they simply won't say in public. They say stability, but how is that going to happen? By keeping 100,000 troops there for decades and spending several trillion more dollars that we don't have and can't possibly sustain? Where I have difficulty with this, besides the unsustainability of it, is our record thus far in "transforming societies" abroad is now and always has been dismal. This is an historical artifact being ignored by the COIN-dinistas.

Now, there are some basic questions in terms of war planning that need to be addressed publicly. Here's the bullet-point list:

National purpose (what are we about?)

- National goals (what do we want?)

- National policy (what will we do about that?)

- Grand Strategy (civil and military action)

- Strategy (over-all military action)

- Resourcing the strategy (how much, how many to accomplish the strategy?)

- Tactics (fighting)

Coll and his colleagues do not really address the first two items in realistic terms. Without those answers, every thing else  is just grasping at straws. We do not discuss our "national purpose," beyond silly notions of being the great democratizers to the world (which is false anyway).

What are our national goals? It's a good question, isn't it? Has the White House even bothered to say anything substantive on this question? Not yet. Nor is there any real public debate about that.

The rest all follows. As we go down the list, we find that none of these items match up in real terms. They want to do COIN, even though we don't have either the troops, resources or time to actually do it. We don't have a Grand Strategy at all. Indeed, it seems that our civil-military elites simply don't do strategy any more. If this sounds like a re-hashing of Vietnam, it's because we had the same problem there. In the end, the lack of a viable government there eviscerated any notion of legitimate "stabilization". If anything, this aspect is vastly worse in Afghanistan, although the size of the opposition is much smaller.

Mostly we're fighting locals who simply don't want us there anymore.

Lastly, the way Coll conflates Afghanistan with Pakistan is kind of sneaky in a way. In so doing, he's turned a one-country problem into a much larger regional problem. He also ignores the simple fact that there are very real limitations on our power, our resources and our abilities. He simply does not address those elephants in the room.

So what happens when we leave? It's a good question. It probably won't be pretty, but there are things we can do to help. But helping is all we can really do and given the fact that almost all our aid is being pocketed by criminals... well, you see where this goes.

The real question, to my mind, is how many people are we going to kill before we face up to the facts?

As for Coll's ideology, I think it's more than fair to say he's a "liberal interventionist." He is not a progressive, for the simple reason he's advocating for what is still essentially colonial warfare. Progressives don't do colonial warfare, regardless of how one chooses to couch it.

He's making an argument designed to appeal to liberals in having us take responsibility for the horrible mistakes of the neo-cons. He's just transferring their guilt onto our consciences. He wants us to continue to kill Afghans for the purpose of establishing a US-friendly regime there. He doesn't explain that, except to appeal to our consciences with the Pottery Barn Rule.

He and his colleagues should at least be able to articulate the intended political end-state there. It seems they can't. Or worse, won't.

Nor will they say how we're going to pay for it or where we're going to get the needed troops.

"More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly." -Woody Allen, My Speech to the Graduates

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by: Emocrat @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 20:01:49 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

open left commentary (4.00 / 2)

Of subject, but.... Ever notice the different level of engagement and the amount of intelligent thought put into most comments here compaired to comments from the general population?

David's articles in the mainstreem press (also posted here) generate responses both places, but the difference in reader comments is dramatic.

Every time I link through to one of his newspaper colums, I am reminded why this is my favorite site.

Thanks open left community.

Government by organized money is just as dangerous as government by organized mob..... FDR

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by: reggiewhitefish @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 16:54:13 PM UTC

I say thanks for saying what has long needed to be said (0.00 / 0)

I read David's column first in my morning newspaper, and wanted to congratulate him immediately. Rather than the majority of comments above, which debate the merits of Afghanistan policy, my comment is on the arrival at long last of specific criticism of the abysmal level of so called 'intelligent' punditry in the PRINT media.

Always before we could ascribe simple-mindedness to TV/Cable news; but now that no decent analysis ever appears in the newspapers (exception made for Sirota and Krugman, and occasionally Dionne) we are really at a loss for the wisdom they once imparted.
 

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by: jjmm @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 17:29:59 PM UTC

political economy (0.00 / 0)

Coll thinks that stability in Afghanistan is both achievable and desirable,

Stability, like "peace", is meaningless until it is situated in a context revolving around "justice."

Peace and stability can coexist with virtually any religious or ideological agenda. It simply means no one is organizing against or struggling to overthrow a particular political economy. Or they are, and are effectively beaten back into relative obscurity.

The real conundrum revolves around circumscribing particular assessments of justice that are then able to effectively circumvent all challengers into the foreseeable future.

From my perspective, therefore, justice should strive more than anything else to revolve around the rule of law--- embraced by as broad a democratic consensus as possible.

But there is no obviating the reality of political economy, is there? Political and economic power will always prevail in the end.  

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by: george walton @ Fri Nov 20, 2009 at 17:31:20 PM UTC

An Nation of Idiots (0.00 / 0)

An "idiocracy" isn't possible without a nation
of idiots to cheer them on.

The dumbing down of America is the logical
outcome of an aliterate citizenry.

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by: Katie @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 07:53:12 AM UTC

By this logic, an aristocracy (0.00 / 0)

isn't possible without a nation of aristocrats to cheer them on.

Idiocracy starts at the top. Many people check out of politics rather than engage the idiocy. Others deplore it but don't know how to challenge it. Much of the idiocy remains hidden to all that don't expend time and energy to uncover it.  

When elites who often act with impunity act stupidly, putting the blame on non-elites doesn't make any sense.

Politics is the art of the possible, but that means you have to think about changing what is possible, not that you have to accept it in perpetuity.

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by: David Kaib @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 18:46:26 PM UTC

[ Parent ]

Dumbing Down (0.00 / 0)

"When elites who often act with impunity act stupidly, putting the blame on non-elites doesn't make any sense."

Who voted for Bush TWICE?

"In a Democracy, the people get the government they deserve." - Alexis de Tocqueville

Obama's election would not have been possible without the blogosphere, i.e. people reading and writing over the internet. And probably would not have happened at
all without the economic melt-down just before the election.

And when most Americans eschew reading to getting their news, and much of their world view, from the idiot box, the result is huge amounts of dumbing down.

Already Obama's support is eroding because he hasn't solved all problems in one year. And support for health reform is also eroding because "it's too expensive", with nary a peep about the hundreds of billions spent, per year, on the military.

There are a lot of smart pundits in American, unfortunately they have to struggle just to survive. Meanwhile the Glen Beck's and Bill O'Reilly's make millions.

Also, a lot of experts have concluded that democracy is not possible without a well-educated and engaged middle-class. Unless Americans start using their brains, and get off the couch, we really will end up with a "ideocracy".

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by: Katie @ Sat Nov 21, 2009 at 23:40:05 PM UTC

[ Parent ]