Over at TechPresident, Micah Sifry has two interesting pieces (here and here) on the structure and effectiveness of the the post-election Obama volunteer operation. In the second piece, where he responds to questions regarding what the structure would be like in a perfect world, he raises the interesting possibility of both inside-outside Obama volunteer organizations:
Second, and this is the most critical part in my view, they could have set out to introduce and connect local Obama supporters to each other, organized by congressional district. This is the missing piece that could have altered the track of Obama's legislative agenda--visible, insurgent, civic pressure groups keeping the heat on each member of Congress. Yes, there's a risk that these people wouldn't hew to the White House line on every issue and likely ask for more than what Obama and crew thought they could deliver, but that's movement politics. Your outside forces alter the terrain on which the insider forces then bargain (hello, "Teabaggers"!).
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How could they have addressed the problem of local OFA groups wanting to go their own way, without embarrassing the White House if their demands strayed from the message emanating from the Oval Office? They could have given those local groups a choice (rather than an edict): "If you want funding and staff support from the DNC, accept policy direction from us. If you want to organize on your own, you're on your own." That would have led to a situation where some volunteers would have chosen to affiliate with the DNC (and heck, doesn't the Democratic party want more local chapters--obviously that question is complicated by local politics), and some would have said, we'd rather be independent.
Maybe you'd have congressional districts with both types of groups working. But it would have been the members' choice and thus their motivation to make the situation work. And either way you'd probably have hundreds or thousands of vibrant local groups in existence arrayed around "continuing the movement" on their own terms, and in connection with each other, supporting each other's efforts, rather than this limp list-based DC-centered operation. (Marshall Ganz offered one vision of how this might work here.) Instead, right now you have David Plouffe, Mitch Stewart, Jeremy Bird, Natalie Foster et al--people I respect for their hard work--trying to command and control a volunteer movement. That can only work if the base is really motivated, and it obviously isn't working very well now.
I have a few thoughts on the potential of this idea, and on the potential of OFA in general, in the extended entry.
1. On motivation, Micah mentions this in his first piece, but it's something that deserves re-emphasizing: motivation comes from how OFA activists feel about their cause, and when Obama caves to conservative Democratic Senators or generally refuses to fight, they become less willing to help. I don't think drop-off in terms of e-mail response, YouTube views, etc. comes as much from structural issues or how Obamaland chooses to involve OFA activists, which Micah discusses at length, as much as it does from Obama disappointing activists, and you see that in the response to pushes like this.
I'm mentioning this because I think it's important to keep one's eye on the ball re why Obama supporters aren't responding, especially as the traditional media starts discussing the 2010 elections. It isn't because of meta structural issues, it's because we're not getting the change we worked for.
2. I am skeptical that if you give local Obama-supportive groups the choice Micah describes after the election, and then take away all their resources if they opt to be independent, that they will be very effective at all. If "Omaha Citizens for Obama" told the DNC they didn't want to take DC-centered direction and were stripped of some or all web organizing tools, staff support, funding, etc... would they be effective at all? Sure, they now are a community, to some extent. But the resources they have used all along to do their organizing is now far more limited. To tell people, especially those new to politics "If you want to organize on your own, you're on your own" may be just sidelining them altogether.
3. To me, the biggest problem isn't the structure of OFA. It's the fundamental belief among those controlling DNC apparatus that no Democratic Party-affiliated organization should ever do anything that could remotely "hurt" another Democrat. I got at this in a critique of OFA a few months ago:
There are a number of arguments I've heard against OFA getting involved. One is that OFA should only work on issues that "everyone" agrees on. Another is that pressuring members violates the DNC's core mission of electing Democrats, because having a bunch of people call their members' office and ask the intern to tell the member to vote a certain way will somehow cause them to lose their re-election. Another is that if you "make aware" Obama supporters (also known as citizen engagement) in, say, John Tanner's district that he might suck on women's reproductive health, you'll rile them up and Tanner might lose Democratic votes for re-election, which violates the core mission of the DNC. None of these arguments are very persuasive. OFA could have even done a bland, list-wide "call your member and ask him/her to x". That way you don't name someone specifically, and you can reason that you're targeting all members of Congress because it's such a critical issue, not just Democrats.
The strongest argument I've heard is that OFA pressuring Democrats will cause congressional Democrats to pick up the phone and scream at Obama and screw him, and us, on other legislation. Relationships matter. Okay. But Obama is involved in party primaries, supporting Sens. Bennet, Gillibrand (should she have one), and Specter. His administration is pushing Gov. Paterson to bow out of a re-election bid. George W. Bush got involved in supporting Specter in 2004 and Chafee in 2006 in their respective primaries. Rahm himself got involved in congressional primaries in 2006, and has a reputation for working members hard for votes, engaging allies to pressure them, and so forth. So what's the difference between these actions and asking activists to make phone calls to advance your agenda? Both can damage relationships, both have rewards. If Obama's picks lose, those people can screw him. In this case, the reward is protecting women's reproductive freedom and advancing health care reform. So how come Obama takes a risk by siding with Senate and gubernatorial candidates, but remains silent on core issues of the Party?
In politics, relationships do matter, and I consider that in my own work. But the argument in terms of that here just doesn't hold water. Moreover, we only have a short window in which to enact real progressive change, and I think, within reason and wherever possible, the President should use all available tools to obtain that change and be our "fierce advocate". Please, Mr. President, include OFA among those tools.
So long as this fundamental belief exists, OFA will continue to be a blunt instrument if direction isn't given to pressure the people obstructing real change.
Update (9:20 AM, Jan 5th): David Plouffe sends out a survey blast this morning asking folks what issues they're interested in, how they want to help, and general open comments. Fill it out if you're inclined.
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