[Note]: The following is written from a perspective emphasizing developmental potentials which have been at least somewhat realized. I freely acknowledge-and have elsewhere argued-that the history of liberalism is a lot more complicated and problematic than this account alone would suggest. The repeated tardiness of liberals to champion racial justice would be an obvious case in point, precisely the sort of point that as a radical I have made on various different occasions. However, that example is much less a failing of ideology than a failing to live up to the ideology. Clearly, liberalism by itself has repeatedly failed to address the broader needs of justice. However, radicals have often been most effective by challenging liberalism simply to live up to its promises, and it's in that spirit that the following is written.
In his diary, "One liberalism through the ages", Dan makes a very strong case for seeing liberalism as centrally concerned with promoting and defending autonomy. This makes considerable sense to me as a way of distinguishing liberalism from libertarianism, and as exposing some of the flaws involved in libertarian attempts to pass themselves off as "classical liberals" with a legitimate claim to the liberal tradition.
In addition to his arguments, I would point to Harvard psychologist Robert Kegan's subject/object schema of cognitive development, in which the self is understood in terms of a subject/object relationship, with the subject structures of one level becoming objects at the next higher level. In this schema, the Level 3 "traditional" self is defined by its social surround, the roles and relationships of the society around it, taking as objects the named kinds of things that the society defines as having a stable existence, not just physical objects, but also individual attributes and dispositions, which makes a great deal of sense, since cultures the world around are defined in part by how they divide up the world analytically, and put it back together synthetically into a functioning whole.
Level 4, in turn, takes as objects the traditional self and the social surround it is embedded in, it operates on a principal of autonomy, "self-authorship", which does not necessarily reject the objects of the society it lives in, but does view them critically, as capable of modification, alteration, and reinvention, as well as regarding it as quite possible to invent wholly new objects. The Level 4 self-Kegan calls it the "modern self"--is autonomous in a way that simply isn't possible for the Level 3 self, because it can step back and question the social assumptions that the Level 3 self is embedded within.
Historically, the emergence of the Level 4 self as a relatively more common phenomena corresponds with the emergence of liberalism in the development of modern Europe. It gets its first big boost in the Italian Renaissance, based in city-states that flourished on trade, which brought them in contact with a wide range of cultures, and thus creating a condition conducive to developing the capacity to reflect back on their own culture, observing it-at least partially-with eyes that had learned to observe and come to understand something of the culture of others. It gets a second big boost with the Protestant Reformation, with it's central focus on the individual Christian conscience, and the subsequent Protestant/Catholic wars, which ultimately could only be resolved by adopting a practice of religious tolerance, which further enabled people to critically reflect on religious beliefs that had once been like the ocean in which all swam together. And it got it's third big boost with the Enlightenment, which was a veritable celebration of the power of human reason to reflect upon the world, and make it anew.
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| Empiricism & Liberalism
Yet, for all that, I do not agree that autonomy alone suffices as an explanation for what liberalism is. The most obvious reason for this is simply that autonomy itself cannot be understood in isolation, nor can we understand how it unfolds through time-as opposed to the arrested development of libertarianism--as discussed by Dan. Autonomy depends upon critical reflection, meaning empirical observation that is then the basis for critical reasoning. This is not the top-down abstract reasoning of traditional philosophers, but the bottom-up method of keen observers throughout the ages that was finally systematized into the practice of modern science as the Reformation matured and segued into the Enlightenment. Consequently, I would argue, empiricism is ultimately as important to liberalism as autonomy is, because autonomy without empiricism is an impossibility.
There is another reason why I regard empiricism as central to liberalism, and that is a matter of ancient history. As Eric Alfred Havelock argues in The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, a pre-modern form of liberalism emerged in ancient Greece, developing first in the practice of "natural philosophers" as they then known... what we would now call "scientists". Over a period of centuries these natural philosophers challenged the ancient conservative myths of a past "Golden Age", and developed a sweeping theory of evolutionary progress more than two millennia before Darwin. They detected progress in the development of human skills and technology, even in human language, as well as in the natural world, where they argued that more complex forms developed from more primative ones. And it was out of this empirical tradition-questioning and challenging the received past-oriented mythos-that more general liberal ideas eventually spread. The evidence of this liberal tradition is largely fragmentary, but Havelock makes a compelling case for it. What's most compelling for me, and most relevant here, is that it serves to show that the historical connection between modern liberalism and modern science is not mere happenstance. Indeed, science flourished in Islam as well, during a period in which Islamic civilization was at its most liberal.
Pragmatism & Liberalism
"Pragmatism" is a much-maligned, much mis-understood word, often simply reduced to meaning "whatever works, whatever the consequences." But from a truly pragmatic point of view, that's just about as stupid as you can get. Philosophically, pragmatism means a vast expansion of things brought under consideration, rather than a vast contraction. For a philosophical pragmatist, whatever matters for whatever reason, matters. Different things matter for different purposes, and one cannot decide, a priori that certain purposes are illegitimate and need not be considered at all.
The term "pragmatism" was coined by philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce, who developed it as a philosophy of science, but James adapted it for a far wider purpose. As James saw things, science was nothing but an organized system of common sense, and thus the essence of pragmatism was applicable to human reason in general. One consequence of this is that from a pragmatist point of view there is no special status for scientific discourse, whereas logical positivism (an outgrowth of the competing positivist philosophy of science) has claimed that only scientific discourse is meaningful, much less important.
While positivists were obsessed with understanding the nature of truth, James was far more interested in the entire process of science, which he famously noted was as much concerned with seeking truth as it was with shunning error, and that two imperatives lead to very different kinds of activity, both of which contributed to the success of science as a whole. Thus, pragmatism was inherently linked to pluralism, a philosophy that supports a broad diversity of purposes as well as points of view. Philosophers have long held that diversity is a mere matter of appearances, but that ultimate reality is one. Pluralism, OTOH, sees this striving for unification as just one more purpose among many.
In essence, then, pragmatism represents a fusion of empiricism-learning bottom-up from experience-as theory of knowledge with pluralism-a respect for the inherent, bottom-up moral autonomy of diverse individuals without necessary preconditions.
If this all sounds far too theoretical, let me assure it's not. Historically, liberalism has come to its principles first as matters of pragmatic necessity. Religious freedom is a classic case in point. It emerged as a pragmatic necessity because of the bloody wars of the Reformation. However, over a period of several generations, as the pragmatic principle proved its utility and gave time for fruitful reflection, the case was made that religious tolerance was not just useful for civil peace, but a positive good for men and women's souls. Before tolerance, it was taken for granted that any form of coercion could be justified to convert someone to the "true faith"--a sure recipe for religious war without end, until one side or the other was utterly extinguished. After tolerances, it was argued that coercion could never be the basis for a genuine conversion, so there was no point in trying to force conversion, even if you did posses the true faith. You'd be better off leaving people alone, and hoping that God would guide them to correct the error of their ways.
Even longer after tolerance, yet another new perspective emerged: the notion that what had once seemed insurmountable differences might not actually matter all that much to God, after all. This viewpoint developed in large measure because people spent generations intermingling with one anther, and discovering directly from pragmatic experience that many quite virtuous people held different religious views once thought to be utter incompatible with one another. And so it has been that on multiple levels, pragmatism has proven itself a wise and solid foundation for principles later articulated as if they were divine revelations. Such is the crucial importance that pragmatism has for liberalism, and its modern framework of rights.
The short sighted, self-serving "pragmatism" of petty politicians parading around Versailles like lords is but an obscene shadow of the true meaning of the word. The enormous suffering they cause is proof beyond all question of just how lacking in true pragmatism they actually are.
Liberalism & Compassion
The connection of compassion with liberalism, empiricism and pragmatism is more numinous, in a sense, but nonetheless quite real. The desire for autonomy rather than dominance or sociopathy is desire rooted in compassion to a certain extent: one wants for oneself what one wishes for others as well. Pretenses of "objectivity" notwithstanding, empirical research is usually best done by those emotionally connected to what they study--compassion feeds interest, draws attention, nurtures insight,spurs questions, drives the quest. Compassion for others both underlies a pluralist/pragmatist worldview, and is fueled by the varied experience of the world that results from it.
The Scottish Enlightenment-including Adam Smith, along with Hutcheson and Hume-placed great emphasis on the role of benevolence in human nature and human affairs, and Garry Wills argued vigorously in Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and Explaining America: The Federalist that their views had a profound influence on America's Founders.
All this comports with George Lakoff's argument that liberalism is based on a family model he dubs the "Nurturant Parent" that is both guided by care and compassion for the child, and that seeks to impart compassionate values as well-a family model that empirical research indicates is superior to the "Strict Father" model that underlies American conservatism, particularly in producing adults who exhibit high levels of moral autonomy.
Conclusion
As stated in the introductory note, this is "written from a perspective emphasizing developmental potentials which have been at least somewhat realized." One might also call it a sort of "rational reconstruction," smoothing out the actual rough edges of history. Ordinarily I'm most sensitive to the way that a rational reconstruction can work to sanitize a messy history, and thus disguise the need for struggle, and importance of agency, so I would never present the above as a substitute for real, warts-and-all history. However, as a committed pluralist/pragmatist, I do believe that the above can have real positive value if put to the proper use, and that use, as I envision it, is this: Sketching out what liberalism means at its best in terms of core motivations provides a foundation for critiquing those who would claim the shelter of its good name while continuing to work against that which is best and most valuable in the liberal tradition. In a comment to Dan's diary, I wrote:
Not Being Around in the 1800s
I came of age knowing that the Acts of Enclosure was a really BAD THING, and that the proto-accumulative phase generally was not representative of the longer era before it. And I was aware, more generally, that liberalism had been advanced in universalist terms by a relatively privileged elite that was nonetheless far from the position of power held by the landed aristocracy throughout Europe as a whole. All this was part of what contributed to me growing up as a radical--and the Vietnam War lead me to distrust liberals on a far more visceral and immediate level.
However, growing older, living longer, seeing more of mundane corruption on multiple levels, I've come to have a better opinion of liberalism--if not necessarily most political practitioners. It is, I think, a lot sounder foundation for future progress than I had initially believed, provided one takes its universalist claims seriously in ways that were never originally intended. In particular, I regard the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an exemplary document laying out how a liberal rights framework can support a great deal of a social democratic platform.
The moral here is the same as I got the first time I heard John Coltrane play "My Favorite Things"--what's most important is not necessarily the original intent, but what you can make of it.
This diary is an attempt-however humble and inadequate--to emulate Coltrane, to help make it that much more impossible and unacceptable to play the liberal ideological equivalent of "My Favorite Things" as if Coltrane had not forever redefined the meaning, significance and essence of the song.
If we accept the logic that I lay out above, then it is not just impossible for the libertarian to lay claim to the title of "classic liberalism", as Dan has argued. I would go farther and say that it is similarly impossible for neoliberals to lay claim to liberalism as well. There is, quite simply, far too much evidence of far too much damage, and far too little compassion for their policies to be defensible in terms of what liberalism is at its core, given what we know today.
Instead of drawing the dividing line between neoliberals and neoconservatives, and saying, between New Democrats and populist progressives, "Whatever our differences, we're all on the same side," this analysis provides the deeper foundation for drawing the line between the New Democrats and populist progressives. The arguments they make might have once been intellectually plausible, although I would have argued against them. But that is clearly no longer the case.
It is no accident that Obama's stimulus plan was inadequate as originally conceived. Nor that his conception of "health care reform" was similarly inadequate, as was his plan to fight global warming, with its extra-odious links to the lie of "clean coal" and renewed massive subsidies to nuclear power. Nor that his education plan is totally disconnected from any foundation in empirical evidence or concern for the children it should serve. These are not incidental problems merely resulting from a combination of adverse political forces. They are related core problems that can be traced back to a fundamental failure to live up to what liberalism is at its best. They may be fine for Julie Andrews, but they utterly fail the John Coltrane test. |
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