(Southern) White Men Can't Vote--For All Of Us

by: Paul Rosenberg

Sat Oct 13, 2007 at 11:37


A little over a week ago, Chris wrote a diary, Concern Troll Demographers,  taking off on an article at The Politico, Dems must woo white men to win .  In response, Chris pointed out that that the "white men" being lost were actually a narrower demographic, "the white, straight, Christian, non-union male vote," which "forms about 25-30% of a shrinking percentage of the electorate."  Which, of course, is quite true, as Chris has pointed out several times over the past few years.  But for me, it brought to mind something else as well, the following three charts which I generated last year, which show that Democrats have basically stabilized their support outside the White South since the Bush I years, while only the Southern White conservative Republican demographic has continued to swell:

This got me to thinking about what it would look like to examine party ID by income, comparing the South to the rest of the country.  Which I do on the flip...

Paul Rosenberg :: (Southern) White Men Can't Vote--For All Of Us
A Brief Reprise: Chris on Dems and White Men

Before plunging into the income-based numbers, I want to briefly reprise a few points Chris made:

  • Democrats are actually losing the white, straight, Christian, non-union male vote. And yes, Democrats are getting thoroughly trounced in this demographic, and are lucky to score more than 30% of the vote here in any given national election. This group forms about 25-30% of a shrinking percentage of the electorate, as both self-identified Christians and self-identified whites are dropping precipitously as a percentage of the electorate. These drops easily cancel out the drop in union membership.

  • If the Democratic electoral problem is actually among white, straight, Christian, non-union men (termed WSCNUM from now on), then doesn't the cause of this problem become pretty obvious? It is a combination of multi-faceted identity backlash and the collapse of union density in America.

He went on to conclude:

My point is all of this is two-fold. First, Democrats are not losing all types of white men, and are actually doing quite well among some groups. Second, the groups they are doing the worst among are also shrinking relative to the rest of the electorate.

With that in mind-as well as the charts above, I wanted to see what things look like if we look at income instead of race, and if we take the South out of the equation.  This approach-leaving race out of the equation for now-makes sense in terms of geographical/electoral college logic, and also in terms of highlighting the importance of economics over a time period in which conservatives have done everything imaginable to try to take our eye off the ball.

The National Picture

The data I'm using here comes from the American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Datafile.  I use that instead of the General Social Survey (GSS), the source of the data for the charts I generated, because the ANES has a consistent breakdown of income groups by percentile, while the GSS does not.

Nationally, we can see that Democratic Party identification remains ahead of Republican Party identification, although by a smaller margin after the 1970s.  Both party loyalty and turnout are lower among Democrats, which is the only reason, even today, that Republicans remain competitive nationwide:

Here's the breakdown by individual election-year surveys:

Party ID (with leaners) By Year: Nationwide, 1952-2004Margins Among Income Groups By Percentiles
YearDemsIndRepsAll0 to 16 17 to 3334 to 6768 to 9596 to 100
195257.28.534.322.828.327.027.920.4-31.3
195455.811.133.122.733.025.524.424.8-31.5
195650.512.637.013.515.421.016.713.0-22.4
195856.310.932.823.516.733.730.519.5-31.6
196051.512.436.115.49.123.420.417.5-44.0
196253.111.435.517.613.110.826.215.0-11.3
196461.18.730.230.941.142.040.817.0-3.8
196655.213.031.723.525.538.822.224.1-4.2
196855.012.132.922.038.625.421.117.3-11.4
197054.413.332.322.136.027.624.615.5-16.7
197251.714.134.217.427.322.422.57.7-17.4
197452.217.530.321.928.337.127.68.4-36.6
197651.815.332.919.034.532.624.48.8-44.9
197854.415.530.124.335.234.126.615.0-0.7
198052.214.633.318.935.636.517.57.2-20.8
198255.912.132.023.948.135.827.511.2-23.2
198448.212.139.78.429.924.67.8-5.3-33.3
198650.313.436.314.035.821.515.20.0-19.8
198847.011.741.35.725.916.95.0-6.0-57.4
199051.811.636.615.229.329.513.111.1-50.6
199249.912.337.812.127.927.417.3-3.2-30.5
199446.910.842.44.538.429.10.9-16.9-37.7
199651.910.038.113.836.930.217.4-12.0-12.5
199851.012.536.514.523.131.917.63.5-18.5
200050.413.236.414.139.419.07.310.7-18.3
200450.18.941.09.125.018.87.5-0.4-5.0
TOT52.312.635.117.229.628.119.48.4-23.5

And here's the breakdown by cumulative decade totals:

Party ID (with leaners) By Decade: Nationwide, 1952-2004Margins Among Income Groups By Percentiles
DecadeDemsIndRepsAll0 to 16 17 to 3334 to 6768 to 9596 to 100
1950s54.910.834.320.623.426.824.919.4-29.2
1960s55.211.533.321.925.528.126.118.2-15.0
1970s52.915.132.020.932.330.825.111.1-23.3
1980s50.712.836.514.235.127.014.61.4-30.9
1990s50.311.438.312.031.129.613.3-3.5-30.0
2000s50.311.038.711.632.218.97.45.1-11.7
TOT52.312.635.117.229.628.119.48.4-23.5

Because of the relatively small sample size (just 201 for this decade), even the decade totals for the top 96-100 percentile are rather noisy.  Thus, the sharp drop in the GOP margin among this group from the 1980s and 1990s to the 2000s could well be significantly overstated.  Furthermore, not all respondents give their incomes, and this can skew the data somewhat.  Still, the big picture trends are fairly clear, which enhances our confidence in them.

The most useful distinctions, in my judgment, come from looking at what happens with the combined lower income 0-16 and 17-33 percentile groups and comparing them with the middle and upper 34-67 and 68-95 percentile groups.  The Democratic margin among the former groups actually rises by over 10 percent from the 1950s to the 1970s, where it remains fairly stable for three decades until dipping down 10 points this decade.  But the margin among the later groups is stable from the 50s to the 60s, then drops 20% in the 70s, and more than 50% more in the 1980s, and another 40% in the 1990s, before bouncing back slightly in the 2000s.  In short, the Democrats loss of partisan edge comes almost entirely from the upper and middle incomes.

But what happens if we look at things regionally, comparing the South with the Non-South?

The Southern Picture

The Southern picture, as one might expect, is one of dramatic decline in Democratic identification. Here's the breakdown by individual election-year surveys:

Party ID (with leaners) By Year: South, 1952-2004Margins Among Income Groups By Percentiles (Data Is Noisy Due To Small Sample Sizes)
YearDemsIndRepsAll0 to 16 17 to 3334 to 6768 to 9596 to 100
195271.89.618.653.244.145.164.963.042.9
195664.113.722.241.931.540.054.042.037.9
195865.813.920.345.616.853.362.846.063.6
196061.315.223.537.821.949.243.847.3-30.4
196257.115.327.629.533.60.037.826.65.6
196471.49.019.751.765.554.860.325.334.3
196661.112.826.135.033.042.240.736.1-4.5
196863.513.423.140.453.633.040.541.014.3
197059.115.425.433.754.027.238.917.416.7
197257.614.627.829.736.835.033.013.86.9
197456.320.223.632.733.951.133.718.20.0
197660.814.324.935.844.450.532.822.0-4.0
197859.714.425.933.840.334.937.740.2-21.8
198058.412.629.129.339.846.433.116.0-38.5
198261.59.728.832.751.637.038.918.4-10.0
198453.315.231.521.838.037.317.26.2-23.1
198656.413.729.926.540.735.522.817.2-18.2
198855.310.434.321.035.131.616.57.0-16.7
199055.915.328.827.137.342.725.57.3-40.0
199250.715.234.116.629.429.423.7-8.7-21.9
199448.210.541.36.932.633.30.0-13.4-57.7
199652.010.038.014.033.841.413.3-16.4-51.9
199850.312.437.113.218.333.710.39.3-29.7
200047.115.837.110.142.115.9-3.40.9-29.6
200450.78.041.59.230.024.06.3-7.4-31.3
TOT57.613.628.828.937.438.329.818.5-12.3

And here's the breakdown by cumulative decade totals:

Party ID (with leaners) By Decade: South, 1952-2004Margins Among Income Groups By Percentiles
DecadeDemsIndRepsAll0 to 16 17 to 3334 to 6768 to 9596 to 100
1950s67.212.420.446.930.846.160.550.348.1
1960s62.913.124.038.941.535.844.635.23.8
1970s58.715.825.533.141.939.735.222.3-0.5
1980s57.012.330.726.341.037.625.713.0-21.3
1990s51.412.735.915.630.336.114.6-4.4-40.2
2000s48.911.939.39.636.020.01.5-3.2-30.4
TOT57.613.628.828.937.438.329.818.5-12.3

In the 1950s, the higher income groups give Democrats the highest margins-over 50 percent overall.  But by this decade, that advantage is completely wiped out.  In contrast, the margins among the lower income groups has shrunk somewhat, but is still substantial.  Of course race plays a huge role in keeping those margins up among the lower income groups.  But what about the rest of the country?

The Non-Southern Picture

The Non-Southern pictures is strikingly different. Here's the breakdown by individual election-year surveys:

Party ID (with leaners) By Year: Non-South, 1952-2004Margins Among Income Groups By Percentiles
YearDemsIndRepsAll0 to 16 17 to 3334 to 6768 to 9596 to 100
195251.58.040.511.011.719.316.410.1-40.4
195644.812.143.11.81.412.13.35.3-39.0
195852.39.638.114.116.724.118.910.5-54.3
196046.511.042.54.0-6.19.310.66.0-49.2
196251.19.339.611.5-1.917.521.19.4-18.2
196456.58.534.921.623.834.132.514.9-22.9
196652.813.134.118.720.136.614.621.4-4.1
196851.211.537.214.028.121.513.79.3-20.7
197051.912.235.916.120.227.916.514.8-26.2
197248.713.837.511.219.314.417.05.8-24.3
197449.916.034.115.822.228.724.24.4-46.6
197647.515.836.710.923.922.520.24.8-53.5
197851.416.132.518.930.633.621.03.812.1
198049.015.635.413.632.630.410.03.5-11.8
198252.613.533.918.845.235.021.77.9-29.2
198445.610.643.81.822.617.43.2-9.1-36.5
198646.813.240.06.930.112.011.3-6.4-20.8
198842.312.445.3-3.017.16.9-1.4-11.1-63.4
199049.69.540.98.721.218.66.412.4-52.2
199249.410.839.89.725.925.914.7-1.2-33.7
199446.110.943.03.144.927.91.0-18.9-25.6
199651.99.938.113.840.320.319.4-9.48.9
199851.312.536.115.226.330.621.70.5-12.7
200052.211.736.116.136.520.712.714.7-12.7
200449.89.540.79.119.615.48.01.74.6
TOT49.412.138.511.022.222.014.34.2-27.2

And here's the breakdown by cumulative decade totals:

Party ID (with leaners) By Decade: Non-South, 1952-2004Margins Among Income Groups By Percentiles
DecadeDemsIndRepsAll0 to 16 17 to 3334 to 6768 to 9596 to 100
1950s49.59.940.69.09.918.512.98.6-44.6
1960s51.610.737.714.012.823.818.512.2-23.0
1970s49.914.835.314.623.225.419.86.7-27.7
1980s47.313.139.77.629.620.39.0-3.0-32.3
1990s49.710.739.610.131.724.712.7-3.3-23.1
2000s51.010.638.412.628.018.110.48.2-4.1
TOT49.412.138.511.022.222.014.34.2-27.2

Democratic margins in the lowest group are up dramatically since the 1950s-attributable in large part to an increase in minority population percentage-while the others are virtually unchanged, except for the very top, which is probably partly an outlier, with a very small sample size.

In short, the Democrats' loss of partisan ID seems to be heavily concentrated in the South, among middle and upper-income voters-which is another way of saying the White South.  This is not to say that they haven't lost some white voters elsewhere throughout the nation.  But those losses have been offset by minority gains at virtually every income level.

This may just be a long-winded way of saying, "Chris was right."  But given the unrelenting pervasiveness of the "Dems need to appeal to white men" narrative, it's helpful to have the same point made using a variety of different metholodologies.


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The Source Of The Problem Is Clear To Me! (0.00 / 0)
They are Fucking Republicans!  And, we don't worry about wooing lying, Racist, Reactionary, Right-Wing Republicans.  We kick their Asses.

Good Analysis (0.00 / 0)
This is a nice analysis and shows where much of the opposition lies. But I was disturbed by your concluding sentence:

Democrats' loss of partisan ID seems to be heavily concentrated in the South, among middle and upper-income voters-which is another way of saying the White South.

Your analysis says the problem is middle- and upper-income Southerners, not "whites." There is, probably, some correlation between "white" and "middle- and upper-income" in the South, but there is also a growing black middle class and still lots of poor southern whites. So your concluding statement seems to take a pretty big leap beyond the data. It would be interesting to see some actual numbers on income levels among blacks, Hispanics, and whites in the South, before making this conclusion.

Also, I suspect that the most conservative southerners are active-duty military folks and vets. I would guess this is true among all groups: blacks, whites, males,females, poor, and middle-income. Those attracted to the military are probably generally more conservative and, I assume, a stint in the military is like a few years in Republican propaganda camp. On the other hand, most folks in the military (non-officers) come from relatively poor backgrounds so maybe they are actually more liberal. It would be interesting to see correlations for military folks if it were possible to find.


It's Not A Leap, It's A Sideways Glance (0.00 / 0)
Your analysis says the problem is middle- and upper-income Southerners, not "whites." There is, probably, some correlation between "white" and "middle- and upper-income" in the South, but there is also a growing black middle class and still lots of poor southern whites. So your concluding statement seems to take a pretty big leap beyond the data.

As mentioned in the diary itself, there's already a problem with sample size from the NES without doing a breakdown by race, so there simply isn't enough data from that source to talk about it.  However, there is data from other sources, and the black middle class is solidly Democratic.

With blacks going Democratic by 85-90% in virtually any election you can shake a fist at, there's really not much sign of GOP inroads anywhere, except, of course, amongst the opportunists who can advance quite rapidly in the professional political class, due to the lack of any black faces with strong support from their own communities.

CNN's 2004 Presidential exit poll data is here, for example.  Kerry took the African-American vote 89-10%.  You can choose other races using the pull-down menus up top, and find similar results anywhere you want to look.  Florida Senate, for example, 91-9%.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
But What about Poor Southern Whites? (0.00 / 0)
Are they also conservative because they are white or are they liberal because they are poor? Your analysis says that perhaps they are liberal because they are poor. This is where I'd like to see some data. My gut says that poor whites are conservative, especially those involved with the military. But your data indicates that perhaps that is not true. Maybe it is only relatively _wealthy_ white Southeners.

[ Parent ]
As I Say Below (0.00 / 0)
Look for a new diary soon.  Class is definitely very important here.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3

[ Parent ]
The Problem (0.00 / 0)
I agree with the comment above about how middle and upper-income voters in the South are correlated with "whiteness" but there are a number of poor whites as well.  I think you'd agree that from the 1950s to today, you'd see a big jump in partisan affiliation among African-Americans towards the Democratic Party following the Civil Rights movement.  So it is very possible that if lower income voters in the South appear to be flat overall in partisanship, it's because lower income African-Americans becoming more Democratic cancels out lower income White Southerners becoming more Republican.  So the shift away from the Democratic Party in the South becomes a shift across all income groups.  Economics becomes irrelevant, race and identity are the key motivating factors.

Well, Duh! (4.00 / 1)
Of course the shift to the GOP has to do with race.

This just in: Water is wet!

The question is not just about the shift, but where it is concentrated, and where it has not been seen.  The intense concentration in the South is indicative of how strong the racial component is, and how much it thrives on not being challenged.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Right . . . (0.00 / 0)
But your post seems to also argue that upper and middle income whites were most sensitive to the issue of race.  I'm not saying this is wrong, just that I don't see it in the numbers.

[ Parent ]
Okay. Gotcha! (0.00 / 0)
Sorry to misunderstand.  I think this is important enough to put into a separate diary, with the data presented in tables.  But for now, the answer is that yes, class is definitely quite important.  Lower income whites have remained relatively supportive of the Democrats.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3

[ Parent ]
Looking Forward (0.00 / 0)
To the separate diary.

[ Parent ]
The standard interpretation (0.00 / 0)
Is that the Republicans had made some inroads into black voters who had gone to the Democrats due to the New Deal (even though FDR got the New Deal through Congress by striking political deals with Southern politicians by refusing to sign anti-lynching legislation and exempting seasonal--and mostly black--agricultural workers from certain parts of the New Deal), but that was all wiped away when the GOP ran a presidential candidate (Barry Goldwater) who had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (even if he did so for libertarian and non-racist reaasons).  I'm out of town so I don't have my books at my fingertips, but I want to say that JFK didn't appeal to blacks as much as past Democratic candidates (perhaps because of his Catholicism). so Republicans had something to work with until the disaster of 1964.

As long as Democrats keep getting gifted with symbolic reference points such as the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, black voters can be locked in to the point of almost being taken for granted.

Things You Don't Talk About in Polite Company: Religion, Politics, the Occasional Intersection of Both


[ Parent ]
I Don't Think That's The Standard Interpretation (0.00 / 0)
Truman's civil rights initiatives, although thwarted on the legislative front, were appreciated, and his executive order integrating the armed forces certainly changed the lives of many.  It was a major reason that blacks looked to the armed forces in very positive terms, whereas they had been unfairly treated in the military, as elsewhere, prior to this time.

Furthermore, Kennedy's victory in 1960 was recognized as depending on the Kennedy family reaching out to the King family, and publicizing it below the radar, so as not to pay a price for it in the white community.

King had been jailed, and it was feared he could well be killed while in jail.  JFK called Correta himself while King was in jail, and RFK called a judge and got him to set bail, so King could get out of jail alive.  In response, King's father came out openly in support of Kennedy, and the Dems publicized this via leafletting in some key northern ghettos.  Shortly after the election, Eisenhower said this probably tipped the election, and later historians have agreed.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
1964 is the key (0.00 / 0)
By Eisenhower's re-election bid in 1956, almost 40% of blacks were voting for the Republican presidential candidate and in 1960, if memory serves me right, you still had close to a third of African-Americans voting for Nixon.  It was Goldwater who drove blacks to the lopsided 90% or more voting for Democrats, and Republicans have not been able to recover from that.

1964 was clearly the watershed election for creating the current partisan alignment of black voters (and the overall realignment of the South). 

Things You Don't Talk About in Polite Company: Religion, Politics, the Occasional Intersection of Both


[ Parent ]
You're Missing My Point (0.00 / 0)
Sure a lot of blacks voted for Eisenhower.  I never said they didn't.  What I said was that it was mistaken to think that the GOP was winning back blacks from the New Deal coalition, by putting up a real fight for their votes.  This was particularly true as Blacks moved north and joined the industrial working class.

And while Goldwater's campaign certainly turned off a lot of blacks, there was also the little matter of the Democratic President, LBJ--a Southern Democrat, no less--and the Democratic-controlled Congress passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, after a whole series of events in which the Kennedy and then Johnson Administration took the side of Civil Rights activists.  Then, the next year there was the Voting Rights Act. And in 1968 there was the Fair Housing Act.

In short, there was a whole continuum of factors involved.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
My point was that (0.00 / 0)
Referring back to Truman is a mistake.  Remember that about 85% of Congressional Republicans voted for the Civil Rights Act, while Southern Democrats voted overwhelmingly against it.  But the Republicans decided to nominate one of the few who voted against the act.

There's a significant difference between getting 30% of the black vote and getting 10%.  The shifts after specifically 1964 were huge.  Democrats maintained that edge while Republicans have continually given symbols to confirm that divide, from Nixon's Southern Strategy to Hurricane Katrina.

The lesson here is that black voters love Democrats in part because they hate Republicans and gravitate automatically to the opposition and not necessarily because Democrats have done wonderful things for African-Americans.  It's the same basic principle that makes negative campaigning (a technique that I advocate) so successful.

Things You Don't Talk About in Polite Company: Religion, Politics, the Occasional Intersection of Both


[ Parent ]
You Just Ignore What You Don't Want To See (0.00 / 0)
In addition to everything else I've pointed to, you seem to forget that the national Democratic Party so alienated its Southern White contingent that they ran third-party presidential campaigns in both 1948 and 1968.

So what if that contingent voted against civil rights?  It was the Democratic leadership that pushed it through--leadership that included a white Southerner in the White House, who signed the legislation with great fanfare.  Not only that, he actually said, "We shall overcome" on national tv.  I saw that with my own eyes as a teenager, and chills ran down my spine.  You'd better believe that that caught some attention in the black community.

None of this didn't went unnoticed by black voters.  Of course they knew that the local power structure oppressing them was run by the Democratic Party.  But not only did the GOP turn its back on them in 1964, the national Democrats--haltingly, to be sure--opened their party up despite local opposition so intense that it produced these massive defections.  Then, in 1968, the Democrats first had Bobby Kennedy running in the primaries--the only white politician in America at the time who had the power to stop a riot with a speech (the night Martin Luther King died, text and audio here).  And after Kennedy was assasinated, the Democrats nominated Hubert Humphrey, whose 1948 civil rights speech at the Democratic National Convention--a speech without precedent at the time--is what catalized the Dixiecrat walkout.

In short, the Democrats gave blacks very real reasons to switch their allegience, and did so repeatedly at great political cost.  Sure the GOP turned its back on them, but the two actions could not possibly be separated from one another.  And blacks knew it.  They were not stupid.  They could not afford that luxury.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
This is complicated for me (0.00 / 0)
I am an Edwards supporter. I am also a black gay male.  This is relevant because I find that this identity politics is now being used to justify candidates who are far more likely to not push a progressive agenda than the Southern white male candidate. I mean both Clinton, with gender, and Obama, with race, is part are relying on identity to push classic liberals into endorsing them. My point? This is complicated. To admit that Southern white males aren't alone in this, is to me you stating what should be obvious but-for the mainstream blowhards. But to amit something more complicated- namely that gender and race aren't necessarily indicators of progressive thinking is something that is often missing.

The Key To Identity Politics (0.00 / 0)
For me, a key insight into identity politics comes from this simple fact: conservatism is the original identity politics.  It wasn't called "identity politics," of course, but that's what it was.

To be a citizen with full rights, i.e., a "real American" was to be rich, white, male, Christian, English-speaking and of course (it went without saying) straight.  Once the country was old enough, you could unambiguously add "native born" to that list as well.  Additionally, in all states but Maryland, Christian meant "Protestant" as well.

This insight, once sufficiently reflected on, should make it less mysterious that identity politics can so readily be co-opted for anti-progressive purposes.  It's not that it has to be that way, but when it does work out that way, it's a good deal less surprising when you keep in mind where it all started.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
My concern is that (0.00 / 0)
a lot of people who think of themselves as moderate or liberal will easily be persuade by the rhectoric rather than the substance of both character and policy. It points out how progressism can easily, as you say, go off the rails of its goal- which is human progressive - rather than being manipulated to change form, but not substance. Let me add that the power of identity politics is such that its extremely hard to overcome it with mere factual assertions. You can claim ad nauseum that candidate X is better than candidate why due to actual policy and character factors, and it is still overwhelmed by identity politics. to me its a kind of cult of personality politics.

[ Parent ]
Unfortunately, You Are 100% Correct (0.00 / 0)
Back in 1992, for example, when Feinstein was running for U.S. Senate, she couldn't get endorsements from NOW and other women's groups in San Francisco, because they knew her record too well.  So she came down to Los Angeles, and picked up an easy endorsement from LA NOW, which didn't ask any hard questions--didn't even bother to call their San Francisco affiliate for advice.  Just saw she was a woman, and didn't do anything else.

Here's the kicker, though.  LA NOW had just changed leadership.  The new leader was... wait for it... Tammy Bruce.

Well, she's a lesbian, she's got to be progessive, right?

Yeah, right. 

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
This is the thing that pisses me off (0.00 / 0)
when I see my fellow gays supporting Clinton. it's like look her damn record first. And when they do they end up rationalize it. It's like all they see is her name and  her gender. I've given up even having this argument. Let's be clear- as of 2004, the Clinton's were trying to throw gays under the bus, but what are we doing? throwing fundraisers for them and pretending they didn't do any of this. I am not saying there is a perfect candidate but the idea we are going to support in greater numbers than not a candidate who has acted less rather than more progressive in actuality rather than words on gay issues seems wrong.

My point here is that identity politics can become a blind spot for whether the issues that the group actually  wish to accomplish will be accomplished based solely on the identity. I am all for increasing gays, women, people of color etc into the ranks, but I don't want to do that at the expense of everyone else but the person being elected. Which seems to be the faustian bargain that we are being asked to make, and no one seems to be noticing.

Over at mydd, there this poster whom i want mention who regularly talks about voting for clinton for what I suspect are mostly gender reasons despite her claims to contrary. Its a frustrating idea that someone would vote for clinton without regard to what she is actually saying. I don't see how that improve sthe situation for women.


[ Parent ]
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