If you compare Obama's victory in Iowa with his loss in New Hampshire, the story by the numbers is pretty simple. In New Hampshire, Obama tied Clinton among the very liberal, and lost the somewhat liberal, the moderate, and the somewhat conservative groups by 1-2%. That is within the margin of error for all groups. In Iowa, Obama tied Clinton among conservatives, beat her by 2% among moderates (within the margin of error), beat her among 'somewhat liberals' by 11% and crushed her among the very liberal by 16%. This tracks the angry with Bush block that Obama lost from the Iowa to New Hampshire, as angry with Bush voters are probably more liberal than not.
And now, Chris isomewhat despondent that voters are choosing candidates based on identity and not issues. I think though that what has happened is not that identity is paramount, but that ethnic identity and not ideological identity has become paramount. To some extent you can't disentangle these, but if you look at what happened from Iowa to New Hampshire, it's clear that the contest is not between ethnic groups but between competing identities among voting blocks themselves. If the contest is ideological, Obama wins. If it is based on ethnicity and gender, Clinton has a bigger coalition. |
The exit polling in New Hampshire on Iraq war is clear proof that substantive distinctions on major issues isn't how the electorate in the traditional coalition blocks are making decisions. Those who want an immediate withdrawal from Iraq went for Clinton, while those who want to keep troops in Iraq or to bring them home gradually went for Obama (or to a lesser extent, Edwards). Not only has Clinton not paid for her vote on Iraq and her generally hawkish posture, but Democrats actually think she is the most liberal on Iraq. This is precisely the opposite of what elites like Matthew Yglesias believe. This misinformation also clearly breaks Obama's ideologically victorious Iowa coalition into pieces Clinton can pick off.
Clinton is framing the electorate right now, and Obama is letting her. With attack dog Bill Clinton casting doubt on Obama's position on Iraq using his enormous megaphone, and Obama running commercials on his mother's experience in the health care system and his position on fuel efficiency, why shouldn't they believe that Clinton is the most progressive on Iraq? And Iraq just isn't a very serious point of contention in the race, even though it is a top issue for voters. This blurring of issues, in fact, the irrelevance of issues, is by design. The person who is running Obama's race doesn't believe in ideological campaigns.
Axelrod's is a less grand, postideological approach, and his campaigns are rooted less in issues than in the particulars of his candidate's life. For him, running campaigns hitched to personality rather than ideology is a way of reclaiming fleeting authenticity. It is also, more and more, the way of the Democratic Party. Its 2006 Congressional campaign strategy - run by Axelrod's close friend Emanuel, with the Chicago consultant acting as principal sounding board - did not depend on any great idea of where the party ought to go, like the last political cataclysm, Newt Gingrich's 1994 House "revolution." As they have reclaimed power, the Democrats have done so not by moving appreciably to the left or the right; rather, they have done so by allowing their candidates to move in both directions at once. "What David is basically doing - and this is somewhat new for Democrats - isn't trying to figure out how to sell policies," says the Democratic media consultant Saul Shorr. "It's a matter of personality. How do we sell leadership?"
Rahm Emanuel's strategy for 2006 kept Iraq off the table until the Lieberman primary loss, though to his credit he offered a good amount of flexibility to candidates. Axelrod makes his campaigns tests of personality, and eschews ideology. That's why he's trying to piece together a clump of ethnic groups to bring Obama over the finish line, using a postpartisan message about hope.
The problem that Chris alluded to is that the math doesn't favor Obama in this context. Right now, a coalition of older, female, and low income voters beats a coalition of African-American, young, secular, and high education voters, at least on a national level. But somehow Obama broke up this coalition in Iowa, so obviously it's possible to get around ethnic/gender based identity politics. Or rather, somehow it's possible to craft a different sort of identity politics.
After all, identity is very complicated, and people have multiple overlapping identities. Political scientists influenced by behavioral economics, like Ian S. Lustick, reflect this in their studies of ethnicity.
Regardless of how we approach the problem of studying ethnic identity and its political meanings, we can begin by assuming we each approach the topic constructivistically. From this position, identities at both the individual and collective levels are ultimately fluid, chosen, instrumentalizable, responsive to change in relevant incentive structures, and liable to be manipulated by cultural or political entrepreneurs.
Obama was a cultural and political entrepreneur in Iowa, but somehow the older incentive structure has reasserted itself. Perhaps this quote from a voter explains what happened in New Hampshire
"But in the end, she was the one bringing up the real issues about the middle class like college loans. His speeches felt like pep rallies."
It's not that Clinton has an inviolable lock on old people, women, or low income voters, just as Obama doesn't have a lock on young people, seculars, or the highly educated. As long as the categories are sliced this way, though, Clinton will win. If you sliced it along ideological lines, 56% of the voting universe in New Hampshire is liberal whereas 36% is moderate. There are other starker differences; 78% of New Hampshire voters see global warming as an urgent problem, 21% see it as a long-term problem. And on Iraq, 94% of voters want to see troops withdrawn either ASAP or gradually, versus 5% who want to keep troops in country.
I don't really know what kind of strategy would work for Obama, and maybe his current postpartisan pattern is enough. I worry though that it is leading him down a path on which he has a disadvantage. I also wonder how he was able to break up the older coalition in Iowa and what identity groupings he was able to form that are now in tatters. Obama's strategy is set, he's not going to run an ideological campaign. But he was able to run one in Iowa, and progressive candidates (ie. future Ned Lamont's) are going to have to replicate what he did there. |
