An End To The Culture Wars? Survey Says--Not So Much

by: Paul Rosenberg

Sun Jan 13, 2008 at 12:03


Obama's promise to end the culture wars is a source of enormous appeal.  And why not?  Wouldn't we all much rather solve actual problems-ones that could even threaten the future of human civilization?  The only problem is the question of how realistic such a promise can be.  I've pointed out in the past that the partisan polarization we're experiencing has causes that go far beyond individual goodwill.  And I've pointed out that this period of increasing polarization and prolonged gridlock also corresponds with an unprecedented period of bi-partisan divided government.  It's also obvious that political battles over culture have a very long history in America, and did not just appear out of nowhere in the 1960s.

Here, I want to take a different approach.  I want to examine the claim, made fairly often by Obama supporters, that the culture wars are over for young voters.  I'm going to look at data from the General Social Survey on two hot-button culture-war issues for which we have continuous long-term data: abortion and homosexuality, comparing results for successive decades from the 1970s to the 2000s.  And for sake of comparison, I'm going to present data on Boomers-those born from 1946 to 1964, and those under 30 at any particular time they are surveyed.  The results show quite clearly that these culture war issues are not resolved among younger voters.This is not to deny the obvious point--which Chris has pointed out a number of times--that younger voters are increasingly abandoning the GOP and shifting to the Dems.  But it is to say that culture war issues have not all been resolved.  The most plausible explanation is simply that conservative governance has been such a disaster that it has simply overwhelmed all other considerations-much as the Great Depression did in the elections of 1930 and 1932.

But don't take my word for it.  Look at the data yourself, and then we can debate what it means.

Paul Rosenberg :: An End To The Culture Wars? Survey Says--Not So Much
AbThreat--Abortion In The Face Of Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect

For this analysis, I am using a combined measure I created to address the issue of abortion under duress in three forms--a pregnancy resulting from rape, a pregnancy that threatens the mother's health, and a pregancy reulting in a birth defect.  The most significant changes have taken place in the Republican Party, as can be seen in the following tables.

AbThreat--Boomers

First we look at Boomers.  Not much change among Democrats, and only a modest change among non-partisans in the present decade:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Democratic Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
     All 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s80.111.74.83.4
    1980s79.211.64.44.7
    1990s82.78.34.14.8
    2000s79.510.54.75.4

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Non-Partisan Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s76.112.45.75.8
    1980s77.09.96.07.2
    1990s77.68.85.68.1
    2000s71.810.76.610.9

But a significant shift can be seen among Republicans:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Republican Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s81.510.45.32.8
    1980s75.611.66.76.0
    1990s72.99.67.410.0
    2000s62.412.211.613.8

The result is a modest, gradual shift among all voters:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    All Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s79.711.55.13.7
    1980s77.711.45.45.5
    1990s78.28.95.67.4
    2000s71.911.17.59.4

And a significant increase in partisan polarization, growing faster every decade:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Differences Between Democratic and Republican
    Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s-1.31.2-0.50.61.8
    1980s3.60.0-2.3-1.33.7
    1990s9.9-1.4-3.4-5.29.9
    2000s17.1-1.6-6.9-8.417.0

Still, even this sharp increase has produced a level of polarization that is relatively modest--as is virtually all issue polarization, as I have argued previously.  It is nothing compared to the polarization in terms of which candidates people support.  Yet, this is the basis on which culture war claims are built.

AbThreat--Under 30

Now let's look at the Abthreat trend among voters under 30.  Democrats under 30 in this decade are more like non-partisan Boomers (71.8% of whom support abortion in all three cases) than they are like Democratic Boomers (79.5% of whom support abortion in all three cases).

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Democrats Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
     All 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s79.111.95.03.9
    1980s77.613.04.84.6
    1990s80.512.92.74.0
    2000s72.312.88.76.0

Non-partisans under 30 are mid-way between non-partisan Boomers (71.8% of whom support abortion in all three cases) and Republican Boomers (62.4% of whom support abortion in all three cases).

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Non-Partisans Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s76.412.16.05.5
    1980s76.810.16.07.0
    1990s82.49.63.34.7
    2000s67.511.613.07.6

And Republicans under 30 make their Boomer counterparts look like flaming liberals.  While just 5 points separate Democratic and non-partisan support for abortion in three cases, a whopping 14 points separates non-partisans and Republicans:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Republicans Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s81.611.05.22.3
    1980s74.812.97.05.4
    1990s72.215.25.27.4
    2000s53.118.413.415.1

The result is an under-30 level of support for abortion in all three cases that is quite close to the Republican Boomer level of 62.4%:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    All Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s79.211.85.23.8
    1980s76.512.55.85.3
    1990s77.613.23.85.4
    2000s64.714.311.59.5

Yet, because Democrats and non-partisans have moved right as well, the Republican/Democratic differences are not much higher than Boomer differences in this decade.  What is different is that the under-30 differences have shot up so fast from such previously low levels as late as the 1980s:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
    Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s-2.50.9-0.21.62.57
    1980s2.90.1-2.2-0.72.97
    1990s8.3-2.2-2.5-3.58.21
    2000s19.2-5.5-4.7-9.119.26

AbThreat--Boomers v. Under 30

Comparing the Boomers and voters under 30, we find that the partisan differences have grown slightly more pronounced among those under 30:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
    Between under 30 and  Boomers
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s-1.1-0.30.31.00.7
    1980s-0.80.20.10.6-0.7
    1990s-1.6-0.90.91.7-1.7
    2000s2.0-3.92.2-0.82.3

And the difference between Boomers and those under 30 as a whole has grown even larger:

    Abortion In Response To Threat:
    Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
    Differences Between Under 30 and  Boomers
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s0.5-0.3-0.1-0.10.5
    1980s1.2-1.1-0.30.31.5
    1990s0.6-4.31.81.94.3
    2000s7.2-3.2-4.1-0.17.3

AbAutonomy--Abortion As A Right To Chose In Response To Circumstances

Four other GSS questions test support for the right to abortion in less threatening circumstances.  These relate much more to the basic right of women to function as autonomous agents in control of the basic decisions about the course of their lives: abortion if a woman isn't married, if she doesn't want any more children, if she doesn't have the resources to raise another child, or for any reason.  These questions have always been much more evenly split than the AbThreat questions, and the recent shift in a more conservative direction has affected them even more.

AbAutonomy--Boomers

Democratic Boomers grew significantly more liberal from the 1980s to the 1990s, with a 10-point jump in support for abortion in all 4 cases, and became only slightly more conservative from the 1990s to the 2000s:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Democratic Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s32.010.310.112.035.7
    1980s37.76.85.610.039.8
    1990s47.74.24.79.034.3
    2000s45.74.85.48.335.7

Non-Partisans became significantly more polarized from the 1970s to the 1980s, with the liberal pole making the greater gain--a 10-point jump in support for abortion in all 4 cases, compared to a 4-point gain in support for no cases. There was another 4-point shift from some cases to no cases from the 1980s to the 1990s, and then a 5-point shift from all cases to no cases between the 1990s and the 2000s:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Non-Partisan Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s29.210.18.914.338.1
    1980s39.16.54.77.542.2
    1990s39.84.14.95.046.1
    2000s34.23.13.38.551.2

Republicans opposition in all four cases has grown in every single decade.  This has come primarily from a reduction in those supporting abortion in some cases, as support for abortion in all cases also grew, more modestly, from the 1970s to the 1990s, before all those gains and more were wiped out in the 2000s:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Republican Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s30.97.110.814.137.2
    1980s32.16.47.19.345.2
    1990s36.44.43.65.750.0
    2000s28.44.03.44.759.5

Boomers as a whole grew more polarized, with greater gains in the liberal direction (an 11-point gain for abortion in all cases), from the 1970s to the 1990s, followed by a 5-point shift in the conservative direction (5 points less for all cases, 5 points more for none) from the 1990s to the 2000s:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    All Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s31.29.210.113.036.4
    1980s36.06.66.09.442.0
    1990s42.14.34.37.142.2
    2000s37.24.24.37.147.2

Polarization has grown dramatically over the years.  In the 1970s, when abortion rights were part of the GOP platform, there was a mere 4.3 difference between Boomers in each party.  By this decade the difference was almost one in four:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Differences Between Democratic and Republican
    Boomers (1946-1964)
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s1.23.2-0.7-2.1-1.44.3
    1980s5.60.5-1.50.7-5.46.8
    1990s11.3-0.11.13.4-15.715.8
    2000s17.30.82.03.6-23.823.7

AbAutonomy--Under 30

Democrats under 30 generally grew more liberal and slightly more polarized from the 1970s to the 1990s, then turned somewhat more conservative and more polarized in the 2000s:

 

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Democrats Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s31.69.810.212.436.0
    1980s35.76.27.111.140.1
    1990s44.36.76.29.633.4
    2000s35.26.37.86.743.8

Non-Partisans under 30 followed a generally similar pattern to Democrats in their age cohorts, but with a more conservative center of gravity:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Non-Partisans Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s26.711.38.014.739.3
    1980s35.86.76.97.343.5
    1990s32.46.46.710.943.3
    2000s29.13.95.98.452.7

Republicans under 30 have grown increasingly anti-abortion with every decade, as support for no cases has almost doubled from the 1970s to the 2000s.  From the 1970s to the 1990s, this came at the expense of those in the middle, as support for four cases held fairly steady, but in the 2000s, this dropped by over 10 points:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Republicans Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s32.55.511.415.635.0
    1980s28.98.27.39.546.0
    1990s30.05.16.08.950.0
    2000s19.81.95.18.564.7

The overall pattern among all under-30s is two-fold: from the 1970s to 1990s, polarization increased, as support for both extremes increased by about 5.5 percent, followed by a sharp 12-point shift from all four cases to no cases:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    All Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo Case
    1970s30.98.910.213.736.4
    1980s33.27.07.19.942.7
    1990s36.46.06.29.541.8
    2000s28.44.16.37.953.2

Partisan polarization among those under 30 follows a similar pattern to that of Boomers, although it starts of barely higher and is presently barely lower, by only about one percentage point in both cases:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
    Under 30
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s-0.94.3-1.2-3.21.05.3
    1980s6.8-2.1-0.21.5-6.08.3
    1990s14.31.60.20.7-16.616.7
    2000s15.44.42.7-1.7-20.922.6

AbAutonomy--Boomers v. Under 30

Comparing Boomers and voters under 30, we find a fairly steadily increasing difference in their views, but at a modest rate.  The difference centers in the middle through the 1990s, then shifts primarily to no cases in the 2000s:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Differences Between Under 30 and  Boomers
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s0.30.4-0.1-0.60.00.7
    1980s2.8-0.4-1.1-0.6-0.72.8
    1990s5.6-1.7-1.9-2.40.56.1
    2000s8.80.1-2.0-0.8-6.08.9

In contrast to the differences between age groups, the degrees of polarization within age groups has remained quite comparable, never varying by more than 1.5 percent:

    Abortion Autonomy:
    Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children
    Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
    Between under 30 and  Boomers
    Approve Abortions in:
    DecadeAll 4 Cases 3 Cases2 Cases1 CaseNo CaseTot Diffs
    1970s-2.11.1-0.5-1.22.51.0
    1980s1.2-2.51.30.8-0.61.5
    1990s3.01.7-0.9-2.7-0.90.8
    2000s-2.03.60.7-5.32.8-1.2

To sum up, there was a general liberalizing and polarizing trend from the 1970s to the 1990s that was stronger among Boomers, followed by a sharp conservative shift from the 1990s to the 2000s, that was stronger among those under 30.  The overall result was a much greater difference between generations than between levels of polarization within generations.

Homosexuality--Right or Wrong?

Unfortunately, we don't have as much long-term polling on gay issues as we'd like.  A major lack is polling on whether it's anyone else's business.  Other polling indicates that gays benefit from a substantial number of people who think it's purely a private matter.  This helps protect them against discrimination, but it's a barrier to advancing gay marriage--if it's a private matter, then why should the government get involved?  Still, you go to war with the data you've got, as one of America's top war criminals would say.

Homosexuality--Boomers

Democratic Boomers show a distinct pattern, with disapproval of homosexuality growing somewhat from the 1970s to the 1980s, and then shrinking more dramatically over the next two decades.  The AIDs epidemic would seem to be the most obvious explanation for the rising disapproval in the 1980s, with a variety of factors contributing to growing approval, not least the transformation of attitudes within the gay community as it has grown increasingly self-confident and non-defensive; as more and more come out to their friends and family, the stigma appears increasingly absurd to more and more people.  The number saying it is "not wrong at all" has almost doubled since the 1980s:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Democratic Boomers (1946-1964)
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s56.28.310.624.10.8
    1980s66.05.19.519.40.0
    1990s55.85.07.631.70.0
    2000s48.75.16.739.50.0

Non-partisan Boomers followed a similar pattern, in terms of direction of positive attitudes, but the positive shift since the 1980s has been far more modest, barely larger than the negative shift from the 1970s to the 1980s.  At the same time, unlike Democratic Boomers, totally negative attitudes have not fully recovered from their 1980s increase:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Non-Partisan Boomers (1946-1964)
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s56.25.612.424.21.6
    1980s66.24.58.420.90.0
    1990s64.55.09.021.70.0
    2000s61.76.17.125.10.0

The pattern among Republican Boomers is actually mid-way between Democrats and non-partisans, though starting from a much lower level of acceptance.  As a result, Republican acceptance is now within striking distance of non-partisan acceptance, even though the "always wrong" position has only declined modestly since the 1980s:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Republican Boomers (1946-1964)
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s58.49.014.317.31.3
    1980s71.76.47.714.20.0
    1990s70.35.16.518.10.0
    2000s65.04.27.723.30.0

The pattern among all Boomers is a more modest version of that among Democratic Boomers on the full acceptance side, while the full disapproval side has yet to fully recover from the 1980s regression:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    All Boomers (1946-1964)
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s56.77.911.922.31.1
    1980s68.05.48.717.90.0
    1990s62.85.07.424.70.0
    2000s57.15.07.130.90.0

Polarization between the parties among Boomers has increased every decade, but the largest increase was from the 1980s to the 1990s, the increase in polarization from the 1990s to the 2000s was relatively modest:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Differences Between Democratic and Republican
    Boomers (1946-1964)
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    OtherTot Diffs
    1970s-2.2-0.8-3.76.8-0.46.9
    1980s-5.7-1.31.75.20.07.0
    1990s-14.5-0.11.113.60.014.7
    2000s-16.20.9-0.916.20.017.2

Homosexuality--Under 30

The pattern among Democrats under 30 was basically the same as for Boomer Democrats, except that it was more robust.  Those saying homosexuality was "not wrong at all" more than doubled in just one decade, from the 1980s to the 1990s.  The pace of growing acceptance slowed considerably in the 2000s, but it was enough to produce a clear plurality in favor of full approval:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Democrats Under 30
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s56.37.611.523.61.0
    1980s67.45.68.818.10.0
    1990s48.54.97.439.30.0
    2000s41.74.59.344.50.0

The pattern among non-partisans under 30 is strikingly similar to Democrats of the same age, with those saying homosexuality is "not wrong at all" now just barely ahead of Democrats by 0.3 percent:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Non-Partisans Under 30
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s56.16.512.223.41.8
    1980s66.85.78.219.10.0
    1990s54.76.46.932.00.0
    2000s43.74.27.044.80.0

Republicans under 30 show the same pattern of attitude change, although at more conservative levels, when it comes to full approval, but complete disapproval still has not fully recovered to pre-1980s levels, though the gap is quite small:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Republicans Under 30
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s57.39.714.217.31.4
    1980s73.26.17.213.50.0
    1990s65.64.27.422.90.0
    2000s58.54.38.528.70.0

The pattern of all voters under 30 is strikingly similar to that of Democratic Boomers.  The level of full acceptance in this decade is identical--39.5%--rising dramatically from similar levels in the high teens in the 1970s:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    All Under 30
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    Other
    1970s56.67.912.322.01.2
    1980s69.55.88.116.60.0
    1990s56.44.97.231.50.0
    2000s47.74.48.439.50.0

Partisan polarization more than doubled between the 1980s and the 1990s, after remaining the same between the 1970s and 1980s, it then declined ever-so-slightly from the 1990s to the 2000s.  This reflects a relatively uniform immediate reaction to the AIDs epidemic, followed by a sharply stronger reversal among young Democrats in the 1990s:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
    Under 30
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    OtherTot Diffs
    1970s-1.1-2.1-2.76.3-0.56.3
    1980s-5.8-0.51.64.60.06.3
    1990s-17.10.70.016.40.017.1
    2000s-16.80.20.815.70.016.8

Homosexuality--Boomers v. Under 30

Partisan polarization levels between Boomers and those under 30 reached a peak of 2.5% in the 1990s, but otherwise has always been under 1%.  Clearly, cohort effects dominate.

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
    Between Under 30 and  Boomers
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    OtherTot Diffs
    1970s1.1-1.30.9-0.50.0-0.6
    1980s-0.20.8-0.1-0.60.0-0.7
    1990s-2.60.8-1.22.90.02.5
    2000s-0.5-0.71.8-0.50.0-0.4

Boomers and those under 30 have grown increasingly apart, reaching a full 10 point difference this decade.  However, as noted above, those under 30 have views that are virtually identical to Boomer Democrats as a whole:

    Homosexuality: Is It Wrong?
    Differences Between Under 30 and  Boomers
    DecadeAlways
    Wrong
    Almost
    Always
    Wrong
    Sometimes
    Wrong
    Not
    Wrong
    At All
    OtherTot Diffs
    1970s0.20.0-0.40.4-0.10.5
    1980s-1.5-0.30.61.30.01.8
    1990s6.50.10.2-6.70.06.7
    2000s9.40.6-1.3-8.70.010.0

Conlusion

All the above shows a distinct schizophrenia in the culture wars.  While attiudes towards gays have grown increasingly accepting since the 1980s, attitudes towards abortion have grown sharply more negative in the 2000s.  Furthermore, both shifts are more pronounced among those under 30, but even there a majority of young Democrats still doesn't fully accept homosexuality--although a plurality does. Furthermore, the degrees of partisan polarization on these issues does not differ significantly between Boomers and those under 30. From this data, there is no evidence whatsoever that the culture wars are coming to an end anytime soon.  Things are gradually advancing for gays, but we're a long way from catching up with Uruguay, which just approved national recognition of civil unions.  On the other hand, things are becoming more perilous for abortion rights--a trend not seen anywhere else in the world, except for probably Iraq and Afghanistan.

If Obama's "end to the culture wars" narrative has any truth to it, that doesn't come from culture war attitudes as traditionally discussed, but rather from massive Republican failure that has made such issues fade in relative significance.  This is the same dynamic that occured in 1930/1932, as the Great Depression overwhelmed religious and ethnic differences that had previously kept the WASP working class firmly behind the WASP elite.  While such allegiances were not totally destroyed, they were significantly weakened as the GOP failure produced a long-term realignment that changed the political universe.

This is one more reason why his "post-partisan" narrative appears fundamentally misdirected.  If Obama cannot articulate a clearly different approach to politics--with different substance to it--then he fails to accentuate the one force that is working to submerge the culture wars, the replacement of a political order that stresses such conflicts with a new one that stresses common solutions to a whole new set of pressing concerns.


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The right question is emphasis (4.00 / 2)
Paul,

The problem with this analysis is that I believe you are answering the wrong question. You suggest that the is and will continue to be a difference between Democrats and Republicans on two key social issues. However, the problem is, that it contrasts with the position that Chris
articulated yesterday, that identity, and not issues are a primary factor in how people vote.

What your polling data doesn't show you is the intensity of the feelings that certain identity groups feel towards cultural issues. Could it be that people under age 30, while they have certain preferences (and ability to answer a poll question), but are unwilling to actually follow through on their beliefs. Are abortion rights and gay rights less salient for those under 30 than issues like the economy or Iraq?

Additionally, I do not think that Obama is naive enough to believe that cultural issues will completely drop off the map. Instead, Obama's rhetoric suggests that soulutions should be found where there is common ground, and not rhetorically attack the extremes. Agreement on common ground, while "compromising" for those who strongly believe on the issues, may be post-partisan, but can lead to steps forward for the nation. An example, I believe of Obama's approach could be a rapid acceptance of civil unions at this point in time. Most Americans are now accepting of civil unions, and not same-sex marriage. While the stigma of second-class citizenship would persist, Americans would be better off today.


Yes, No, And Maybe (0.00 / 0)
First off, I freely admit that this doesn't directly attack the issue, because the issue is too damn slippery to define, much less analyze, in terms of any set of hard data.  That's why, in part, I alluded to other approaches that I and others have taken in my first paragraph.

Still, it's quite true that various Obama supporters have voiced their view that gays are simply accepted by everyone under 30, and this is a signature for them of the youth/change/future vs. old fogey divide.  At the very least, this data blows that canard out of the water for good.

Secondly, you are questioning the salience of such issues.  And so was I.  That was my whole point: these issues haven't been resolved, they've been overhwelmed, much like 1930/1932.  But the flip side of that is that if you don't do something about the issues that have overwhelmed them, these social issues are still right there, ready to bite you in the ass.  In short, it's a window of opportunity, not a done deal.

Third, regarding identity, I didn't draw out the point here, but I did allude to it:

Still, even this sharp increase has produced a level of polarization that is relatively modest--as is virtually all issue polarization, as I have argued previously.  It is nothing compared to the polarization in terms of which candidates people support.  Yet, this is the basis on which culture war claims are built.

The short take is: partisan identity and ideological identity are only weakly correlated with issue polarization compared to candidate polarization.  Candidates symbolically embody identities as much more fundamentally opposed to one another than actual individuals are.

Additionally, I do not think that Obama is naive enough to believe that cultural issues will completely drop off the map. Instead, Obama's rhetoric suggests that soulutions should be found where there is common ground, and not rhetorically attack the extremes.

This runs into another problem that Obama doesn't confront--the ability of the rightwing esrablishement to repeatedly move the center toward the extreme right.  This is the very essence of their strategy, and it's something that Democrats have been virtually blind to for over 30 years now.

This is what a "culture war" in the Gramscian sense is all about: controlling the entire constellation of social institutions,so that one can move the entire society, the entire framework of political discourse, and the operating assumptions of everyday life as well. I didn't even touch on the Gramscian culture war in this post, but it's the 800 pound gorilla that Obama and his supporters are simply pretending doesn't exist.

In closing, the point of this analysis is to show that there's a persistent reality out there that Obama's narrative seeks to deny or at best downplay.  The more nuanced approach that you suggest is certainly credible, but it contrasts sharply with the dramatic black-and-white choices between ill-defined alternatives that Obama seeks to paint.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Several points (4.00 / 2)
One thing you don't measure is how important these issues are.  Reproductive rights were and are very important to people who have personal memories of the pre-Roe world and how it affected them and their friends.  Except for people who are part of mega-churches and youth movements that stress abortion and homosexuality as great social evils, I just don't think the issues are so important to younger people--after all, abortions are readily available in many areas, though very problematic in rural areas and small towns in most states, and gays aren't being sent to jail except in very rare instances.  These both would change in a heartbeat if, say, Huckabee became President.

Second, when people say they don't approve of abortion in particular instances they don't mean they actually want  doctors, much less the women involved, to be tried and go to prison in these instances.  They want it to be socially less acceptable, maybe some serious obstacles, but the number who want criminal penalties is very small, as the recent South Dakota vote showed.

Third, the "culture war" issue isn't whether attitudes have changed so much as whether the fondness for high intensity politics based on hot-button cultural issues is greater among Boomers than younger people.  Look at the ages of the great culture warriors on both sides.  It is the general ratcheting down of the rhetoric that Obama is pushing.  On way too many issues people's positions, particularly those who are seen on TV, have been stripped down to the bones and then we beat each other over the head with the bones, as someone said.  Think of it as Jim Lehrer vs the Capitol Gang.  Reasoned talk vs a shoutfest.  That's what Obama is talking about, not so much the strength or substance of the positions.

Finally, much of what you have found is the result of the prevailing Zeitgeist when people came of political age, and the increased level of conservative voices in the last 10 years when liberals went into a retreat from which they are finally emerging.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
Hey look here! (0.00 / 0)
"Generation Next" the most tolerant yet!  They don't sound like the young Boomers did in the mid'60s, not even a little, except that they think they are unique and times are better.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.

[ Parent ]
Several More Points (4.00 / 1)
As I've already said, the issue of salience is obviously important and also difficult to assess.  But the bottom line is that the strongest reason to believe that culture war salience has declined is the fact of the Bush meltdown.  And this can only be fully capitalized on if the Democrats regain control of government, and make significant changes that benefit a significant number of people.

We can squabble over a lot of the points in between, but this conclusion is, I believe, inescapable.  As long as such divisive attitude remain at large in the land, they can and will be successfully reactivated if the Democrats leave a vacuum for it, either sooner or later.

Finally, I want to point out that the leading rightwing culture warriors were all from an older generation--Patrick Buchanan, born 1938, Pat Robertson, born 1930, Jerry Falwell, born 1933--these were the guys that really charged things up after the original culture warrior, Richard Nixon, born 1913, was driven from the White House.  The culture war was, above all, the rightwing counter-attack on the Civil Rights Movement and the Women's Movement.

Blaming it all on the Boomers is simply very bad history.  And bad history is the homefield of the right.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Bill Bennett. Newt Gingrich. Tom DeLay (0.00 / 0)
And that crazy David Horowitz.  Boomers all.

Nixon wasn't a culture warrior so much as an opportunist.  He did have racial and religious prejudices, but mostly it was about how to get and keep power.  Falwell and Robertson and Buchanan were a vanguard comparable to other Silent like Martin Luther King, Malcolm X and Robert Kennedy.  But things didn't get ugly until we had the backlash to the campus protests of 1965-1970, as I recall, when the Boomer troops were in the streets and then their opposite numbers went after them for the next 35 years. 

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
Nixon Was The One (0.00 / 0)
Who built an entire political career based on demonizing outsiders.  He was the godfather of McCarthyism (Nixon's staff gave McCarthy the material for his coming-out speech in Wheeling, WV), he won the Presidency in 1968 through a combination of treason (undercutting the Paris Peace Talks) and his racist Southern Strategy, and his "law and order" campaign slogan that painted anti-war protesters, civil rights activists and inner-city rioters as forces of cultural destruction.

If that's not the basic framework of the culture wars, then I'm a monkey's uncle.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Do you really expect resolution??? (0.00 / 0)
Paul,

You are correct in stating that these issues will always be at or below the surface, depending on whatever particular set of issues the media is emphasizing at a particular point in time. However, these cultural issues (and ascriptive traditions) are always reemerging in one form or another across American history - read Rogers Smith's Civic Ideals as an example. I do not doubt that some Obama supporters believe that these issues will disappear from the political sphere, but the point I am making, as you suggest is much more nuanced.

The culture wars are not going to be "won" by arguing the loudest or through an overwhelming majority, but because of the recognition that the continued salience of these issues are harmful to democracy. Obama's approach, I believe, is to minimize the salience of the culture wars, the actual differences between the two parties, so that the issues that really affect the American public will be addressed. Remember, as much effort was waged over whether or not to condemn MoveOn, than the actual substance of whether or not to fund the troops.


[ Parent ]
The Gramscian Culture War (4.00 / 1)
Of course I don't expect these issues to disappear.  That's precisely the point.  Or one of them, anyway.  It's an illusory goal to try to make such things disappear--though they can fade significantly, which is what happened when FDR and a Democratic Congress pulled America out of the Great Depression, which is why I keep harping back to 1930/1932, the last really substantial one-two punch of wave elections that established the New Deal Party System.

As for the vote to condemn MoveOn, that was purely a consequence of the fact that the right has been fighting a Gramscian culture war (aka "war of position") for the part 40 years, and the left has not.  It's generally the case that when only one side is fighting a war, the other side loses consistently.

Now, if Obama wants to bring a plastic yogurt spoon to a nuclear war, something tells me that that's not quite going to cut it.  Know what I mean?  I dom't care how clever he is with his plastic yogurt spoon, the odds are just not with him.

And not in a million-to-one kind of way.  But in a 1-to-zero kind of way.

Now, I'm not saying that that's his plan.  But I am saying that it's not clear that that's not his plan.

And I find it quite troubling that would-be/could-be allies really have no clear idea what he's up to.

That sort of information asymmetry may be fine for the authoritarian right.  But for the egaitarian left, not so much.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Minimize the salience? (0.00 / 0)
"...so that the issues that really affect the American public will be addressed."

That is pretty silly.  If only it weren't for the same-sex marriage, we'd all be having an intelligent discussion about economic issues?  How about instead we just start having the intelligent discussion?  Other issues will recede WHEN we start talking about the big ones.  How I wish Obama were bringing some of them up on the campaign trail!

You're essentially blaming the women's movement and the gay movement for "distracting" America from "the important issues".  And that's just wrong.  If it weren't for social issues, there'd be almost no difference between the parties at all.  The answer is to sharpen the differences on economic issues.  Unfortunately it's going to require a revolution within the party for that to happen.  But it needs to.


[ Parent ]
Wow (0.00 / 0)
Well done! Great look at this and well done analysis.

Interesting analysis. (0.00 / 0)
I think that you hit the nail on the head where it comes to the history of the "Culture War." This makes a lot of sense to me but it doesn't seem to answer the question you attempt to address about whether Obama can end the culture war. I doubt that the culture war will END anytime soon, but it can be sidelined.

While I don't know if Obama's candidacy would be able to sideline this conflict (culture police action?) any of the campaigns can work to accomplish this. Many of those who are opposed to gay marriage and abortion would rank other issues significantly higher in deciding their votes. I would suggest that Democrats who attempt to minimize the conflict on cultural issues tend to perform best.


No, I can't agree... (0.00 / 0)
...with the suggestion that the best way to deal with these issues is to hide.  Dems need to do a better job articulating WHY we hold the positions we do.  I consider Paul's data pretty disturbing to the extent that they show an increase in youthful conservative extremism.  We need to stand up for what we believe in.

The only way to "move on" to other issues is to move on to them.  How about economic issues, for instance?  Health insurance?  Foreign policy?  The war?  Dems should be drawing stark differences on the so-called "real" issues.  Instead, we have this absurd Obama campaign theme of magically rising above it all.


[ Parent ]
Methodology (0.00 / 0)
I have a problem with the methodology.
The boomers are a fixed group that is being tracked over the decades. So looking at their attitudes in general may show how their opinions have changed over time.

Political affiliation is not fixed. A Dem boomer in the 1980's may become an independent in the 1990's. So breaking attitudes down by party may just be measuring the same change in attitude.

The situation with the under 30's is also not comparable. This is a sliding window. People age out of the group so what is being measured is the attitudes of a different group in each decade. I think this makes comparisons difficult.

It would be interesting to see how each group tracks with time. The under 30's of the 1990's are now the 30-40 group.

I've always thought that people don't really change their viewpoints once they reach a certain age. Social viewpoints change as the older generation dies off and is replaced by a newer one. I can't tell from the data whether my conjecture is right or not.

Another thing that might be worth knowing is population size. Right now it seems that many people are dropping their affiliation with the GOP, so those who remain will tend to be the most ideological. A strongly partisan attitude held by a small residue means something different from one held by a larger group.

Policies not Politics


The Perfect, The Good And The Good Enough (0.00 / 0)
Robert,

My short answer is that it's not not a perfect methodology, to be sure.  But it's good enough.

First the low-hanging fruit: There was no real point in tracking past under-30 cohorts for the purpose of this analysis.

Second:

Political affiliation is not fixed. A Dem boomer in the 1980's may become an independent in the 1990's. So breaking attitudes down by party may just be measuring the same change in attitude.

On an individual level this is not really relevant, since what matters is group behavior.  If one Democrat becomes an independent, and one independent becomes a Democrat, it's basically a wash.  But there clearly has been significant group change, and that change is overwhelmingly centered in the white South, as I've shown in some earlier analyses.  Therefore, a breakdown of this analysis in terms of the white South vs. the rest of the country would certainly be of interest.

I've always thought that people don't really change their viewpoints once they reach a certain age. Social viewpoints change as the older generation dies off and is replaced by a newer one. I can't tell from the data whether my conjecture is right or not.

I think it's quite clear that attitudes towards gays have continued to change over time among Boomers, as have attitudes on abortion.  It's all a matter of how much you consider to be siginficant.  Clearly, there is a much greater opportunity for change with a whole new cohort, but it is simply false that people don't change after a certain age.  They change less and less rapidly than when they are younger and in the process of forming their basic outlooks on life, but that doesn't mean they cease to change, particularly when the world changes around them.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
What affects political views most (0.00 / 0)
across age coherts is which party has the Presidency and what the rpevailing Zeitgeist is when people come of political age.  Look at this nifty line graph from the NY Times:

Until last year, the most Democratic age cohort was those who came of age while Truman was President.  When Ike was in office, more GOPers.  Ditto Reagan, even more so.  The two big exceptions are Nixon and GW Bush, who were such disgraces that under them more young people become staunch Democrats.

 

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
But What Matters (0.00 / 0)
is not simply how people are registered, but how active they are, how committed they are, how much they advance and support new policies, etc., etc., etc.  And here, other factors come heavily into play.

If we get a large Dem-leaning cohort that's discouraged about Dem performance in the first time they see Dems hold power, it could be a long, long time before they ever see it again--and they might be pretty apathetic about it, too.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Let's hear it for hope! (0.00 / 0)
I think I am not only a couple of years older, I'm temperamentally an optimist, even as I try to be realistic. 

I actually enjoy your posts very much--there's always something to react to.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
I'm Only Pessimistic If They Drop The Ball (0.00 / 0)
Pessimism of the intellect.
Optimism of the will.
    --Antonio Gramsci


"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3

[ Parent ]
Let's run with this (4.00 / 1)
There is one point where I am uncomfortable with your analysis, where you say Obama "fails to accentuate the one force that is working to submerge the culture wars."  First of all, I doubt that they can be "submerged" any more than you can submerge gangrene.

Secondly, I see an opportunity here.  It has been noted ad nauseum that men are more likely to vote for Republicans than women.  Certainly the locker-room cock-measuring contest known as the Republican debates shows why.  But suppose, just suppose, that male culture could be changed.  Wouldn't men then be more open to progressive candidates and programs than they now are?

I don't suggest a simplistic direct assault on the NFL and beer commercials as our main tactical thrust ("Down with Cheerleaders!").  And while you point out that the "Great Depression overwhelmed religious and ethnic differences," I would argue that it also transformed them, opening the door for the New Deal.

How to turn this into effective tactics?  I'm not sure.  But the question is not WHETHER we engage on the cultural front, but HOW.

Full Court Press!  http://www.openleft.com/showDi...


It's History! (4.00 / 1)
There is one point where I am uncomfortable with your analysis, where you say Obama "fails to accentuate the one force that is working to submerge the culture wars."  First of all, I doubt that they can be "submerged" any more than you can submerge gangrene.

But this is exactly what FDR and the Democrats did with the identity politics of the previous era.  They forged a cross-ethnic, cross-racial working class coalition, and it took the GOP more than 30 years to crack it.  One particularly telling piece of evidence from this era is all those WWII movies with their inter-ethnic squads.

suppose, just suppose, that male culture could be changed.  Wouldn't men then be more open to progressive candidates and programs than they now are?

Male culture is changing, has already changed, dramatically.  But not enough in the ways that matter for us.  This is where Lakoff's work comes in, big time, I would argue, because (1) there is a significant fluidity that is not being taken advantage of and (2) nurturance plays a huge, though largely unacknowledged role in masculinity, and the more a political discourse is built upon drawing that out, the greater potential there is for a long-term progressive realignment.  Men express nurturance in very different ways then women do, the key is to tap into those modes of expression, not to try to use typicallly female modes, even though the two modes are becoming less distinct.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
I'm not suggesting we avoid programmatics (0.00 / 0)
I'm just suggesting we not avoid cultural issues.  See further The Mass Psychology of Fascism.

Yes, let's consider Hollywood.  Look at all those Hollywood movies of the 20's with everyone running around solving murders in tuxedos.  In the 30's, the Hollywood image of the little guy (usually guy) emerged full force.  Busby Berkeley's bit on the forgotten men (still gets tears from me), Wizard of Oz.  It marked a heavy cultural shift.  Hollywood has never been simply a reflection.  It's a player.

As for those multi-ethnic WWII movies, hey.  The multi-ethnic ethic was hammered into us by them.  Quite consciously.  A one (New Deal) two (culture) punch to the right wing jaw.

Full Court Press!  http://www.openleft.com/showDi...


[ Parent ]
What is the effect of having Black Presidents (4.00 / 1)
in 24 and Denzel Washington in some movie?

Today's Holluwood output seems to be less uniform and more edgy, but it is still pretty multiracial and ethnic.  What we are lacking is working class heroes like Ralph Kramden and the Life of Reilly.  That's what happens when you replace the leftists with morality-lite upper income greedheads.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
Not Totally Lacking (0.00 / 0)
There's a great difference, of course, but not a total absence of working class heroes.  The Simpsons are the first thing that comes to mind.  Next is the whole cop genre, which has gotten more upscale with the shifting focus to FBI shows and counter-terrorism and such, but hasn't totally disappeared. K-Ville, for example, is a classic working-class cop show.  And Veronica Mars had a very bitting, if conflcted class divide right at the heart of the show.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3

[ Parent ]
I absolutely agree with you (0.00 / 0)
On Veronica Mars. 

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.

[ Parent ]
Boy, Do I Miss That Show! (0.00 / 0)
What I really miss is Buffy, The Vampire Slayer.  But Veronica Mars was not a bad follow-up at all.  Joss Whedon was such a fan, in fact, that he even did a cameo in it.  One of the most interesting things about Buffy was that it navigated the high school-to-young-adulthood transition, and Veronica Mars got cancelled right in the midst of doing the same. 

I'm definitely looking forward to Dollhouse, which not only reunites Whedon with Tim Minear and Eliza Dushku, it has the added bonus of a definite Philip K. Dick-flavored setup.

And, meanwhile, Summer Glau, who played Firefly's supergirl is doing a more mundane supergirl role as protective android from the future in The Sarah Connor Chronicles.  She just might be reason enough to keep watching.  Defintely a step up from the Gropenator, that's for sure.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
It normalizes having President Obama (0.00 / 0)
... if he makes it.

Full Court Press!  http://www.openleft.com/showDi...

[ Parent ]
Frankly, Paul (0.00 / 0)
It seems that far from bringing us together at some mystic point beyond the culture wars, we are being driven apart along identity lines in addition to the culture wars.  Maybe some of the fault lines were always there but had been papered over.  But the Obama/Clinton wars some to have overwhelmed the traditional populist/liberal stances of John Edwards. We aren't talking so much now about residual forces and universal health care but age and race.  All of a sudden it seems like Democrats are more split than at any time since the Vietnam era of 1968-72.  For what?

Meanwhile, we may be letting an historic opportunity slip through our fingers.  Lest anybody noticed, six GOp house seats in Texas went unchallenged on January 2.  Last cycle, the number was one.  (We did pick up a challenged seat by filing for all four in seats in Mississippi)  Republican House members are dropping like flies with 21 retirements so far vs. 20 GOp (and 10 Dem) for the entire 2006 cycle.  We've got one of the most unpopular presidents of all time.  We are slipping into a recession.  And now, our party is being split into warring factions just when we could really profit. 


this is why we have primaries (0.00 / 0)
We've never had our leading candidates be a woman and Black man.  We're on new territory.  Such is progress.  Would the correct response be to push Edwards into the lead and have Hillary and Obama drop out?

What we are seeing is that long-standing suppressions are breaking down.

Full Court Press!  http://www.openleft.com/showDi...


[ Parent ]
I Think That Versailles Is Hyping This Far More Than People Are Buying It (0.00 / 0)
I mean, you've got Jesse Jackson's wife campaigning for Clinton, for gosh sakes.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3

[ Parent ]
Maybe its because (0.00 / 0)
Hillary really IS polarizing, even within her own party.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.

[ Parent ]
A strong governing majority even with some culture warring (4.00 / 1)
Paul,

I have to admit I didn't review your data carefully enough to fully digest it, but I thought I'd throw in a few comments with that caveat.

I don't think Obama is really saying that the "culture wars" are over--meaning that polarization of views on things like abortion have necessarily been reduced in terms of intensity, especially among hard-core Republicans.  I think he's saying that the details of this aren't what's most important.

To me, his argument is more that the Dems (and the country as a whole) will benefit from a shifting of focus from the culture wars to other more important issues, and that this shift can best be achieved through appeals to reason, emotional inspiration (the "hope" and "we can do it" messages), invitations to "come together as Americans", etc. 

This appeal obviously won't work for some Republicans (both leadership and voters).  But I think his point is that it can work for enough Americans to develop a strong governing coalition based on shared progressive views by a healthy majority of Americans (a sharing that some of your prior posts have shown is the case).

The issue then is not so much the exact breakouts on these polarizing attitudes, but the fact that those who base their votes on these issues are (and perhaps have always been) a relatively small percentage of the population. And further, that if younger people and other previously-alienated non-voters can be attracted to vote (and even become activists to some greater degree), then that percentage can become even smaller (isn't it the case that anti-abortion voters tend to vote more consistently and at higher levels, which means that an expansion of the voting population is likely to dilute their share of total voters?)

I thought this comment from Obama in an 11/06 Harper's article by Ken Silverstein speaks to his strategy, which makes increasing sense to me.

Obama said that the "blogger community," which by now is shorthand for liberal Democrats, gets frustrated with him because they think he's too willing to compromise with Republicans. "My argument," he says, "is that a polarized electorate plays to the advantage of those who want to dismantle government. Karl Rove can afford to win with 51 percent of the vote. They're not trying to reform health care. They are content with an electorate that is cynical about government. Progressives have a harder job. They need a big enough majority to initiate bold proposals."

To me, the apparent focus of each of the three Dem candidates has validity.  Clinton says you have to make the system work (which, to some degree, is obvious and necessary), while Edwards core message is that you have to confront corporate power to change the system and implement policies that help those in need and the majority of Americans, not just those with money and political power. 

To me, Obama acknowledges both of these perspectives, while adding to them a strategy of achieving and solidifying an expanded governing majority that largely agrees with Edwards (and can begin to focus their minds and hearts on these really important issues), even though some of its members may not share Edwards' passion about it (perhaps because their circumstances are not so dire, they're busy with their lives, they don't understand specific issues clearly enough, etc.) 

But, regardless of their passion levels, if more citizens feel less alienated from the political process because it's less focused on highly polarized issues that aren't important, while ignoring important issues that are difficult but not impossible (and essential) to address, then more of them would be likely to vote based on the progressive views they hold.

Of course the Republican noise machine would fight this shift with all the weapons at their disposal.  But they'll do that regardless of our strategy, so the question then becomes how best to defeat them. 

I think Obama's proposals to open up government processes to the public are key weapons in that fight. 

I believe most citizens want to understand enough about what's going on to make reasonably well-informed and thoughtful decisions.  But the combination of government secrecy and right-wing "noise" makes that extremely difficult. 

Opening up government, including leveraging technology as Obama proposes, fights both problems.  If I can borrow the concept of "signal-to-noise ratio" from communications engineering...it increases the signal strength of the "government-to-citizen" and "citizen-to-government" two-way communication channel, while reducing the "noise level" that interferes with proper reception and understanding of the content, meaning and intent of those signals.  The right-wing Republican administration that has controlled most levers of power for years operates on just the opposite operating principle...weaken the signal through secrecy and deceit, while boosting the noise, which confuses many citizens, while agitating and activating those who blindly focus on what I'd call "religious" issues.

When I hear Obama talking about our national political dialog needing "more light" not "more heat," that's how I interpet what he's saying.


I'm Not Sure What Obama's Saying, Either, Mitch! (0.00 / 0)
So that makes two of us!

But I am taking different sorts of looks at different possibilities of what he might mean, and, somewhat more concretely, the entailments of different versions of the narratives and mythos he deploys.  Thus, I'm not claiming that Obama himself has said that young people are all totally accepting of gays.  But I have heard his supporters make this claim as part of the Obama package.

My larger perspective is that all these issues aren't what's important anyway.  They are just the raw material that's used to divide us.  The real culture war is the Gramscian one, the war of position over culturally dominating instutions.  And that's a war that liberals, proegressives, Democrats, Obamaphiles, what-have-you all have yet to figure out.  Most of them don't have more than the vaguest notion of what it's all about.

As I see things, Obama thnks he's got a clever strategy, but it's got a strong element of individual entrepreneurship, which is fundamentally part of a political field phenomena that strongly favors conservatives and Republicans. (See Democracy Heading South: National Politics in the Shadow of Dixie.)  Add that to the fact that he doesn't seem to grasp the nature of the Gramscian culture war, and I have very serious doubts about his chances of success. 

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Gramscian War (4.00 / 1)
I am SO with you re the bigger picture, and one of my frequent ponders has to do with how much lower America has to go before the herd (or even the shepherds) begin to see it. 

I left America when Bush was appointed president, so my knowledge of what's going on there is limited to what I can grab from all the obvious sources and occasional visits.

I read polls and sometimes I'll think for a minute that maybe people are starting to get it.  Then I read the news.  Yes, a significant number of people are beginning to say the right things more often in responses to polls.  But, from Spain, at least, it seems pretty clear that they have absolutely NO idea what that stuff they're saying would actually look like in the real world, nor do they have even the beginning of an idea what all would be involved in putting that stuff in action.

So I have no idea how much lower America has to go before it even begins to become aware of the bigger picture.  I sometimes find myself hoping that Obama sees the big picture, understands that it is too horrifying for George and Martha America, and so is keeping quiet about it -- referring to it only obliquely -- and has the charisma and magic to somehow lead us through the changes without the sheep ever having to see more than a manageable part of the big picture at a time.  But I'm afraid that's wishful thinking involving supernatural powers and events (and probably somebody other that BO). 

To be perfectly honest, part of me was delighted when Bush won.  I thought it MIGHT bring the US to a point where the Gramscian war became apparent to the average Joe.  Alas.  Denial is One Powerful mechanism.

- S

"Ignorance is the most dangerous element in any society." - Emma Goldman


[ Parent ]
What I suspect/hope he's saying/thinking (0.00 / 0)
I don't see "individual entrepreneurship" as an element that necessarily favors conservatives and Republicans, if its balanced by "communitarian" and "dignitarian" elements.  I don't think these are fundamentally incompatible, but they do need to be seriously rebalanced in our society and the world as a whole.

With regard to Obama's grasp of the Gramscian war of position, I'd repeat sections of an earlier comment of mine in response to an earlier post of yours on this subject....

Paul's comments above spurred some speculation on what might (or maybe should) be Obama's strategy...

First of all, its important to remember that the President has a much bigger bully pulpit than any other political figure in the country, including state and U.S. Senators and presidential candidates.

Secondly, I think the expansion of the Internet (including its video capabilities) is relevant to Paul's excerpts about Gramsci's theories of hegemony and culture war/war of position.  Its reasonable to assume that Internet-delivered video that bypasses the broadcast/cable gatekeepers will continue to expand in reach, capabilities and quality/bandwidth.  This, in turn, provides a vehicle for presenting an increasingly powerful alternative to the hegemic mass media and popular culture.

If a POTUS is both a skilled communicator and a true progressive, this expanding "Internet-bypass" communication channel presents the possibility of creating direct links with grassroots progressives as well as citizens who have become immersed in what Paul's excerpts calls "false consciousness."  These links would not be limited to the one-to-many "broadcast" mode our culture has known for decades, but would also include a rich mix of horizontal and two-way multimedia interactions reflecting the evolution of today's netroots, with the support of a truly progressive POTUS and other progressive political leaders.

This scenario might be described by this paraphrasing of a section of Paul's Gramsci-focused excerpt:


The war of position is a culture war in which progressive elements gain a dominant voice in mass media, mass organizations, and educational institutions to heighten progressive consciousness and inspire progressive organization. Following the success of the war of position, progressive leaders--including a progressive POTUS--would be empowered to begin the war of manoeuvre, the actual insurrection against capitalism, with mass support.

Like Chris, I have some strongly ambivalent responses to different aspects of Obama and his candidacy.  And, like Matt and Chris, I'm quite impressed with some of his media/tech-related proposals, especially those associated with using technology to make government more transparent, open and responsive to public input.  My "hopeful" Obama scenario is that something like what I describe above is his real strategy. 


[ Parent ]
Relevance? (0.00 / 0)
Paul,

I'm not a data wonk, so maybe I'm missing something here. It's interesting stuff for an old hippie with a 1946 date of origin to pour over.  Generally, it confirmed what I already knew intuitively. So what else am I supposed to get from it?  (Or should I just revisit my first statement, stop at the comma, and move on to something else?)

I've never interpreted Obama's "end to the culture wars" as meaning anything other than an end (at least for now) to the significant roll they've they've played in our political life for the past 40 years - what you proposed in the second paragraph of your conclusion.

Ultimately, in this particular game, the only data that REALLY matter are the ones at the end of the day on election day, and I don't see this little study as contributing much of anything  to the ultimate goal.

Those ultimate data are much more influenced by which "special interests" do the best job of getting the voters out to the polls than by the opinions of any subset of the general population on any given day. 

If I'm missing some huge, obvious thing here, please tell me.  Otherwise, maybe I'll just give up on trying to "get" data posts.  ;-)

- Stuart

"Ignorance is the most dangerous element in any society." - Emma Goldman


I Just Get Teed Off At People When They're Just Gassing (0.00 / 0)
about stuff that we can actually know for sure.  And the evolution of the culture wars can be measured in various different ways that nail some things down as true or false.  This doesn't answer all questions, but it cuts down on the wiggle room a lot.  And the more we can do that, the more we can improve the signal-to-noise ratio in our ongoing discussions.

The fact that you've interpreted Obama one way says nothing about hoe others have interpreted him.  What I've done here is pretty conclusively shut down certian lines of argumentation.  It's incremental progress, but progress, nonetheless.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Indeed (0.00 / 0)
Well, good luck lowering the signal to noise ratio!  ;-) 

I have no illusions about the nearly infinite number of possible interpretations of Obama. That's one of many problems I have with the guy. I am not a fan.

In no way did I intend to diss your work.  I wanted to know if I was missing something, and I guess I'm not.  I'm just not a guy who gets all wet over data.  I think it's that simple.  I appreciate your response.

- Stuart

"Ignorance is the most dangerous element in any society." - Emma Goldman


[ Parent ]
Declare Victory and go home? (4.00 / 1)
I don't question your facts or analysis, but I think things are perhaps more post-modern than we think. Personally, I'm pretty much down with Edwards and his rhetoric that calls attention to the economic divide, but Obama may be better able to cause changes in voting behavior, especially with Independents and some Republicans.

I wouldn't say that Obama necessarily BELIEVES the culture wars are over, rather that he is ASSERTING that they are over. Maybe that is all it takes. Paradigm shifts have their own inevitability and internal logic, they defy logic and our own best efforts to convince people of the new reality. At some point, the succeeding generation just ignores the conflicts of the past, because they have become irrelevant. The old codgers (on both sides) keep fighting the old conflict, but everybody else is already into the new world-order.

So, I see Obama's assertions of post-partisanship to be an attempt at wishing into existence a post-paradigm-shift. I'm not so woo-woo to believe that it is so simple. But I do believe that there are already people for whom this is the new reality. Obama is merely talking to the people who feel that or wish that the conflicts are "post" rather than "present". His focus groups and polling probably show that this is a possible political path.

There is a more practical explanation for this.

From your own posts here, you have shown repeatedly that a large portion of the population, including Republicans and Conservatives actually have Progressive & Liberal positions on any number of issues. To keep them pulling the Republican lever require stoking the fires of anger and hatred. Maybe, the simple act of declaring the culture wars or partisan conflict over, creates an opening or a path for these prodigal liberals to vote Democrat.

It may be true that the great and wonderful noise machine controls many levers of opinion (in the gramscian sense), but (as you have pointed out) there is a significant disconnect between people's value sets on the issues and what they do in the voting booth. I have to believe that a disconnect so large could be subject to catastrophic failures.

Obama's post-partisan schtick may be sufficient to undercut the right-wing noise machine, lowering psychological barriers, and allowing changes in voting patterns.

Contrast that with Clinton. On the issues they aren't so far apart, but Clinton's positioning and her situation as favorite whipping boy (excuse me), maintains the divide, and the voting patterns of the old paradigm.


I Agree This Is Possible (0.00 / 0)
But I also think it's impossible to tell.  Millions of people believe in Obama, but it's not entirely clear what specifically they believe in when they believe in him.

He's a lot like JFK in that regard.  Only the degree of uncertainty is two or three orders of magnitude higher.

There is a possible positive gloss I can imagine for all this, but I want to work on saying it right, so I'm not misunderstood.  However, it is only a theory.  And I really don't believe one can morally lead a democracy on the basis of blind faith.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
We wanted political change and all we got was a lousy politician (4.00 / 1)
From our end of the political spectrum we keep demanding good policy, and proof that our candidates will represent us. Or at least, may they stop dumping on us with Republican memes.

In fact, they're all politicians. They are saying what they believe the public wants. Or, more specifically, they are trying out lines of rhetoric that will cause segments of the public to vote for them. We on the left haven't shown that we are a sufficient voting bloc, and there is some evidence that we'll fall in line at the end, so they usually don't even throw us any bones.

I've no illusion that Obama would be better than Bill Clinton. But, maybe no worse, and maybe we get some significant public momentum away from the right-wing lock-step.

The only actual positive policy vibes I get from Obama is that his foreign policy advisers seem more reasonable.


[ Parent ]
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