| AbThreat--Abortion In The Face Of Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect
For this analysis, I am using a combined measure I created to address the issue of abortion under duress in three forms--a pregnancy resulting from rape, a pregnancy that threatens the mother's health, and a pregancy reulting in a birth defect. The most significant changes have taken place in the Republican Party, as can be seen in the following tables.
AbThreat--Boomers
First we look at Boomers. Not much change among Democrats, and only a modest change among non-partisans in the present decade:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Democratic Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 80.1 | 11.7 | 4.8 | 3.4 | | 1980s | 79.2 | 11.6 | 4.4 | 4.7 | | 1990s | 82.7 | 8.3 | 4.1 | 4.8 | | 2000s | 79.5 | 10.5 | 4.7 | 5.4 |
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Non-Partisan Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 76.1 | 12.4 | 5.7 | 5.8 | | 1980s | 77.0 | 9.9 | 6.0 | 7.2 | | 1990s | 77.6 | 8.8 | 5.6 | 8.1 | | 2000s | 71.8 | 10.7 | 6.6 | 10.9 |
But a significant shift can be seen among Republicans:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Republican Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 81.5 | 10.4 | 5.3 | 2.8 | | 1980s | 75.6 | 11.6 | 6.7 | 6.0 | | 1990s | 72.9 | 9.6 | 7.4 | 10.0 | | 2000s | 62.4 | 12.2 | 11.6 | 13.8 |
The result is a modest, gradual shift among all voters:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | All Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 79.7 | 11.5 | 5.1 | 3.7 | | 1980s | 77.7 | 11.4 | 5.4 | 5.5 | | 1990s | 78.2 | 8.9 | 5.6 | 7.4 | | 2000s | 71.9 | 11.1 | 7.5 | 9.4 |
And a significant increase in partisan polarization, growing faster every decade:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | Differences Between Democratic and Republican Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -1.3 | 1.2 | -0.5 | 0.6 | 1.8 | | 1980s | 3.6 | 0.0 | -2.3 | -1.3 | 3.7 | | 1990s | 9.9 | -1.4 | -3.4 | -5.2 | 9.9 | | 2000s | 17.1 | -1.6 | -6.9 | -8.4 | 17.0 |
Still, even this sharp increase has produced a level of polarization that is relatively modest--as is virtually all issue polarization, as I have argued previously. It is nothing compared to the polarization in terms of which candidates people support. Yet, this is the basis on which culture war claims are built.
AbThreat--Under 30
Now let's look at the Abthreat trend among voters under 30. Democrats under 30 in this decade are more like non-partisan Boomers (71.8% of whom support abortion in all three cases) than they are like Democratic Boomers (79.5% of whom support abortion in all three cases).
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Democrats Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 79.1 | 11.9 | 5.0 | 3.9 | | 1980s | 77.6 | 13.0 | 4.8 | 4.6 | | 1990s | 80.5 | 12.9 | 2.7 | 4.0 | | 2000s | 72.3 | 12.8 | 8.7 | 6.0 |
Non-partisans under 30 are mid-way between non-partisan Boomers (71.8% of whom support abortion in all three cases) and Republican Boomers (62.4% of whom support abortion in all three cases).
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Non-Partisans Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 76.4 | 12.1 | 6.0 | 5.5 | | 1980s | 76.8 | 10.1 | 6.0 | 7.0 | | 1990s | 82.4 | 9.6 | 3.3 | 4.7 | | 2000s | 67.5 | 11.6 | 13.0 | 7.6 |
And Republicans under 30 make their Boomer counterparts look like flaming liberals. While just 5 points separate Democratic and non-partisan support for abortion in three cases, a whopping 14 points separates non-partisans and Republicans:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Republicans Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 81.6 | 11.0 | 5.2 | 2.3 | | 1980s | 74.8 | 12.9 | 7.0 | 5.4 | | 1990s | 72.2 | 15.2 | 5.2 | 7.4 | | 2000s | 53.1 | 18.4 | 13.4 | 15.1 |
The result is an under-30 level of support for abortion in all three cases that is quite close to the Republican Boomer level of 62.4%:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | All Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 79.2 | 11.8 | 5.2 | 3.8 | | 1980s | 76.5 | 12.5 | 5.8 | 5.3 | | 1990s | 77.6 | 13.2 | 3.8 | 5.4 | | 2000s | 64.7 | 14.3 | 11.5 | 9.5 |
Yet, because Democrats and non-partisans have moved right as well, the Republican/Democratic differences are not much higher than Boomer differences in this decade. What is different is that the under-30 differences have shot up so fast from such previously low levels as late as the 1980s:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | Differences Between Democrats and Republicans Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -2.5 | 0.9 | -0.2 | 1.6 | 2.57 | | 1980s | 2.9 | 0.1 | -2.2 | -0.7 | 2.97 | | 1990s | 8.3 | -2.2 | -2.5 | -3.5 | 8.21 | | 2000s | 19.2 | -5.5 | -4.7 | -9.1 | 19.26 |
AbThreat--Boomers v. Under 30
Comparing the Boomers and voters under 30, we find that the partisan differences have grown slightly more pronounced among those under 30:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | Differences Between Democrats and Republicans Between under 30 and Boomers | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -1.1 | -0.3 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.7 | | 1980s | -0.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | -0.7 | | 1990s | -1.6 | -0.9 | 0.9 | 1.7 | -1.7 | | 2000s | 2.0 | -3.9 | 2.2 | -0.8 | 2.3 |
And the difference between Boomers and those under 30 as a whole has grown even larger:
Abortion In Response To Threat: Rape, Health of Mother, Birth Defect | | Differences Between Under 30 and Boomers | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | 0.5 | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.5 | | 1980s | 1.2 | -1.1 | -0.3 | 0.3 | 1.5 | | 1990s | 0.6 | -4.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 4.3 | | 2000s | 7.2 | -3.2 | -4.1 | -0.1 | 7.3 |
AbAutonomy--Abortion As A Right To Chose In Response To Circumstances
Four other GSS questions test support for the right to abortion in less threatening circumstances. These relate much more to the basic right of women to function as autonomous agents in control of the basic decisions about the course of their lives: abortion if a woman isn't married, if she doesn't want any more children, if she doesn't have the resources to raise another child, or for any reason. These questions have always been much more evenly split than the AbThreat questions, and the recent shift in a more conservative direction has affected them even more.
AbAutonomy--Boomers
Democratic Boomers grew significantly more liberal from the 1980s to the 1990s, with a 10-point jump in support for abortion in all 4 cases, and became only slightly more conservative from the 1990s to the 2000s:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Democratic Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 32.0 | 10.3 | 10.1 | 12.0 | 35.7 | | 1980s | 37.7 | 6.8 | 5.6 | 10.0 | 39.8 | | 1990s | 47.7 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 9.0 | 34.3 | | 2000s | 45.7 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 8.3 | 35.7 |
Non-Partisans became significantly more polarized from the 1970s to the 1980s, with the liberal pole making the greater gain--a 10-point jump in support for abortion in all 4 cases, compared to a 4-point gain in support for no cases. There was another 4-point shift from some cases to no cases from the 1980s to the 1990s, and then a 5-point shift from all cases to no cases between the 1990s and the 2000s:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Non-Partisan Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 29.2 | 10.1 | 8.9 | 14.3 | 38.1 | | 1980s | 39.1 | 6.5 | 4.7 | 7.5 | 42.2 | | 1990s | 39.8 | 4.1 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 46.1 | | 2000s | 34.2 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 8.5 | 51.2 |
Republicans opposition in all four cases has grown in every single decade. This has come primarily from a reduction in those supporting abortion in some cases, as support for abortion in all cases also grew, more modestly, from the 1970s to the 1990s, before all those gains and more were wiped out in the 2000s:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Republican Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 30.9 | 7.1 | 10.8 | 14.1 | 37.2 | | 1980s | 32.1 | 6.4 | 7.1 | 9.3 | 45.2 | | 1990s | 36.4 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 5.7 | 50.0 | | 2000s | 28.4 | 4.0 | 3.4 | 4.7 | 59.5 |
Boomers as a whole grew more polarized, with greater gains in the liberal direction (an 11-point gain for abortion in all cases), from the 1970s to the 1990s, followed by a 5-point shift in the conservative direction (5 points less for all cases, 5 points more for none) from the 1990s to the 2000s:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | All Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 31.2 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 13.0 | 36.4 | | 1980s | 36.0 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 9.4 | 42.0 | | 1990s | 42.1 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 7.1 | 42.2 | | 2000s | 37.2 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 7.1 | 47.2 |
Polarization has grown dramatically over the years. In the 1970s, when abortion rights were part of the GOP platform, there was a mere 4.3 difference between Boomers in each party. By this decade the difference was almost one in four:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | Differences Between Democratic and Republican Boomers (1946-1964) | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | 1.2 | 3.2 | -0.7 | -2.1 | -1.4 | 4.3 | | 1980s | 5.6 | 0.5 | -1.5 | 0.7 | -5.4 | 6.8 | | 1990s | 11.3 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 3.4 | -15.7 | 15.8 | | 2000s | 17.3 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 3.6 | -23.8 | 23.7 |
AbAutonomy--Under 30
Democrats under 30 generally grew more liberal and slightly more polarized from the 1970s to the 1990s, then turned somewhat more conservative and more polarized in the 2000s: Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Democrats Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 31.6 | 9.8 | 10.2 | 12.4 | 36.0 | | 1980s | 35.7 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.1 | 40.1 | | 1990s | 44.3 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 9.6 | 33.4 | | 2000s | 35.2 | 6.3 | 7.8 | 6.7 | 43.8 |
Non-Partisans under 30 followed a generally similar pattern to Democrats in their age cohorts, but with a more conservative center of gravity:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Non-Partisans Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 26.7 | 11.3 | 8.0 | 14.7 | 39.3 | | 1980s | 35.8 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 43.5 | | 1990s | 32.4 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 10.9 | 43.3 | | 2000s | 29.1 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 8.4 | 52.7 |
Republicans under 30 have grown increasingly anti-abortion with every decade, as support for no cases has almost doubled from the 1970s to the 2000s. From the 1970s to the 1990s, this came at the expense of those in the middle, as support for four cases held fairly steady, but in the 2000s, this dropped by over 10 points:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Republicans Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 32.5 | 5.5 | 11.4 | 15.6 | 35.0 | | 1980s | 28.9 | 8.2 | 7.3 | 9.5 | 46.0 | | 1990s | 30.0 | 5.1 | 6.0 | 8.9 | 50.0 | | 2000s | 19.8 | 1.9 | 5.1 | 8.5 | 64.7 |
The overall pattern among all under-30s is two-fold: from the 1970s to 1990s, polarization increased, as support for both extremes increased by about 5.5 percent, followed by a sharp 12-point shift from all four cases to no cases:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | All Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | | 1970s | 30.9 | 8.9 | 10.2 | 13.7 | 36.4 | | 1980s | 33.2 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 9.9 | 42.7 | | 1990s | 36.4 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 9.5 | 41.8 | | 2000s | 28.4 | 4.1 | 6.3 | 7.9 | 53.2 |
Partisan polarization among those under 30 follows a similar pattern to that of Boomers, although it starts of barely higher and is presently barely lower, by only about one percentage point in both cases:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | Differences Between Democrats and Republicans Under 30 | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -0.9 | 4.3 | -1.2 | -3.2 | 1.0 | 5.3 | | 1980s | 6.8 | -2.1 | -0.2 | 1.5 | -6.0 | 8.3 | | 1990s | 14.3 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 0.7 | -16.6 | 16.7 | | 2000s | 15.4 | 4.4 | 2.7 | -1.7 | -20.9 | 22.6 |
AbAutonomy--Boomers v. Under 30
Comparing Boomers and voters under 30, we find a fairly steadily increasing difference in their views, but at a modest rate. The difference centers in the middle through the 1990s, then shifts primarily to no cases in the 2000s:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | | Differences Between Under 30 and Boomers | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | 0.3 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.6 | 0.0 | 0.7 | | 1980s | 2.8 | -0.4 | -1.1 | -0.6 | -0.7 | 2.8 | | 1990s | 5.6 | -1.7 | -1.9 | -2.4 | 0.5 | 6.1 | | 2000s | 8.8 | 0.1 | -2.0 | -0.8 | -6.0 | 8.9 |
In contrast to the differences between age groups, the degrees of polarization within age groups has remained quite comparable, never varying by more than 1.5 percent:
Abortion Autonomy: Any Reason, Single, Poor, No More Children | Differences Between Democrats and Republicans Between under 30 and Boomers | | Approve Abortions in: | | Decade | All 4 Cases | 3 Cases | 2 Cases | 1 Case | No Case | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -2.1 | 1.1 | -0.5 | -1.2 | 2.5 | 1.0 | | 1980s | 1.2 | -2.5 | 1.3 | 0.8 | -0.6 | 1.5 | | 1990s | 3.0 | 1.7 | -0.9 | -2.7 | -0.9 | 0.8 | | 2000s | -2.0 | 3.6 | 0.7 | -5.3 | 2.8 | -1.2 |
To sum up, there was a general liberalizing and polarizing trend from the 1970s to the 1990s that was stronger among Boomers, followed by a sharp conservative shift from the 1990s to the 2000s, that was stronger among those under 30. The overall result was a much greater difference between generations than between levels of polarization within generations.
Homosexuality--Right or Wrong?
Unfortunately, we don't have as much long-term polling on gay issues as we'd like. A major lack is polling on whether it's anyone else's business. Other polling indicates that gays benefit from a substantial number of people who think it's purely a private matter. This helps protect them against discrimination, but it's a barrier to advancing gay marriage--if it's a private matter, then why should the government get involved? Still, you go to war with the data you've got, as one of America's top war criminals would say.
Homosexuality--Boomers
Democratic Boomers show a distinct pattern, with disapproval of homosexuality growing somewhat from the 1970s to the 1980s, and then shrinking more dramatically over the next two decades. The AIDs epidemic would seem to be the most obvious explanation for the rising disapproval in the 1980s, with a variety of factors contributing to growing approval, not least the transformation of attitudes within the gay community as it has grown increasingly self-confident and non-defensive; as more and more come out to their friends and family, the stigma appears increasingly absurd to more and more people. The number saying it is "not wrong at all" has almost doubled since the 1980s:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Democratic Boomers (1946-1964) | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 56.2 | 8.3 | 10.6 | 24.1 | 0.8 | | 1980s | 66.0 | 5.1 | 9.5 | 19.4 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 55.8 | 5.0 | 7.6 | 31.7 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 48.7 | 5.1 | 6.7 | 39.5 | 0.0 |
Non-partisan Boomers followed a similar pattern, in terms of direction of positive attitudes, but the positive shift since the 1980s has been far more modest, barely larger than the negative shift from the 1970s to the 1980s. At the same time, unlike Democratic Boomers, totally negative attitudes have not fully recovered from their 1980s increase:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Non-Partisan Boomers (1946-1964) | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 56.2 | 5.6 | 12.4 | 24.2 | 1.6 | | 1980s | 66.2 | 4.5 | 8.4 | 20.9 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 64.5 | 5.0 | 9.0 | 21.7 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 61.7 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 25.1 | 0.0 |
The pattern among Republican Boomers is actually mid-way between Democrats and non-partisans, though starting from a much lower level of acceptance. As a result, Republican acceptance is now within striking distance of non-partisan acceptance, even though the "always wrong" position has only declined modestly since the 1980s:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Republican Boomers (1946-1964) | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 58.4 | 9.0 | 14.3 | 17.3 | 1.3 | | 1980s | 71.7 | 6.4 | 7.7 | 14.2 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 70.3 | 5.1 | 6.5 | 18.1 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 65.0 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 23.3 | 0.0 |
The pattern among all Boomers is a more modest version of that among Democratic Boomers on the full acceptance side, while the full disapproval side has yet to fully recover from the 1980s regression:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | All Boomers (1946-1964) | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 56.7 | 7.9 | 11.9 | 22.3 | 1.1 | | 1980s | 68.0 | 5.4 | 8.7 | 17.9 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 62.8 | 5.0 | 7.4 | 24.7 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 57.1 | 5.0 | 7.1 | 30.9 | 0.0 |
Polarization between the parties among Boomers has increased every decade, but the largest increase was from the 1980s to the 1990s, the increase in polarization from the 1990s to the 2000s was relatively modest:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | Differences Between Democratic and Republican Boomers (1946-1964) | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -2.2 | -0.8 | -3.7 | 6.8 | -0.4 | 6.9 | | 1980s | -5.7 | -1.3 | 1.7 | 5.2 | 0.0 | 7.0 | | 1990s | -14.5 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 13.6 | 0.0 | 14.7 | | 2000s | -16.2 | 0.9 | -0.9 | 16.2 | 0.0 | 17.2 |
Homosexuality--Under 30
The pattern among Democrats under 30 was basically the same as for Boomer Democrats, except that it was more robust. Those saying homosexuality was "not wrong at all" more than doubled in just one decade, from the 1980s to the 1990s. The pace of growing acceptance slowed considerably in the 2000s, but it was enough to produce a clear plurality in favor of full approval:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Democrats Under 30 | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 56.3 | 7.6 | 11.5 | 23.6 | 1.0 | | 1980s | 67.4 | 5.6 | 8.8 | 18.1 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 48.5 | 4.9 | 7.4 | 39.3 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 41.7 | 4.5 | 9.3 | 44.5 | 0.0 |
The pattern among non-partisans under 30 is strikingly similar to Democrats of the same age, with those saying homosexuality is "not wrong at all" now just barely ahead of Democrats by 0.3 percent:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Non-Partisans Under 30 | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 56.1 | 6.5 | 12.2 | 23.4 | 1.8 | | 1980s | 66.8 | 5.7 | 8.2 | 19.1 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 54.7 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 32.0 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 43.7 | 4.2 | 7.0 | 44.8 | 0.0 |
Republicans under 30 show the same pattern of attitude change, although at more conservative levels, when it comes to full approval, but complete disapproval still has not fully recovered to pre-1980s levels, though the gap is quite small:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Republicans Under 30 | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 57.3 | 9.7 | 14.2 | 17.3 | 1.4 | | 1980s | 73.2 | 6.1 | 7.2 | 13.5 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 65.6 | 4.2 | 7.4 | 22.9 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 58.5 | 4.3 | 8.5 | 28.7 | 0.0 |
The pattern of all voters under 30 is strikingly similar to that of Democratic Boomers. The level of full acceptance in this decade is identical--39.5%--rising dramatically from similar levels in the high teens in the 1970s:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | All Under 30 | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | | 1970s | 56.6 | 7.9 | 12.3 | 22.0 | 1.2 | | 1980s | 69.5 | 5.8 | 8.1 | 16.6 | 0.0 | | 1990s | 56.4 | 4.9 | 7.2 | 31.5 | 0.0 | | 2000s | 47.7 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 39.5 | 0.0 |
Partisan polarization more than doubled between the 1980s and the 1990s, after remaining the same between the 1970s and 1980s, it then declined ever-so-slightly from the 1990s to the 2000s. This reflects a relatively uniform immediate reaction to the AIDs epidemic, followed by a sharply stronger reversal among young Democrats in the 1990s:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | Differences Between Democrats and Republicans Under 30 | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | -1.1 | -2.1 | -2.7 | 6.3 | -0.5 | 6.3 | | 1980s | -5.8 | -0.5 | 1.6 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 6.3 | | 1990s | -17.1 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 16.4 | 0.0 | 17.1 | | 2000s | -16.8 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 15.7 | 0.0 | 16.8 |
Homosexuality--Boomers v. Under 30
Partisan polarization levels between Boomers and those under 30 reached a peak of 2.5% in the 1990s, but otherwise has always been under 1%. Clearly, cohort effects dominate.
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | Differences Between Democrats and Republicans Between Under 30 and Boomers | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | 1.1 | -1.3 | 0.9 | -0.5 | 0.0 | -0.6 | | 1980s | -0.2 | 0.8 | -0.1 | -0.6 | 0.0 | -0.7 | | 1990s | -2.6 | 0.8 | -1.2 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 2.5 | | 2000s | -0.5 | -0.7 | 1.8 | -0.5 | 0.0 | -0.4 |
Boomers and those under 30 have grown increasingly apart, reaching a full 10 point difference this decade. However, as noted above, those under 30 have views that are virtually identical to Boomer Democrats as a whole:
| Homosexuality: Is It Wrong? | | Differences Between Under 30 and Boomers | | Decade | Always Wrong | Almost Always Wrong | Sometimes Wrong | Not Wrong At All | Other | Tot Diffs | | 1970s | 0.2 | 0.0 | -0.4 | 0.4 | -0.1 | 0.5 | | 1980s | -1.5 | -0.3 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 1.8 | | 1990s | 6.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -6.7 | 0.0 | 6.7 | | 2000s | 9.4 | 0.6 | -1.3 | -8.7 | 0.0 | 10.0 |
Conlusion
All the above shows a distinct schizophrenia in the culture wars. While attiudes towards gays have grown increasingly accepting since the 1980s, attitudes towards abortion have grown sharply more negative in the 2000s. Furthermore, both shifts are more pronounced among those under 30, but even there a majority of young Democrats still doesn't fully accept homosexuality--although a plurality does. Furthermore, the degrees of partisan polarization on these issues does not differ significantly between Boomers and those under 30. From this data, there is no evidence whatsoever that the culture wars are coming to an end anytime soon. Things are gradually advancing for gays, but we're a long way from catching up with Uruguay, which just approved national recognition of civil unions. On the other hand, things are becoming more perilous for abortion rights--a trend not seen anywhere else in the world, except for probably Iraq and Afghanistan.
If Obama's "end to the culture wars" narrative has any truth to it, that doesn't come from culture war attitudes as traditionally discussed, but rather from massive Republican failure that has made such issues fade in relative significance. This is the same dynamic that occured in 1930/1932, as the Great Depression overwhelmed religious and ethnic differences that had previously kept the WASP working class firmly behind the WASP elite. While such allegiances were not totally destroyed, they were significantly weakened as the GOP failure produced a long-term realignment that changed the political universe.
This is one more reason why his "post-partisan" narrative appears fundamentally misdirected. If Obama cannot articulate a clearly different approach to politics--with different substance to it--then he fails to accentuate the one force that is working to submerge the culture wars, the replacement of a political order that stresses such conflicts with a new one that stresses common solutions to a whole new set of pressing concerns. |