| Prelude
Conventional observers and political scientists have a strong tendency not to see what is happening with this upcoming election. Realigning elections are rare creatures, and like many such creatures there are always those who doubt they even exist. Far more common than two consecutive wave elections favoring the same party are swings one way, then the next, and so it is only natural that this is what's considered natural. And if realigning elections, bringing about new party systems every 36 years or so, are such rare creatures, then what can we say about the rise and fall of great powers? Or the rising post-materialist wave? None of these deeper factors register much in the common academic or professional political literature. And yet, the signs of their imminant impact are unmistakable.
Unmistakable-but not unopposible. Indeed, these forces stand opposed by a powerful obstructing wall, which I have referred to repeatedly under the rubric of hegemony, which has both an institutional and an ideological aspect. The ideology is authoritarian, anti-modern, anti-reason, and anti-democracy. Over the past decade, it has sought to overturn one election (1996) by hounding an elected President into acts of desperation for which it then sought to remove him from office. It sought-successfully, to steal another election in broad daylight by usurping the popular will and preventing the counting of ballots, based on legal "reasoning" by the Supreme Court which were declared null and void for any other purposes. It virtually ignored a mass murderer responsible for killing 3,000 Americans, and fraudulently took us to war with that mass murderer's chief ideological rival. It sought to turn the entire executive branch-but especially the Department of Justice-into an arm of the Republican National Committee, in a quest to establish permanent one-party rule. It sought to undermine the separation of powers, the architectural keystone of Constitution. It sought to nullify the right to habeas corpus, dating back to 1215 and the Magna Charta. It sought to turn the Federal Government into an instrument for taxing the public in order to amass enormous private wealth for friends of the President, Vice President and the Republican Party.
In short, it sought to turn America into a neo-feudal, pre-modern state. This agenda is so deeply and profoundly anti-American that the nation as a whole is in revolt. Approximately 50 percent of all Americans strongly disapprove of President Bush's job performance. At this point, four things, above all, are keeping back the tide of sweeping change. One, a deeply intimidate political "opposition" that is more like the GOP's hapless sidekick than a real opposition party. Two, a press corps[e] that functions primarily as a palace propaganda machine. Three, a broader array of institutional power, from politicized churches, to propagandistic "think tanks" to ideologically lock-step federal judges, that is militantly opposed to allowing even the slightest moves in the direction of changing course. Four, a public that has long been starved of any truly oppositional political discourse, so that it has an extremely difficult time formulating anything it wants in positive terms that are recognizable to more than a fragment of the public at large.
This is the nature of the wall. But even though it remains extremely formidable, it shows distinct signs of fragmentation, which bode well for the November elections, though what lies beyond the elections in terms of governance is far less clear.
Here, I want to examine several different aspects of the hegemonic power structure confronting the power of the three waves discussed in previous installments.
The 2008 Elections
The November elections are obviously highly important. If I am correct, they will be the most important elections since 1968 at the very least, and possible since 1932. However, that imporance will not flow from the elections alone, but more importantly from what happens as a result of them. So the elections themselves are only the beginning.
The Presidency
There is clearly little, if any chance that McCain could win in November. Bush's popularity continues running lower than even before the 2006 election, and McCain's chosen path to the nomination was to identify himself as much as possible with Bush. Ouch!
Obama looks virtually certain to be the Democratic nominee, and he should win rather handily.while strongly reinforcing the youth trend toward Democratic Party identification. Nothing is certain, of course, but this is clearly the most likely outcome at this time.
The House
Strong as the tide was for Democrats in 2006, the tide should be even stronger in 2008, with Bush's popularity lower than in 2006, and the economy worsening in additon to the endless Iraq War. With Obama at the top of the ticket, some freshman Dems may have to run hard, but none should lose. OTOH, the wave of GOP retirements, and some remaining close calls from 2006 are enough all by themselves to indicate that another 20-30 seats may well be low-hanging fruit. If the GOP base remains unenthusiastic, and Obama continues to inspire, Democrats could pick up twice that many seats.
On the eve of the 2006 midterms, October 24, 2006, Pew pollster Andrew Kohut wrote a brief piece for the NY Times, "Can Safe Seats Save the Republicans?"
In it, he called attention to the fact that 1994 had been a watershed, and that since then the ratio of Democratic votes to seats won had shifted markedly, aided most recently by precision district-drawing software:
Polls now show margins of support for the Democrats that historically would have been associated with winning a clear majority in the House.
But the political landscape is different than it was 15 years ago. Following the 1990 and 2000 censuses many districts were redrawn, using computer-assisted geopolitical mapping to maximize partisan homogeneity and decrease competitiveness. And it worked. In 2004 only 32 seats were won by less than 55 percent of the vote.
The 1994 midterm election marked the end of Democratic Congressional legacy. Democrats no longer won re-election in conservative districts, especially in the South, and these districts became safely Republican. This, along with high-tech redistricting, weakened the link between the number of Congressional votes a party gets nationally and the number of seats it captures, as the chart below shows. And that makes it harder than ever to use national polls to predict how many seats a party will win in the House.
The latest Pew Research Center poll finds a 13-percentage-point advantage for the Democrats when respondents are asked which of their local Congressional candidates they intend to vote for. Before the era of safe seats, an edge that size in a national poll would mean a shift of at least 70 seats. But this year, a change of that magnitude is unlikely.
Of course, it was unlikely. Democrats only a little under half that. But even in the old days there was considerable variation. Still, once the dust had settled, what the Democrats did do was actually closer to the pre-1994 trend than it was to the post-1994 as can be seen from the graph below-the graph from Kohut's story with the 2006 result added in red, and a circle surrounding the range of potential results to duplicate in a McCain-slump/Obama wave election:
Of course, there is no guarantee that our results will fall in that range. But the 2006 results clearly indicate the possibility.
The Senate
Things could be better for us in the Senate. We could have a stronger field of challengers. But all things considered, it's still a distinct possibility we could get to 60 seats this year. The latest Rothenberg Report has 10 GOP seats and just one Dem that are out of the "safe" category. And Nebraska is not among them:
Likely Takeover (1 R, 0 D)
* VA Open (Warner, R)
Lean Takeover (1 R, 0 D)
* NM Open (Domenici, R)
Toss-Up (3 R, 1 D)
* CO Open (Allard, R)
* Coleman (R-MN)
* Landrieu (D-LA)
* Sununu (R-NH)
Narrow Advantage for Incumbent Party (2 R, 0 D)
* Smith (R-OR)
* Stevens (R-AK)
Clear Advantage for Incumbent Party (3 R, 0 D)
* Collins (R-ME)
* Dole (R-NC)
* McConnell (R-KY)
Electoral Conclusion
Summing up all the above, the November elections look pretty good for us. Nothing is ever certain, of course. But looking back at the last two years of highly disappointing Congressional performance, I think it's reasonable to say that winning elections is neither the hardest nor the most important challenge we face. It would be foolish to take our eyes off the ball, and let these opportunities slip away, but it would be equally foolish to focus only on winning, and end up with a dysfunctional governing majority, for whatever reason. The opportunity here is huge-we've only had a Democratic Congress and Democratic President for 6 years since 1968, and very little was accomplished during those 6 years. If we can make a significant mark in 2009-2010, we can be in good shape to win control of enough legislatures to ensure a better House map in 2012, even though there will be continued Sunbelt gains. Thus, a good two years in 2009-2010 can mean two more decent House elections. It is extremely rare to have more than two consecutive wave elections. But picking up another 5-10 seats in 2010 and 2012 would be nothing to sneeze at. The key will be two-fold: legislative and narrative victories. That's what we turn to next.
Deeper Aspects of Hegemonic Struggle
Going beyond just winning elections will require that we engage the right in hegemonic struggle across all platforms and institutions. This post cannot possibly address all of them, but it can address a few key examples, and give some indication of what this will entail.
Think Tanks
As a rule, Rightwing think tanks reflect a keen awareness of Gramscian culture war. Centrist and progressive think tanks do not. Rightwing think tanks exist to push an ideological agenda. Other think tanks exist to try to solve problems. The right doesn't care about problems. It cares about running things. It cares about power. If there are problems, it will take strategic advantage of them to move its agenda. If the problems get in the way of moving that agenda, then it might actually try to solve the problems, or at least move them out of the way. But solving problems is definitely a low priority. Moving the agenda-winning the culture war-is all that really matters.
This was vividly illustrated when Tacitus posted about the Overton Window at Swords Crossed.
The Overton Window is all about shifting policy in one ideological direction or another:
(Illustration from Corrente, with good, brief intro.)
Here is how Tacitus described it:
The mission of a think tank is to introduce ideas into public discourse and normalize them within the public discourse. The steps an idea takes to full legitimacy are roughly as follows:
# Unthinkable
# Radical
# Acceptable
# Sensible
# Popular
# Policy
This is a rough continuum. Not all ideas start at the same point, not all make it to the endstate -- and some travel backwards. The think tank, with its advocacy and scholarship, does its best to make sure that its preferred ideas reach their endstate. But how does it do this in a systemic way? How does it stay within the bounds of possibility -- the acceptable, sensible, and popular -- even as it reaches for long-term goals in the radical and unthinkable categories?
Needless to say, this is not how think tanks have traditionally thought of their missions. They neither considered themselves far outside the mainstream of political thought, nor did they think they had perfect solutions handed down from on high to bring to the unwashed masses. They were much more involved in mucking around with imperfect solutions, cobbling things together as best they could, and engaging in dialogue more than propaganda. For the most part, this is still how most think tanks consider themselves-and that's a problem going up agains the Overton Window model, as we shall now see. Tacitus continued:
One useful tool is the Overton window. Named after the former vice president of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy favicon who developed the model, it's a means of visualizing where to go, and how to assess progress. Let's say, for example, that you want to make education as free and choice-based as it can possibly be. Let's start by developing a continuum of educational states, from the desired extreme of total freedom, to the undesirable extreme of total statism. It might look something like this:
# No government involvement in education.
# All schools private with government regulation.
# Voucher system with public schools.
# Tuition tax credit with public schools.
# Homeschooling legal.
# Private schools restricted.
# Homeschooling illegal.
# Private schools illegal.
# Children taken from parents and raised as janissaries.
Note the total lack of any consideration of education per se. Note, too, the ludicrous extreme indicative of extreme paranoia. This model clearly has nothing to do with education, certainly not with imroving the quality of education, access to education, educational motivation, or any other realworld educational concern. It is all about the ideological agenda of privatization. Period. End of story.
Tacitus continued:
Now, back when Joe Overton drew up this notional list (which is meant to be illustrative, so don't get hung up on its particular accuracy), the range of actual, reasonable possibilities as perceived by the general public in Overton's state of Michigan were the items bolded below:
# No government involvement in education.
# All schools private with government regulation.
# Voucher system with public schools.
# Tuition tax credit with public schools.
# Homeschooling legal.
# Private schools restricted.
# Homeschooling illegal.
# Private schools illegal.
# Children taken from parents and raised as janissaries.
The bolded items, representing the politically possible amongst all conceivable options, are the Overton window. The idea is to shift that window in the preferred direction. In Michigan today, the Overton window looks substantively different:
# No government involvement in education.
# All schools private with government regulation.
# Voucher system with public schools.
# Tuition tax credit with public schools.
# Homeschooling legal.
# Private schools restricted.
# Homeschooling illegal.
# Private schools illegal.
# Children taken from parents and raised as janissaries.
There are obviously a whole range of problems raised by this model. The most obvious is that it aims to do something that it is totally at odds with any concern about education per se. Some of the ideas it might propose-such as homeschooling-might be innocent enough on their own, and even, in some cases, highly beneficial. But they don't exist because of those benefits-they exist to further an agenda of eventually destroying public education. What's more, homeschooling frequently fits into another agenda-brainwashing children to reject science and reason, effectively making them unfit to be citizens in a healthy, funcitoning democracy. This is a deeply anti-social agenda, and it is a very big part of the what the hard right is all about.
Looking at this model, two contradictory responses are likely to emerge. One is simply the need to counter it with equally agressive advocacy in the opposite direction. But a second resonse is that this is so thoroughly wrong-headed that opposing it via the same methods would only serve to make things worse. After all, no one in their right minds, wants to take children from their parents and raise them as janissaries. And, more realistically, most sensible policy analysts favor policy mixes in most policy areas. Put simply, it is not generally the case that there is one right way to do anything, and thus is does not generally make sense to organize yourself around a model that depends upon such a false assumption.
There is a way around this divergence of contradictory responseses-and that is simply to develop more sophisticated versions of the Overton Window model. Instead of moving along a linear track from one ideological extreme to another, one can think in terms of moving effective ideas from the stage of inspired idea to proven scientific concept, to engineerable application, to manufacturable product, and so forth. In other words, substitute a reality-based framework for an ideological one, but maintain the concept of long-term directed advocacy.
A couple of operational consequences flow from this model. One is that a lot more resources need to be devoted to communications and advocacy, and not simply to the thinking part of being a think tank. Getting ideas out there to the broader public needs to be a high priority-not just reaching traditional media, but interfacing with bloggers, activists, and anyone else who can help spread the word about new ideas and policy proposals. A think tank without a strong communications department is not really in the game.
A second consequence is that a lot more attention needs to be focused on how ideas are framed. This is not, as is sometimes thought, simply a matter of communication, although that is a vitally important aspect. It also reflects a very basic aspect of how they are thought about in the first place. The reality-based model is quite naturally a collaborative model. By eschewing the notion of having an omniscient top-down ideological blueprint for everything under the Sun, it naturally follows that one wants to be open to new ideas and input from a wide range of potential sources, active partners as well as the many wellsprings of ideas in the wider world. Framing is vitally important in getting clear about the foundations of ones own ideas, which in turn makes it much easier to grasp how other ideas complement, expand upon or enhance them. This is true both in terms of conceptual foundations, and in terms of how policy ideas are founded in progressive values.
Improving the quality of how progressive think tanks operate is one of the key ingredients for making major advances in the culture war against the right. These observations are simply a commonsense starting point for making the necessary changes.
Old Media
Old media is a very serious obstacle, and I don't have a lot to say about it here. What can you say when those who got everything wrong are promoted and those who got everything right are let go? When it happens not once or twice, but over and over and over again? The best thing we can do, IMHO, is continue to build the power of new media. Not only does this create an effective alternative, it exerts pressure on old media as well. We have to keep hounding them constantly, of course. But it's unrealistic to expect this to provide a solution. The best it does is provide damage control. Which is important. Very important. But my main concern is about going on the offensive. And that means....
New Media
Here I want to borrow liberally from a comment by mitchipd in my previous diary, "A Gramscian Take on The Times And McCain". The comment is well worth reading and responding to in its entiretly, but I'm going to draw on it selectively here. What's particularly noteworthy is that it addresses new media in combination (implicitly) with two of the three waves I've discussed in this set of diaries-the great powers wave that is returning us to an egalitarian ethos and the post-materialist wave that is raising our awareness of, desire and commitment to democracy, self-determination, and participation.
First, Mitch points up the potential of web video-an important form of new media:
My sense is that the video medium (and, as Rush et al have shown, radio) is better suited than written words to address the less-than-rational cognitive levels you address here.
That highlights to me the value of web-based video (including its relative ease of editing, posting, distribution, viewing and re-editing) as a tool for building the counter-hegemonic institutions you refer to in your closing. And the fact that web-based video can also be integrated with written words, links to source material and interactive discussion, makes it much better suited for moving up the cognitive-level hierarchy than one-way broadcast TV, especially given the latter's entrenched role as a hegemony-maintainer (both intentionally and by virtue of its economic incentive system, technology, regulation, etc.).
Related to this is the reasonable expectation that the capabilities (software, bandwidth, availability, etc.) of web-based multimedia communications will continue to grow, probably at an accelerating rate.
I agree wholeheartedly. By itself, tv makes you dumb. Of course, anyone halfway smart talks back to their tv all the time. But web-based video evens things out considerably, particularly-as Mitch notes--with its ease of integration with other forms.. This is inherently empowering.
In 2000, I was part of the Los Angeles Independent Media Center at the Democratic National Convention. We credentialed around 1000 people to use our facilities. That's a lot of people. A small handful were also credentialed by the convention, but we were there primarily to cover the outside events, the wide variety of demonstrations and protests. The big problem was that a very large number of those people were videographers, it took a long time afterwards to sift through, edit, and make something out of all the footage taken. My point is, that bottleneck is now gone. I think we're in for a real explosion of political videographers unlike anything we've ever seen.
Mitch continues, on what is, for purposes of this section, a related side-topic:
Another point that comes to mind after reading this post is that there's an emotional counterpart to lower levels of cognition, which I'd simplistically describe as "fear-driven" emotions, which obviously include fear itself, but also include externalized anger (related to defense mechanisms like "delusional projection") that can be intensely triggered as lower levels of cognition bang up repeatedly against realities they cannot accommodate.
In my view, this links to Obama's "hope-focused" political message and strategy. While there are good reasons to be doubtful about its efficacy and to be concerned about risks associated with its failure, I see this strategy as an invitation to Americans that are "on the cusp" in terms of their predominant cognitive level to move up the cognitive scale.
Several comments. First, this makes sense to me, and highlights my frustration over Obama's relative lack of specific, substantive visionary proposals, which I've highlighted in writing about Rober Fuller's dignitarian vision, Jacob Hacker's The Great Risk Shift, and discussing a robust revisioning of foreign policy and security ("Improving Obama's Foreign Policy--Seven Suggested Additions"). A "hope-focused" political message and strategy is good, but having some examples that function as concrete embodiments is even better.
Second, this does connect rather directly with something that Robert Kegan says about making the transition from one level of cognitive development to the next. To do this, people need to (a) be developmentally ready, (b) be challenged and (c) be supported. I agree with Mitch that Obama provides some crucial elements for this process--and that web-based new media has the capacity to complement and add to this process, which is nothing less than a major process of empowerment.
Skipping down a bit, Mitch goes on to say:
All of this points to:
1) A potential evolution of the progressive (broadly defined) netroots as an increasingly capable counter-hegemonic institution (in terms of content, format, technical capabilities, integration with other political, social and media institutions, etc.). We're already seeing that today, and I have no reason to believe it will not continue, very likely at a generally accelerating pace.
2) The potential for the netroots to provide high-value input that is distilled and synthesized from the citizenry as a whole, accompanied by consistent and constructive pressure on an Obama Administration and Congress.
3) The netroots working with the expanding progressive elements within the dominant political institutions in ways that build strong and sustainable linkages between them, and strong and sustainable institutions that can provide the cognitive and emotional evolutionary bridges for an increasing number of Americans who are ready to move up the cognitive and emotional scales.
4) As this "war of position" unfolds in the political and media arenas, the growth of the Internet and related technologies would enable a "war of movement" that I might describe as a shift from today's hyper-capitalism to something that would incorporate (among other things) the principles and practices described in the book Natural Capitalism.
This war involves an economic shift from control by concentrated aggregations of capital and the high levels of negative externalities with which this concentration is associated (e.g., pollution, poverty, poor health), to a more decentralized and democratic economic structure marked by local and global collaborations of "connected" citizens in peer-based "social production" systems (as described well in Yochai Benkler's "Wealth of Networks"), coupled with the migration to decentralized and renewable energy systems described in Natural Capitalism and other books.
This war of movement would also encompass powerful development-related innovations pioneered by folks like Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize-winner and founder of the Grameen Bank, and discussed in his most recent book: "Creating a World Without Poverty: How Social Business Can Transform Our Lives."
As Yunus explains in that book, his "on the ground" economic and social development strategies (including the simple but transformative concepts of "micro-lending" and "social business") are closely tied to the potential to achieve high levels of productive and equitable "connectivity" in the world, even in relatively poor developing countries and regions.
Achieving this connectivity ties back once again to the integration of declining-cost and decentralized communication and energy technologies.
All of which I agree with. The most fundamental shift we are engaged in, IMHO, is a shift toward radical egalitarianism. This doesn't necessarily mean a classless Marxist future, but it does mean a future in which privilege means far less, creation of value means far more, and a basic concept of human dignity creates a much higher floor, beneath which no one is allowed to fall. (Even if they're really stupid and don't understand a thing I say!)
This is not an original idea of mine, by any means. Lots of people have had it before. One of the best expressions of it comes from William Urey in his book, Getting To Peace , in which, among other things, he points to how this is a form of return to the dominant social forms of the pre-historic, pre-agricultural era-what I like to think of as the first information age, when the ratio of stories, songs and other forms of information to material stuff was much, much higher than anything seen since.
A key point here is that the new, decentralized, multilateral communication model embodies the value system that it communicates about. The medium is the message, and the message is the medium.
Conclusion
There are many other fronts of hegemonic struggle I haven't talked about. There are institutions such as the federal and state judiciary. There is Bush's wholesale politicization of virtually the entire Executive Branch. There is also his extensive privatization of executive functions to his wealthy cronies. There is the widespread politicization of religious institutions. But all of these other fronts of struggle can be dealt with to the extent that we make significant progress in the core areas of strategic thinking and communications. These are the core areas from which light can be shed on all others. |