Comments on Municipal Broadband and Unlicensed Spectrum

by: Gerald Faulhaber

Thu Jul 26, 2007 at 14:11


Dr. Faulhaber will be liveblogging here this evening at 7pm EDT.

Gerald Faulhaber is a Professor of Business and Public Policy, and of Management, at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  He has written widely on telecommunications and Internet issues, most recently on spectrum policy issues, public safety radio, and file sharing.  He was Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission in 2000-2001.

First, a note of thanks to Sen. Durbin for hosting this online real-time blog regarding these issues critical to our nation's infrastructure.

Municipal broadband, particularly in its WiFi incarnation, has seized the headlines over the past few years, with my hometown of Philadelphia in the forefront.  The ubiquity of WiFi-enabled computers and in-home WiFi receivers, all using unlicensed spectrum in the 2.4 GHz band, has spurred interest by cities and towns to provide broadband access to all their citizens using this popular technology.  Free (or cheap) broadband for all was the watchword.

Has it worked?  Yes and no.  Towns without broadband from commercial providers have been most successful, with WiFi being deployed by municipalities directly, by municipal power companies, or by community volunteer organizations.  While many have had problems, it seems that this market most amenable to successful municipal WiFi, and I certainly applaud it.  Cities and towns where commercial providers are already present is a rather different story.  The rationale for municipal deployment is usually to provide more complete coverage (digital divide issues) or cheaper coverage.  Unfortunately, many of these systems have had coverage problems and have had difficulty pricing the service to compete with existing vendors and still cover their costs (an interesting and balanced review of the studies of municipal WiFi is in Ars Technica, at http://arstechnica.c... ).

(More in 'there's more'...)

Gerald Faulhaber :: Comments on Municipal Broadband and Unlicensed Spectrum
Unfortunately, WiFi is almost surely the wrong technology for this deployment.  WiFi was designed for in-building use; stretching it to create a city-wide network will always create problems.  Further, in a field with very rapid technical change, it is unlikely that WiFi is a good choice three years from now, and municipalities are the last organizations you want managing in a rapidly changing highly uncertain technological environment.  But ultimately, this is a decision for voters in each city to make, not something the Federal government or even the states should control (except to make sure each city's citizens have a free choice).

Far more interesting are the few attempts to bring broadband to municipalities using either fiber or advanced wireless broadband (WISPs).  I am totally in favor of this type of deployment, although I favor community groups or some other agency that does not have access to taxpayers' pockets to subsidize this.  But especially for smaller communities, this is a big plus, and we should support it.

What is the role of unlicensed wireless spectrum?  As most of us know, this is spectrum the FCC (which is the government agency that allocates all non-Federal radio spectrum) makes available for specific uses with very tight power restrictions in specific frequency bands.  Cordless phones, baby monitors, remote thermometers, WiFi, and garage door openers are examples with which we are all familiar.  Anyone may use this spectrum without a license, but only if they and their devices follow the FCC's strict rules.  Of course, interference is often encountered in these bands.  Licensed spectrum, of course, is controlled by a licensee and used for a specific and defined purpose: broadcast TV and radio, public safety radio, and cellular phones are the best examples here.  Most of this spectrum is now sold at auction (formerly, it was given away by the FCC).  Interference in these bands is almost non-existent.

Many advocates have noted the success of WiFi (and indeed cordless phones) in unlicensed spectrum and have proposed that as technology advances, unlicensed should be the model for all (or perhaps most) spectrum.  Of course, cellular telephony has been an even bigger success, not only in the US but around the world, and that success has involved licensed spectrum.  It is safe to say that neither licensed nor unlicensed has a monopoly on success; indeed, each model has specific applications in which it is superior, and we need to preserve and enhance our abilities to make good decisions regarding what spectrum regime is most appropriate.

Unfortunately, the current model has a government agency, the FCC, making these decisions.  As many have pointed out (including myself; see The Question of Spectrum: Technology, Management and Regime Change, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 123 (2005)  available at http://quello.msu.ed... ) there are two consequences of bureaucratic/political allocations of scarce resources (such as right to spectrum): (i) huge inefficiencies, and (ii) substantial advantages to politically powerful incumbents.  As long ago as 1959, Ronald Coase suggested that having government bureaucrats pass out spectrum was wildly inefficient; he recommended (as do most economists including me) that all spectrum licenses should be put into a market and let people buy, sell, trade, aggregate and subdivide it.  In this way, spectrum will move to its highest valued use.  Of course, governments could also own spectrum and make it available (should they choose) for unlicensed use. 

The model of establishing property rights and a market in the use of frequencies would be like the property rights and markets in land, something with which we are all familiar.  Much privately held land is for exclusive use of its owner (such as my home), but much is also available for use by the public (retail space, malls, hotels, amusement parks).  Publicly held land (also owned, but by a government) can be held for exclusive use (military bases, post offices, city and school property) or can be open to the public (national parks, Central Park in NYC, state forests).  By treating use rights to spectrum as property, then the allocation system can respond to changing needs and technology.  If open unlicensed use increases in value, then either private parties will figure out a way to offer such services, or governments can buy spectrum from private hands and offer it as unlicensed.  And vice-versa if licensed appears to be the right model.  This is exactly how land is allocated: state parks with excess land sell it off, or buy it if they need more land.

Would this be costly?  Not at all.  Spectrum licenses today are very costly for the simple reason that the FCC severely limits the supply available.  If all spectrum were available in the market, this would increase supply, probably by a factor of at least one hundred.  Net result: the price would drop like a stone!  New firms could afford to buy into the market and compete with the big wireless firms.  And indeed the big wireless firms would be quite discomfited by the price drop, as it would devalue their most important asset: spectrum licenses.  But government should not be in the business of supporting the value of big firms' assets.  We should be trying to get as much spectrum out there as we can, and selling all of it, all of it, is the way to do this.  Abundance is the enemy of monopoly power, and we should insist that the FCC stop dribbling spectrum out bit by bit in order to keep the price of spectrum high.  Dump it all in the market, let the price drop, and let's see what our technology firms can do with it.

Both licensed and unlicensed spectrum have their place, and we need both.  But what we really need is to quit controlling this market allocation via bureaucratic/political control.  Get the FCC out of the allocation business; governments are notoriously bad at this.


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Muni-wireless, white space, open networks & the public interest (4.00 / 1)
Rather than repeat my long post on white space spectrum and potential common interests and synergies among the unlicensed, muni-wireless and open-access "movements," I'll just post a link to my diary post:  http://openleft.com/...

700 Mhz would make for amazing universal wireless access (0.00 / 0)
Unfortunately, WiFi is almost surely the wrong technology for this deployment.  WiFi was designed for in-building use; stretching it to create a city-wide network will always create problems.

I wholeheartedly agree.  What techie doesn't know the aggravation of having a good signal on one side of a desk, but not the other side?  This is all because of the frequency used, 2.4 GHz, which wasn't used for decades previously because of these shortcomings.

Even with the best of today's receivers, which are amazingly good with tens or hundreds of millions invested in 2.4Mhz, we still have all these difficulties.  It is inherent in the high frequency used.

As my friend put it, the first TV transmissions were put into the 700Mhz band for a reason: the engineers of that day knew that it was the best possible spectrum on the bandwidth vs. penetration graph.  700Mhz devices will also be cheaper because you won't need as high-quality of a receiver

Making the new spectrum available in the way that Google has proposed will make possible universal wireless access within a city without requiring transmitters on every block.  This is good not only for people, and for handheld devices, but also for sensor networks and other embedded systems of all kinds.

Think of low-cost "cell phones", essentially VOIP phones that would work throughout a house (or even at the neighbors house), and at a very low cost.  Think of wireless high-fidelity speakers that actually work, eliminating the need for cables throughout the entire house (and at a low enough cost to make them affordable).  Think of a phone/PDA that can get wireless web access when you're out in the garden, or at the neighbors house.

But, again, in order to make all this possible, the spectrum has to be open to usage ala the Google proposal.  Please, please, please make the FCC to set the rules so that capitalism can provide the possible services, rather than locking up the spectrum by carrier like the huge chunks of spectrum currently allocated to cell phones.  It really would be amazing, and the rest of the economy would benefit.

background: I've worked as a software engineer for 13 years, starting with 2.4GHz devices in the 90's, BlackBerries and Palms in the early 2000s, and now work as a consultant on a myriad number of embedded software projects.

end the occupation of Iraq


Very thoughtful comment (0.00 / 0)
Thanks much.  I wholeheartedly agree, and I would like to see these models tested in the real marketplace.

My problem is that Google and others (including those on this blog) want the FCC/Congress to force this model.  It doesn't have to be done this way.  If it is a good model, then by all means let Google buy the spectrum at auction and implement their model and we'll see how it works.  If they are successful at having the government impose their business model on 700 MHz, all this means is that they will pay much less money for it, since no one will bid on it.  Are we really trying to save money for Google by having the government pre-approve their business plan?  Let 'em duke it out with the other guys and prove their model is the best.

BTW, the market cap of Google is approximately 50% more than the market cap of the entire cable industry.  Yeah, they've got a hemi;-)

Prof Gerry Faulhaber


[ Parent ]
question on auction behavior (0.00 / 0)
How do you respond to this observation on blocking premiums by Google's public policy shop?  I believe Harold mentioned something similar below.

[ Parent ]
And that market cap can melt like snow . . . (0.00 / 0)
If investors see Google pouring billions into a new business they don't understand agai8nst entrenched incumbents.  Verizon took a beating for years for FIOS, and that was a critical upgrade in their core business.

I would not rely on market cap in this unforgiving and highly volatile market, especially with credit tightening up.


[ Parent ]
m arket cap and other myths (0.00 / 0)
Market cap is a measure of size/value of the firm, and it depends upon how investors view the firm.  Google has not many physical assets, so this is the best measure of their economic impact and power.  Volatile markets will affect Verizon as well as Google, so the relative measure should be fairly stable.

If Google does something investors don't like it will affect market value?  Duh!  Of course it will.  That's true of all businesses.  But it hardly negates the value of market cap in measuring overall economic impact of a firm.  I think I'll stick with it. In spite of its initial "Don't Do Evil" dictum, they are well on their way to becoming the New Evil Empire;-)  Surprised so many folks still see them as a Protector.

Prof Gerry Faulhaber


[ Parent ]
Empircal problems with auction distribution (0.00 / 0)
Gerry:

In the more than ten years of auctions to distribute spectrum, several empirical problems have emerged that challenge Coases theory that auctions would ensure that licenses are put to their highest best use.  These problems arise -- I believe -- from the simplification assumptions made in the nature of the market.  To some degree, this is understandable, because convergence of platforms has broadened market definitions substantially.  But they also emerge becuase the highest use from a social utility standpoint does not align with the profit maximizing behavior of licensees.

A few examples:
1) The "blocking premium."  Google and others in the recent auction have drawn attention to the problem of valuation of the license.  As I observed last night in a separate comment, the value of the license to a rational new entrant is based on the expected return.  But the rational incumbent has two advanatges in valuation.  First, the incumbent includes in the license return the value of exclusion of a rival and the continued scarcity of spectrum that permits it to capture monopoly-like rents.  For the non-economists, AT&T can charge particular prices and exercise particular types of market doinance over device manufacturers because it maintains sacarcity of capacity and keeps the absolute number of providers low.  An incumbent also has an advanatge (what I have called the "incumbent discount" in that it already has significant market share and infrastructure that a rival must duplicate -- while confronting entrenched incumbents.

But this understates the problem significantly.  Convergence has created a more complex market that aggravates the blocking premium.  I offer as empirical proof last year's AWS auction (and the Rose studies documenting it).  I predicted one month before the AWS auction that Spectrum Co. would be willing to pay an enormous premium to foreclose DBS not because it wanted the spectrum, but because it wanted to protect its broadband/video markets from DBS competition. http://www.publickno... This was, in fact, what happened. http://www.publickno....  That Spectrum Co.'s behavior was motivated by blocking rather than a genuine plan to maximize revenue is demonstrated by the fact that even one year later, they still have no plan to use the AWS spectrum acquired.

We may see a similar dynamic in 700 MHz as Spectrum Co tries to block the Telcos from enhancing their ability to offer "quadrupple play" broadband. http://www.wetmachin...

These results are clearly not maximizing for consumers, but they are revenue maximizing for participants.

2) The inability to provide non-profit maximizing services.  I submit the spectrum market is inherently constrained and will reduce to oligopoly over time, because spectrum operators have government protected monopolies over the critical asset -- spectrum itself.  This allows spectrum operators to seek profit-maximizing oligopoly rents that exclude services that would provide far greater public benefit.

I submit the most critical of these is pure transport.  As we have seen in the internet world, and as we are seeing in Finland with Digita (although that experiment is still too early), consumers and others in the value chain desire raw transport as it is possible to replicate other goods and services provided by the network operator at lower cost and customized to the user.  But the network provider wishes to avoid raw transport at all costs because, even where profitable, it is not profit maxmizing.  Raw transport absorbs the bulk of network cost, and therefore returns the lowest profit margins of any service.  Therefore, despite market demand, the network operator will not willing provide raw transport unless compelled by a regulator or competition.  But, as I have postulated, absent regulatory interference, the wireless market must inevitably collapse to oligopoly.

Traditional theory holds that a provider would offer raw transport to capture marginal customers since teh cost of transport is already included in every other bundled service.  But this overlooks convergence.  The reason raw transport is desired is because it provides direct competition to the higher margin services.  Accordingly, the network operator will not offer raw transport even given the incentive to capture marginal customers.

That's probably enough for now. :-)


A serious set of comments; let me try to do them justice (0.00 / 0)
The "blocking premium" story shows up in many other economic contexts, for example, predatory pricing, cornering markets, and so on ad infinitum.  Usually lots of hype, not much data.  While there are theoretical conditions under which such market controlling behavior makes sense, there is little empirical evidence it actually exists.  Attempts to corner the market via market actions, when they have occurred, have usually ended in grief for the "cornerer"; I'll give you historical examples if you want.  Google simply asserted such premiums would exist, without either evidence or proof of such.  Sorry; doesn't cut it.

I am not familiar with the Rose studies, but anyone who has looked at the outcome of the AWS auction would be stunned to hear an allegation of "blocking" (or warehousing).  I don't have the numbers in front of me, but AT&T and Verizon Wireless took less than 25% of the spectrum (if I recall).  Maybe they just don't know how to do it;-)  To assert that SpectrumCo bid high to keep out DBS is really farfetched; is the claim that those frequencies could be used for satellite?  If so, it would violate some serious international agreements as well as FCC regulations.  Bottom line: "blocking premium" and "warehousing" are often alleged but seldom (inb this case never) proved.  Nice story, Google, but simply asserting it as fact don't make it so (to quote a country music song).

However, the big issue is not this.  The big issue is that the FCC is not offering enough spectrum to make it really cheap.  My story (if you recall): get it ALL out there, and the price of spectrum will drop by 100!  The cure to monopoly is abundance; the cure to letting us all have access to it is abundance.  If spectrum is cheap, none of these problems will arise.

Prof Gerry Faulhaber


[ Parent ]
But where will the spectrum come from? (0.00 / 0)
How do you propose to get more spectrum out there to auction?

[ Parent ]
Where's the spectrum to come from? (0.00 / 0)
A few years ago, Evan Kwerel and John Williams authored a paper called a Proposal for the Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum, at http://hraunfoss.fcc... in which they considered how to get the spectrum out there.  Key to this was getting incumbents into the market ('cause the FCC sure doesn't have the cojones to just take it back and the end of the license period).

It is by no means a perfect mechanism, and my guess is that incumbents would fight it like crazy.  But it is an excellent starting point.

Prof. Gerry Faulhaber


[ Parent ]
Low power underlay. (0.00 / 0)
Harold,

For years, I have been suggesting to anyone who would listen that the easiest way to get more spectrum is to use the existing spectrum more efficiently.

If we allow for a wide swath of spectrum that is currently licensed to be used at extremely low EIRP levels, similar to what the 2.4GHz (WiFi) ISM band is regulated to, we could open up an enormous amount of clean spectrum that would be usable for reasonably short range connectivity without negatively impacting the primary spectrum licensees.

As a specific example, let's look at the 6 GHz band, commonly used for long range point to point links. I would suggest that you could take a spectrum analyzer to just about any populated area in the country and be hard pressed to find any activity in this licensed band.

There is also some precedence for this suggestion with the FCC as they issued a request for comment a year ago today titled, "Spectrum Sharing Innovation Test-Bed." under the FCC 06-77, ET Docket No. 06-89.

I believe a congressional backed bill to push something like this through would go a long way to opening up a lot more "clean" spectrum for this use.


[ Parent ]
underlays... (0.00 / 0)
...or as I have referred to them elsewhere, "non-interfering easements."  I have in previous work come out in favor of such easements, for both very low power devices and cognitive radios.  As I've learned what this entails and the possibility of cheating, I have become much less enthusiastic, especially about cognitive radios.

The problem with low power stuff is policing and enforcement.  How do licensees figure out who is interfering, if they pop their transceiver's power up?  When we recommend these things, we need to know not just that they can be made to work, but how they will work in the real world, with cheats and enforcement issues.

Generally, I believe this COULD be a good way to go, but it needs to be thought through much more carefully than we have.

The FCC can actually do this without a Congressional mandate, and it is done in lots of bands, I understand.  Perhaps a Congressional bill should simply include direction to the FCC to use any and all safe, reliable technologies to increase the efficiency of spectrum utilization.

Prof. Gerry Faulhaber


[ Parent ]
Continuing the "non-interfering easements" discussion. (0.00 / 0)
Thank you taking the time out of your day to post your well thought out reply.

I believe the questions you raise could be somewhat easily answered.

The first tool in the tool chest is to make the penalty for exceeding EIRP so painful that it would be a real deterrent. While there are countless people who are skirting the laws in the ISM bands, either by using non-certified equipment or by exceeding EIRP power levels, the reality is that they do this for two primary reasons; they know there is little to no chance they will be caught and even if they are, the penalties are not severe enough to cause them any real concern.

I can even cite examples where people have publicly posted that they have no intention of paying attention to the certification process and I would suggest that when properly documented claims of excessive power use were prosecuted to the full extent of the law we would see fewer people stepping outside those limits.

This is how I would suggest the FCC proceed with respect to allowing "non-interfering easements" in the real world.

First, this would be a light licensing that would first require any applicant to hire an independent agent to sweep their local area throughly for whichever slice of spectrum they wish to use. Once that area is determined to be free of any activity, the FCC awards a conditional use license for that specific frequency and then makes an entry into a searchable database. Should any primary license holder become effected by interference they should be to quickly identify the party responsible and formally ask that the issue be resolved. Additionally, if at any time, someone is discovered exceeding the EIRP requirements, this would be reason for asset forfeiture as well as whatever fines the FCC would consider appropriate. To provide the necessary funding for the additional FCC compliance work a portion of the value of the assets seized would be shared with the FCC to offset the cost of this additional responsibility.

I would also suggest that any area deemed clear of current spectrum use would be "given" to the applicant after a specific length of time (perhaps two years) unless the spectrum holder files an intent to deploy spectrum in the area within a specific time frame. To be fair, to the original license holder, a tax credit, in the amount of the paid for value of that spectrum should be provided and all license holders should be encouraged to "lease" the spectrum they hold in an area, at the value they bid for it, thereby encouraging the quick adoption and use of this spectrum, especially in rural areas where the license holder would probably never be able to deploy in a profitable manner.

While you are certainly correct in stating that the FCC could take this action, history seems to have shown that a large percentage of the entire RF spectrum lays fallow. I would suggest that this fact seems to show that the FCC's stewardship of this very valuable resource could use a little prompting from Congress. Please do not misunderstand what I am saying here. I believe the FCC has a near impossible job and that there are some responsibilities that Congress should remove from the FCC's shoulders, allowing them to not have to carry the burden of some of these political issues.

One more suggestion, I would like to see low power UWB be classified for outdoor infrastructure use as there is little to no risk of this technology actually impacting any license holder. The chips are being manufactured in large quantities, the price will drop due to the scale of economics and this could be one more tool that could be employed by all to help deliver broadband.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to have this dialog.


[ Parent ]
Rose studies (0.00 / 0)
Empirical studies of the AWS auction, replicating the methodology of the Cramton/Schwartz PCS studies.
http://www.newameric...

[ Parent ]
auction chicanery (0.00 / 0)
There is a history of bidders figuring out collusive schemes, followed by the FCC figuring it out and closing the loopholes.  I am sure this continues, but until I have a chance to carefully read the Rose work, I am highly skeptical.  I also note that this work has not been published in a scholarly journal.

I also believe the FCC should continue to close loopholes that allow collusion, and on the basis of the evidence before me at this time it would appear that anonymous bidding would be a step in the right direction.

Prof. Gerry Faulhaber


[ Parent ]
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