I've been a fan of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, a way to get around the electoral college by simply getting enough states to elect a President with their Electoral College votes to agree to all cast their electoral votes for the winner of the national popular vote. Normally, it's thought of in terms of getting enough states to total 270 electoral votes.
This proposal has tremendous latent appeal, as the Electoral College has become quite unpopular of late. But it hasn't progressed as quickly as many, such as I, might have hoped.
"It disregards the will of a majority of Californians" [and] "is counter to the tradition of our great nation which honor states rights and the unique pride and identity of each state."
You can always count on the Gropenator for a pompous braindead quip. But, then, there's no shortage of others with similar deficits. Add to that the reluctance of battleground states to reduce their importance, and the slow progress so far becomes quite understandable.
Now, however, U.C. Davis law professor and Findlaw.com columnit Vikram David Amar has advanced a radically modified proposal that just might work. Instead of relying on enough state to cast 270 votes, why not rely on a handful of key states--perhaps as few as just three==that no one can win without? His model suggestion is Ohio, Virginia and Florida, but the precise identity of the states is less important than the concept.
He lists three barriers to the NPV compact, and argues that the 3-state solution could substantially reduce all three. Read about it on the flip....
Obviously, such a proposal would significantly alter electability arguments, since it would no longer be about winning certain types of voters in certain specific states, and so Amar mixes in a little discussion of the Democratic primary process as well. Those wanting to read about that should definitely check the original out. Here, I just want to focus on the barriers mentioned and how they would be affected:
(1) The Efficacy Barrier--Reduced
One reason a given state might insist on involvement by a substantial number of other states before committing is that the particular state in question wants to be sure that its actions will accomplish the desired effect of moving to a national popular election - and thus forcing Presidential candidates to campaign for all votes nationally, regardless of how "in play" any given state is....
But given the (seemingly undisputed) demographic/partisan reality in 2008, as to which states are overwhelmingly likely to be determinative battleground states, a move by Florida, Ohio and Virginia together to give their electoral college votes to the national popular vote winner would create almost the same kind of complete certainty: No candidate could hope to win the White House without getting the electoral college votes of at least one of those states. So coordinated action by these three states alone (and perhaps even a two-state subset of these) would be sufficient.
This is an especially important point. It takes a long time to get a lot of states to pass something, unless you're like the beef lobby. Getting just three specific states to pass something is obviously a lot more doable--and each of the three states would know that.
(2) The In-State Un-Popularity Problem--Reduced
There is also a second reason a state might rationally be reluctant to allocate its electoral college votes to the national popular vote winner. The reason is that the national vote winner may be unpopular in that state (and lose there by a significant margin)....
But my present focus on present-day Ohio, Virginia and Florida answers that problem. These three states are, as noted above, considered by virtually everyone to be "in play" for Election Day 2008 - that is, their voters are relatively equally divided between the two major parties and their candidates. So even if, say, Ohio (by pledging to cast its electoral college votes for the national vote winner) ended up giving the Presidency to someone who lost in the state, any loss there would have been by a pretty small margin.
This is largely a perceptual problem, but Amar is right, that it would diminish the perception to have the states involved all be battleground states.
(3) The Sacrifice Of Current Relevance Problem
A third and related reason why a state might be reluctant to act is that acting could involve non-trivial sacrifice. Take Ohio, for example. If Ohio were to allocate its electors for the national popular vote winner, Ohio would be making the question of who wins the most votes in Ohio, in particular, less relevant than it is under the current scheme....
But if, somehow, people in just a small number of states like Ohio could be convinced that their sacrifice, while historically momentous, would not be so great in tangible terms, or is worth the cost, then meaningful reform could be attained with much less national energy that might be supposed.
This is the least convincing. Indeed, it seems clear that the states most willing--even eager--to have such a change are those that don't get attention now--meaning those that aren't battleground states. But this logic cross-cuts with #2.
So, what we have here is a tantalizing situation, where the possibility seems to have grown much closer--but is still not well within reach.
