| Center For American Progress on Iraq (PDF, page 7):
The United States should reduce its troop presence at a rate of about 9,000 per month from its present level of about 130,000 to 60,000 by the end of 2006, and to virtually zero by the end of 2007. The troops remaining in Iraq through 2007 would focus on training Iraqi security forces, eradicating terrorist cells, providing logistical support to Iraqi security forces, and providing border security. All National Guard units would return in 2006 to stand ready to respond to potential natural disasters and terrorist attacks on the homeland.
Also, the U.S. should double its troops in Afghanistan and integrate the U.S. forces with NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to create a single unified NATO command headed by an American three-star general.
This report is from May of 2006. It offers reasonably specific estimates for troop levels in not one, but two countries. The report proposes that 20,000 new American troops be sent to Afghanistan, and that an ever shrinking force of 60,000 American troops in Iraq "would focus on training Iraqi security forces, eradicating terrorist cells, providing logistical support to Iraqi security forces, and providing border security" These tasks are, not surprisingly, virtually identical to those proposed for residual American forces in Iraq by Biden, Clinton, Dodd and Obama.
Biden
If, in the interim we actually make progress on a political settlement in Iraq and start to make Iraq the world's problem, not just our own, then I would support continuing what Democrats are trying to do now: transition our troops out of the civil war and into a limited mission of targeted counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda and like-minded groups, training Iraqis and force protection.
Clinton:
(1) That a phased redeployment of United States military forces from Iraq has begun, in a manner consistent with any limitations on aid for Iraq for security purposes in effect under section 4, including the transition of United States forces in Iraq to the limited presence and mission of-
(A) training Iraqi security forces;
(B) providing logistic support of Iraqi security forces;
(C) protecting United States personnel and infrastructure; and
(D) participating in targeted counter-terrorism activities.
Dodd:
That's why I would include three narrowly targeted exceptions for redeployment - the protection of U.S. personnel and infrastructure, specific counterterrorism operations, and assistance with the training and equipping of Iraqi forces.
Obama:
The plan allows for a limited number of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq as basic force protection, to engage in counter-terrorism and to continue the training of Iraqi security forces.
Does this policy similarity remind anyone of the post I made on Pakistan and cap and trade last night? These proposals for residual forces seem to be coming off a Democratic foreign policy assembly line. It certainly leads credence to what Bill Richardson wrote in the Washington Post today:
Clinton, Obama and Edwards reflect the inside-the-Beltway thinking that a complete withdrawal of all American forces somehow would be "irresponsible."
This does seem to be an insider the beltway consensus on Iraq. However, when you drill down a little deeper, it is possible to see key differences between the plans being put forth by major centrist and progressive think tanks, and those being put forth by most Democratic presidential campaigns:
- First, both the Center for American Progress and the Center for a New American Security actually estimate the number of troops their plans would leave in Iraq. In both cases, the starting figure for American troops to carry out these residual missions is 40,000 to 60,000. That also happens to be the figure first floated for the Iraq Study Group plan.
- Second, there is a key difference between the plan proposed by the Center for American Progress and the plan proposed by the Center for a New American Security. The former proposes reducing the American presence in Iraq to 60,000 troops, and then continuing the reduction to "virtually zero" in one year or less. The latter talks of reducing the American presence in Iraq to 60,000, maintaining that level for up to three years, and then withdrawing the rest over the course of a fourth year.
I make the first point to demonstrate what I feel is continuing obsfucation from major campaigns on estimated residual force numbers. Major think tanks don't have a problem making estimates, so why should major campaigns? The second point shows why it is so key for Democratic campaigns to start being more upfront on Iraq. The Biden-Clinton-Dodd-Obama residual force plans I listed above do not specify how long they would have residual forces conduct the stand ream of missions in Iraq. However, as we can now see from a comparison of CAP and CNAS, these residual force plans can range anywhere from 18 months to four and a half years. This adds a second layer of uncertainty into their plans. Not only do we not know how many troops their plans will require (well, actually, we do know: 40K-60K), but we don't know how long they will have troops conduct those missions in Iraq. This is not only a second layer of uncertainty, but it is a second key differentiating point among Democratic candidates on Iraq.
The plot thickens further. Imagine how much of a difference it could make in the campaign if it was clear that, for example, Obama's residual force plan was in line with the one from CAP, while Clinton's was more like CANS. That would mean up to a three year difference in the length of the Iraq war during their presidencies. As such, it seems as though it would behoove all candidates who are currently trailing Clinton to start making it clear how long they would have significant residual forces in Iraq, while implying that she would keep them there longer. These are potentially huge, campaign changing differences on Iraq, and I am baffled as to why Obama and Edwards in particular are not emphasizing them. Why aren't they doing this? One possible reason, inf act the most likely reason, is that differences is that they do not actually exist. Perhaps all of their Iraq plans were purchased off the shelf from the Democratic foreign policy assembly line.
Until either Edwards or Obama starts emphasizing differences from Clinton on future Iraq plans, it seems reasonable to assume that those differences do not exist. That possibility should send shivers down the spine of every progressive activist in the country. |
