| Setting The Stage
The researches used an analysis of news articles and opinion pieces from mainstream print sources, "including the Washington Post, Time,
Newsweek, San Francisco Chronicle, Wall Street Journal, Christian Science Monitor and Forbes." It contrasted these with "results from a series of
cognitive interviews conducted with non-expert members of the American public."
They discovered that experts and the media (which closely mirrors the experts it relies on) typically employ two different over-arching frames: The Discrete Country frame is strongly rooted in the metaphor that countries are persons. In this frame, the world as a whole is the setting for an ongoing series of confrontations, reconciliations, bargaining sessions and other sorts of encounters between countries-as-persons (CAPs). The Discrete Country frame typically assumes that individual CAPs act principally in their own self interest- realpolitik is an extreme form of this frame - and that encounters have winners and losers. Discrete Country framings often imply that the United States should remain strongly autonomous, since binding agreements and co-operative engagements limit our ability to maneuver for advantage. But they also can be friendly to international engagement, as when they highlight the value of cultivating friendly allies.
The Global System frame is radically different, though it is used by many of the same experts, only in different contexts. This frame implies the strong interconnectedness of individual countries, sometimes to the point of minimizing the existence of national borders and interests. For example, experts often frame questions about foreign policy in terms of its effects on the global economy. According to this frame, the United States is unavoidably part of a larger system in which the economic health of any country may be affected by that of any other. Security is another topic often framed as a Global System.
They also discovered an overlap in expert and public frames, the "American
view":
In a number of ways, the frames used by experts and members of the public overlap. These define, in a very general sense, an American sense of the United States and its role in the world:- Cooperation is not a priority - Neither experts nor non-experts make many references to
multilateralism, cooperative engagement or joint decision-making in the international domain. This probably reflects the basic American value of individualism, explored in the report on findings from cognitive interviews.
- The United States does the heavy lifting - The view that the United States is doing more than its fair share in most international efforts, although it has limited resources with which to work, is also a strong theme in both public and expert framings....
- The United States knows best - Both experts and the public tend to agree that American ideas and knowledge are generally superior in all important realms, from economics to science to politics....
- Americans are good - Both experts and the public tend to talk in terms of America's unique dedication to moral principles. While this view may often be exaggerated, it has some positive influence in that Americans do not feel comfortable taking positions that appear to go against humanitarian principles. At its best, this view leads to a sense of noblesse oblige.
Two Divides: Public vs. Expert Models And Moral Norms vs. Self-Interest
In introducing the following differences, the authors observe: As one would expect, the expert models are more fully articulated and take into account additional factors (such as the global economy) that are barely present in public understandings. On the other hand, the expert models are often striking in that they minimize the importance of people or moral values.
In another paper that I do remember well, which was part of the same project that this paper came from, George Lakoff-in one of the earliest projects of the Rockridge Institute-developes an argument that foreign policy can beapproached by two contrasting frames-one based on self-interest, the other on moral norms.
This study has a grand purpose: to begin a change in American foreign policy -
not just in particular existing policies, but in the very idea of what foreign policy is. New realities have emerged since the end of the Cold War. But they have largely been ignored in American foreign policy. The Global Interdependence Initiative was designed to address those vital concerns. They are:- the environment,
- human rights,
- women's rights,
- children's issues,
- global public health and the spread of disease,
- poverty and the powerlessness of the impoverished,
- fair labor practices,
- violent ethnic conflicts,
- the rights of indigenous people to preserve their traditional ways of life, and crucially
- an economics of sustainability that promotes quality of life rather than an unsustainable economic growth.
When one looks more closely, further details come into focus: the immense danger of global warming, the freedom of women to get an education and engage in public life, the connections between women's education and world population growth, AIDS in Africa, the spread of tuberculosis, the enslavement of children and child labor, and so on. These concerns might sound to some like a laundry list of unrelated topics. As we shall see, they are anything but that. They are a natural category of concerns - a category that has never been adequately described or named. Our job is to forge a general approach to foreign policy where each item on this list is a natural special case, a natural and obvious concern for American foreign policy conceptualized in a new way.
Lakoff goes on to say, "Our job is to change ideas, to imagine and implement a new way of thinking." He then describes two contrasting frameworks for thinking about foreign policy: Self-Interest Versus Moral Norms, and formulates the central argument: The use of international moral norms as a basis for foreign policy is based on the following central idea:It is better to live in a world governed by international moral norms than by the pursuit of self-interest and the potential for conflict that comes with self interest. In ordinary communities, security comes not just from police power. Real security comes only when the community members follow moral norms. The US is the only superpower -- it has superior air power, enough bombs to destroy the world, and is wealthier than any other nation. But that does not make the US really secure. Its wealth and military security are threatened by the possibility of the collapse of markets elsewhere, and by events internal to other countries:a. "rogue nations" harboring and supporting terrorists, b. the sale of nuclear weapons and missiles to such nations,
c. large flows of immigrants fleeing oppression,
d. global warming and other dangers to the world ecology, and
e. looking bad in the "court of world opinion" (which could effect trade and hence wealth and military treaties).
Argument In A Nutshell
My argument, then, is simple: progressives at large approach foreign policy from a moral norms perspective. Its way of organizing our understanding of the world, and its opposition to the self-interest model are a paramount concern for us. But progressives from the foreign policy elite are conditioned by a whole set of frameworks they share with their more conservative-even frothing-at-the-mouth reactionary colleagues. As a result, the elite/mass cleavages often trump the moral norms/self-interest divide, or at the very least complicate it tremendously.
Public Understandings vs. Expert Models-10 Differences
Let's take a look at the 10 differences, and see what pops out.
1. Experts pay more attention to foreign governments - The public pays more attention to foreign populations.
Interviews with the public revealed that they are concerned with the fate of individuals in other countries, but they seldom refer to foreign governments. The press commonly refers to Beijing, Moscow, Baghdad and other world capitals as ways of referring to the governments of foreign countries. These references rarely come up in non-expert discourse.
While both the public and experts make heavy use of the metaphor that countries are persons, the nature of the mapping is different in each case. In the public's understanding, the CAP metaphor usually frames the citizens of a given country as though they were a single person. For experts, the CAP refers to an abstract entity that is far removed from actual persons....
Clearly, progressive experts must be aware of the enormous human cost of the Iraq War. They probably are even more familiar with how many Iraqi civilians have died. But non-elite progressives pay a lot more attention to this cost than the elite progressives do. It figures a lot more importtantly in our thinking. And thus, Obama's lack of urgency in withdrawing from Iraq creates a much bigger disconnect for us than it does for elite progressives.
2. Expert models give much more prominence to the rest of the world - public models downplay the existence of the rest of the world.
Interviews with the public reveal that in their day-to-day lives ordinary Americans have little awareness of other countries and have an especially hard time thinking of foreign countries as actors on the world stage. For example, they tend to hold fast to the belief that the United States provides a disproportionate share of development aid to needy countries, even when confronted with facts that contradict this understanding. This solipsistic tendency probably reflects the importance of the Invisible Neighbor model in American understandings of social relations - Americans feel most comfortable living as though those around them were not actually present (except in crisis situations).
By contrast, the expert model is highly aware that the United States shares the world stage with many other countries. The expert model differs from the public's model in that it is not based on a simple application of a village model of social relations. More specifically, it takes a "bird's eye" perspective on the world - for example, relying on regional and world maps....
This is one of several places where we get tagged as DFHs who don't know what the hell is going on in the world. Best leave it to the grownups. Of course, there are a lot of non-elite progressives like me who have a much more sophisticated view of the world. But out views do not generally inform the larger public, even when they come to support our positions on particular issues, such as withdrawing from Iraq. Still, we are out here, and we are much more prominent online than elsewhere.
3. Experts often think in terms of inclusion within or exclusion from a world community.
While the public sometimes refers to a neighbor model of international relations, this is typically framed in terms of an American neighbor model, in which neighbors are seldom seen except in times of need. Interactions with these metaphorical neighbors are sporadic.
The expert model of the world community, on the other hand, refers to a group of metaphorical persons (CAPs) who interact regularly. The interactions are not usually based on helping, though. Instead, the interactions are often competitive or confrontational....
Again, this is a division that speaks more to elite/public differences than it does to differences between elite/expert progressives and the rest of the progressive activist community.
4. Experts, but not the public, are interested in "sending messages" to other countries, as a basic goal of foreign policy.
....Both experts and the public believe that the United States is particularly wise and knowledgeable, but experts are much
more interested in persuading or manipulating foreign governments into acting in accordance with American views....
Hubris is not a Level 2 durable category characteristic that describes everyone in DC. But it is a direct result of the cognitive frameworks they all share. A greater awareness of this is needed in able to fruitfully overcome the gap between them and us.
5. Experts use a much richer Country-as-Person metaphor.
....
Two parts of this model stand out because they rarely show up in public understandings:- CAPs's motivations are determined by both reason and emotion (the Cartesian split). The rational side of CAPs is represented by pragmatic self-interest. The emotional side is represented by ideology, moral values and doctrines....
- CAPs have a public face and a private self. In accord with the standard American model of person, the intentions of other persons are largely unknowable. The default assumption is that others (in this case other CAPs) are self-interested....
The expert model thus implies that the United States should present a unified front when interacting with other countries, minimizing its internal conflicts.
There is an important exception to the CAP metaphor. In some cases, countries are judged to be either so evil or unknowable that a separate metaphor is invoked, Countries are Animals (see point 4).
Sophistication is not always good, as the very name "Versailles" is meant to remind us. A sophisticated metaphore can simply mask a much more complex reality. The CAP metaphor tends to submerge the very domestic conflicts in other countries-as well as the broader cross-border cultural conflicts-that often play a driving role in determing the foreign policy landscapes that leaders in those countries confront. Non-elite progressives-such as Norman Soloman, Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn-as far more likely to have a much more realistic grasp of foreign power decisionmaking than elite progressives have.
6. The public is much more concerned with social and moral values. Experts are much more concerned with security and national interest - they are much more macho.
Based on findings from interviews, the public does not tend to think about competition between countries for power or resources. This is the result of several related understandings: First, the public is more focused on foreign populations than governments or countries as political entities. Also, the public is more likely to frame foreign countries as at once distant and insignificant. Furthermore, when other countries are invoked, it is often because of their need, which evokes altruistic rather than competitive feelings.
In general, the public tends to temper its competitive feelings with references to social and moral values, and to reject the opposition between national interest and humanitarian principles. This is in clear contrast to the expert model, which is far more concerned with notions of national interest.
This is my central point. The elite models have a strong bias toward reinforcing the self-interest perspective, while public models are much more predisposed toward the moral norms perspective.
7. Experts are more interested than the public in making other societies more American.
In a variety of ways, from direct to subtle, experts express the idea that the United States should seek to transform other countries to make them more like us....
Members of the public did not express this idea in interviews. Instead, they tend to see other countries as essentially and permanently different from us - though individual people are sometimes seen as basically the same everywhere. In the public understanding, other countries can sometimes be taught some of our skills (i.e., "teaching a man to fish"), but there is no particular reason to try to change the country.
Again, modesty is a virtue. We're better off not being so vain that we think the rest of the world should be just like us. Elite progressives are not so sure. And we, in turn, are not so sure how progressive they really are.
8. Experts are much more concerned with American autonomy; the public is much more willing to "play along" with other countries.
Findings from interviews reveal that Americans underplay the existence of other countries, just as they minimize the salience of their own neighbors. This tendency reflects a cognitive bias, however, rather than an ideological position. Indeed, Americans often have an idealized view of community - as something desirable in principle but difficult to attain. Thus, a neighborhood is assumed to constitute a moral community, defined by rights and obligations, even if day-to-day interaction with neighbors is minimal.
The public carries this attitude into the domain of international relations, assuming the existence of a moral international community, whose members enjoy rights and are bound by obligations. Thus, the public is predisposed, to a far greater degree than experts, to enter into treaty obligations. When they do worry about such relationships, their concern is less with restricting American autonomy than with entering into potentially sticky indefinite engagements with other CAPs.
Expert models, by contrast, often make the default assumption that treaties are by their very nature a losing proposition, since they restrict America's freedom to act in its own interest.
This is a really complicated issue. It's highly likely that most elites and most publics everywhere share this same split, although European publics obviously have a much more realistic sense of how important their neighbors are. But it seems highly probable that most publics are themselves more morally motivated, and thus that there is broad public support for a univerally morally-oriented global order, which elites in contrast do not believe in, even most of the more progressive ones.
9. Expert frames are much more polarized than public frames.
In cognitive interviews, the differences between self-described conservatives and liberals were subtle, and sometimes even hard to find. In this respect, there is a sharp contrast between public understandings and expert rhetoric, as represented in the press.
The conservative view that the United States should withhold U.N. dues, for instance, is expressed regularly in the mainstream press, but shared by few members of the public.
Hence, one more contributing factor in the never-ending spectacle of Versailles "liberals" and Democrats caving in to, actively embracing, or just treating with unwarranted respect the ascendence of the rightwing lunatic fringe.
10. Experts are more likely to make use of the Global System frame, and to treat it as an abstract thing in itself.
The Global System frame shifts the focus of attention away from individual countries or CAPs and onto an abstract entity that transcends national boundaries and is sometimes treated as though it were alive. The economy, for example, is treated by experts as a Global System, one that can be more or less healthy, whose lifeblood is capital pumped through the system by such supranational institutions as the IMF, and whose functioning may be adversely affected by any of its parts....
The Global Systems frame may be applied to many issues, including terrorism, disease, military power or systems of values, such as democracy.
The public does use this frame occasionally, typically in cases, such as the environment, disease or natural disasters, where the idea of "one humanity" is relevant - i.e., the idea that people are people everywhere.
This is one reason why elite progressives are much more accepting of globalization and the neoliberal world order. The suffering of American workers is just a price we have to pay for a healthy global economy, yadda, yadda, yadda. Of course, the actual neoliberal is not good at all. But as long as it appears like the only game in town for a global systems perspective, the economic populism that is much more resonant among non-elite progressives will only further contribute to our image as ignorant DFHs.
Conclusion
From all the above, I would argue that the elite/outsider split among progressives is not one that is easily overcome. It requires a lot more serious attention than it has previously received. And it does a lot to explain why Obama appeals to them (elite progressives) a whole lot more than he appeals to us (the DFHs). |
