| Pre-9/11: Breaking New Ground On Four Fronts
In this section, I want to address four challenges to foreign policy orthodoxy as it existed in the 1990s. This is not an exhaustive list by any means, merely an illustrative one.
Jihad vs. McWorld--Benjamin Barber's Challenge to Neoliberalism's Impoverished Vision
In the afternath of the Cold War, the ideology of neoliberalism-basically a return to pre-Depression laissez-faire on a global scale-became virtually unchallenged in official circles. Both Clinton in America and Blair in Britain cut off their parties' populist left wings, and marketed themselves as better than their rightwing opponents at running the world for business interests. While the blinder sort of true believers no longer saw any alternatives left on the playing field (The End of History), the more perceptive sorts did see an opposition to neoliberalism, in the form of religious and ethinc/nationalist tribalism seeking to reclaim and rebuild lost identitites. In 1995, political philosopher Benjamin Barber wrote a highly insightful critique, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World, [1992 Atlantic article of the same name here] in which he argued that neoliberal globalization (McWorld) and its tribal ethno-religious opponents (Jihad) are actually mutually reinforcing in many respects, and both are hostile to democracy generally, and, more specifically, the regulatory/social democratic tradition that saved the West in the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War II. Barber's analysis was a classic example of Shawn Rosenberg's systematic thinking (analogous with Kegan's Level 4) with multiple causes and effects, including circular causation.
Misreading The Public--PIPA's Challenge To The Myth of A New Isolationism
In 1999, I. M. Destler and Steven Kull's book, Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism challenged the conventional wisdom that a new isolationism had arisen in the American public with the end of the Cold War. The publisher's website blurb explains:
Do American policymakers really know what the American public wants in U.S. foreign policy? Through extensive interviews with members of the policy community, the authors reveal a pervasive belief--especially in Congress--that, in the wake of the cold war, the public is showing a new isolationism: opposition to foreign aid, hostility to the United Nations, and aversion to contributing U.S. troops to peacekeeping operations. This view of the public has in turn had a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy.
However, through a comprehensive review of polling data, as well as focus groups, the authors show that all these beliefs about the public are myths. The public does complain that the United States is playing the role of dominant world leader more than it should, but this does not lead to a desire to withdraw. Instead people prefer to share responsibility with other nations, particularly through the UN.
The authors offer explanations of how such a misperception can occur and suggest ways to improve communication between the public and policymakers, including better presentation of polling data and more attention by practitioners to a wider public.
Kull has continued the work begun in this book as head of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA's website is unaccountably down at the time of my writing this. Google's latest cache was Nov. 3.), which has also done detailed polling on the nature of widespread misconceptions-such as beliefs that Iraq had WMDs, and that it was involved in 9/11-and how these relate to other factors (partisanship and media sources in the case of Iraq War myths). PIPA's work remains incredibly valuable as a reality-based counter to the conventional wisdom about what the American people want, as well as helping to identify how support for some policies is based on myths. PIPA has expanded its work into international polling as well.
The Frameworks Initiative
The Framework Institute describes itself thus:
The mission of the FrameWorks Institute is to advance the nonprofit sector's communications capacity by identifying, translating and modeling relevant scholarly research for framing the public discourse about social problems.
FrameWorks designs, commissions, manages and publishes communications research to prepare nonprofit organizations to expand their constituency base, to build public will, and to further public understanding of specific social issues. In addition to working closely with social policy experts familiar with the specific issue, its work is informed by a team of communications scholars and practitioners who are convened to discuss the research problem, and to work together in outlining potential strategies for advancing remedial policies.
FrameWorks also critiques, designs, conducts and evaluates communications campaigns on social issues. Its work is based on an approach called "strategic frame analysis," which has been developed in partnership with UCLA's Center for Communications and Community.
Susan Nall Bales established the FrameWorks Institute in 1999 and serves as its president. Funders of the Institute include: the Annie E. Casey Foundation, Advocacy Institute, Aspen Institute, W. T. Grant Foundation, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Benton Foundation, National Funding Collaborative on Violence Prevention, Center for Communications and Community at UCLA, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Rockefeller Foundation, Caroline and Sigmund Schott Foundation, Washington Dental Service, and the National Institutes of Health.
The fact that you probably never heard of the Frameworks Institute is yet another indication of the fragmented nature of progressives as opposed to conservatives in the ongoing hegemonic war of position.
In 1999/2000, the Frameworks Institute did impressive work on its Global Interdependence Initiative (GII). In her Message Memo [PDF], Bales explained:
This memo reports on communications research conducted by a team of scholars and communications practitioners under the direction of the FrameWorks Institute for the Global Interdependence Initiative, a project of the Aspen Institute. Originally drafted in July 2000, it has been updated to include more recent research results.
The purpose of this Message Memo is to demonstrate ways to apply the research results to the overall task of reframing American attitudes about international engagement. Written from the perspective of a communication practitioner, its intent is to complement, not replace, the actual research reports. It is designed to answer the following questions: - How can the FrameWorks research help communications and policy staff better understand what they are up against in attempting to win public support for policies that recognize global interdependence?
- How can this research help individual organizations become more strategic as they attempt to win support for specific positions?
- How can it help foster collaborations across organizations, recognizing how cross-issue work enhances each organization?
- How can this research help direct organizational energies to the most important issues and audiences?
- How should this research inform our day-to-day communications about global issues?
I discussed two of the papers that came out of this initiative in my previous diary. Here, I want to focus primarily on the one that played a secondary role in that diary, George Lakoff's The Mind and The World: Changing the Very Idea of American Foreign Policy [PDF]
Lakoff begins his paper thus:
This study has a grand purpose: to begin a change in American foreign policy - not just in particular existing policies, but in the very idea of what foreign policy is. New realities have emerged since the end of the Cold War. But they have largely been ignored in American foreign policy. The Global Interdependence Initiative was designed to address those vital concerns. They are:- the environment,
- human rights,
- women's rights,
- children's issues,
- global public health and the spread of disease,
- poverty and the powerlessness of the impoverished,
- fair labor practices,
- violent ethnic conflicts,
- the rights of indigenous people to preserve their traditional ways of life, and crucially
- an economics of sustainability that promotes quality of life rather than an unsustainable economic growth.
When one looks more closely, further details come into focus: the immense danger of global warming, the freedom of women to get an education and engage in public life, the connections between women's education and world population growth, AIDS in Africa, the spread of tuberculosis, the enslavement of children and child labor, and so on. These concerns might sound to some like a laundry list of unrelated topics. As we shall see, they are anything but that. They are a natural category of concerns - a category that has never been adequately described or named. Our job is to forge a general approach to foreign policy where each item on this list is a natural special case, a natural and obvious concern for American foreign policy conceptualized in a new way.
Lakoff goes on to say, "Our job is to change ideas, to imagine and implement a new way of thinking." He then describes two contrasting frameworks for thinking about foreign policy: Self-Interest Versus Moral Norms, and formulates the central argument: The use of international moral norms as a basis for foreign policy is based on the following central idea:It is better to live in a world governed by international moral norms than by the pursuit of self-interest and the potential for conflict that comes with self interest. In ordinary communities, security comes not just from police power. Real security comes only when the community members follow moral norms. The US is the only superpower -- it has superior air power, enough bombs to destroy the world, and is wealthier than any other nation. But that does not make the US really secure. Its wealth and military security are threatened by the possibility of the collapse of markets elsewhere, and by events internal to other countries:a. "rogue nations" harboring and supporting terrorists,
b. the sale of nuclear weapons and missiles to such nations,
c. large flows of immigrants fleeing oppression,
d. global warming and other dangers to the world ecology, and
e. looking bad in the "court of world opinion" (which could effect trade and hence wealth and military treaties).
It's important to realize that Lakoff is not simply repackaging the old distinction between foreign policy idealism and realism. He is saying that there is a very realistic and pragmatic reason to adopt a moral norms perspective-and conversely, that there is something wildly utopian in the notion that going it alone on the basis of narrow self-interest could ever produce the sort of future we desire.
It's an extremely enlightening paper, the main body of which is bookended by a look at the 2000 Bush/Gore foreign policy debate. Lakoff uses that debate as a high-profile example of how the failure to grasp the basic nature of the moral norms framework undermines the articulation of a coherent alternative to even the most cretinous forms of self-interest arguments. As Lakoff explains it, there was much more going on in this debate than other analysts-even very good ones-have previously suppossed. He is particularly astute in explaining how Gore became essentially tounge-tied in debating an opponent with virtually zero foreign policy understanding, but a firm grounding in the self-contained logic of his own position.
There's a lot more of great value in the papers produced for this initiative. But Lakoff's paper, together with the Aubrun/Grady paper ("10 Differences Between Public and Expert Understandings of International Affairs" [PDF]) I discussed in my previous diary, should be sufficient to drive home my two main point here: first, that ideas about how to break out of the foreign policy conventional wisdom were being actively pursued, with intelligence and creativity, and second, that this involved, in part, a challenge to elite narratives. Yet, those ideas were virtually unknown-and remain so today-among the larger progressive activist community, much less among the American people at large. The very people who were potentially the most receptive to these ideas remained unaware of their existence.
The other reserch papers generated for the Global Interdependence Initiative include: - "Framing Studies and Global Interdependence: An Introduction to the Research" by Susan Nall Bales
- "The Myopic Neighbor: Local and National Network Television Coverage of the World' by Daniel R. Amundson, Linda S. Lichter and S. Robert Lichter
- "Four Habits of International News Reporting" by Susan Moeller
- "A Window on the Storm: How TV Global News Promotes a Cognitive 'Refuge Stance'" by Axel Aubrun, Ph.D. and Joseph Grady, Ph.D.
These and all the other research papers generated can be downloaded from the Global Interdependence Initiative (GII) webpage.
The Hart-Rudman Commission
The last pre-9/11 example I want to consider is the Hart-Rudman Commission (The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century). It was established by the Secretary of Defense in 1998 with a charter that explicitly called for it to: 1) conduct a comprehensive review of the early 21st Century global security environment, including likely trends and potential "wild cards"; 2) develop a national security strategy appropriate to that environment and the nation's character; and 3) recommend concomitant changes to the national security apparatus as necessary. This review should be advanced in the form of practical recommendations that the President of the United States, with the support of the Congress, could begin to implement in the Fiscal Year 2002 budget, if desired.
The Commission issued three reports, one for each of it's assigned tasks. The reports represented a bipartisan consensus of elite, insider experts. While their "expert" side leads them, in some respects, to an illuminating critical perspective, their "insider" side limits their ability to agree on ideas that are truly "outside the box."
The Hart-Rudman Commission issued three reports, reflecting a three-stage process, first looking at expectations of future changes, then developing a strategy in response, and finally recommending specific changes in organization and commitment of resources to implement the strategy "or, indeed, any strategy that would depart from the embedded routines of the last half-century," as explained in the last report.
It was not a namby-pamby report. Nor was it inherently obscure. As Harold Evans wrote in The Guardian, less than a month after 9/11:
They and their staffs went to great lengths to acquaint the press in advance with the gravity of their findings. "Hell," says Rudman, "it was the first comprehensive rethinking of national security since Harry Truman in 1947."
The conclusions were startling. "States, terrorists and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers."
Hart told me: "We got a terrific sense of the resentment building against the US as a bully which alarmed us." The report was a devastating in dictment of the "fragmented and inadequate" structures and strategies to prevent and then respond to the attacks the commissioners predicted on US cities. Hart specifically mentioned the lack of readiness to respond to "a weapon of mass destruction in a highrise building".
Yet, for all that the Commission failed to do one very fundamental thing: it failed to look back at the era before it, and assess the successes and failures that preceeded it, particularly the rethinking of national security under Truman that Rudman referred to, and the tragic failure of Vietnam, that was obviously-if not exactly clearly-connected to the framework developed under Truman. I would argue that the failure to look back critically at the era before was both an symptom and a cause of the Commission's essential timidity, despite its apparent boldness compared to the brain-dead thinking that has followed since.
The report offered recommendations for organizational change in five key areas:
ensuring the security of the American homeland;
recapitalizing America's strengths in science and education;
redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch;
overhauling the U.S. government personnel system; and
reorganizing Congress's role in national security affairs.
Included under the first topic, the report stated:
The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures.
We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.
Unlike the Bush-created Daprtment of Homeland Security, Hart-Rudman's vision was both carefully-tailored and constitutionally conceived:
NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the three organizations currently on the front line of border security-the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol-transferred to it. NHSA would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including information technology."
.... The legal foundation for the National Homeland Security Agency would rest firmly within the array of Constitutional guarantees for civil liberties....
The potentially catastrophic nature of homeland attacks necessitates our being prepared to use the tremendous resources of the Department of Defense (DoD). Therefore, the department needs to pay far more attention to this mission in the future. We recommend that a new office of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security be created to oversee the various DoD activities and ensure that the necessary resources are made available.
New priorities also need to be set for the U.S. armed forces in light of the threat to the homeland. We urge, in particular, that the National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself ordains. The National Guard should be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake that mission."
Yet, for all this clear-sighted thinking and more-including recommendations for revitalizing science and technology education, and "doubling the federal research and development budget by 2010"-the report never pulled back to look at America from a world historical perspective like that of Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. It never evaluated America as part of a world system, never abandoned the elite version of the assumptions of American exceptionalism, and never looked back to see what sorts of mistakes we had made the last time such a sweeping analysis had taken place.
Which is, precisely, what I want to do right now.
The Two Cold Wars: Kenan's and Nitze's
In a remarkable paper, "Kennan's Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative Analysis," East European Quarterly, Vol. 31, no. 4, January 1998, Efstathios T. Fakiolas analyzed two key documents from the formative days of the Cold War. Kennan's Long Telegram, which first formulated a comprehensive picture of the Soviet threat, and laid the foundations for the doctrine of containment, and NSC-68, the national security directive primarily authored by Paul Nitze, which formed the blueprint for how the US fought the Cold War throughout most of its duration.
Fakiolas used the framework of foreign policy realism for his analysis, but he determined that the two documents employed significantly different models within that tradition. Although they seemed to many people to be kindred documents, Fakiolas uncovers striking differences. I'm going to do a separate diary delving deeper into his argument, but the bottom line for us now is this: Kennan's Long Telegram and Nitze's NSC-68 appear similar, they depend on different models of international relations within the same realist tradition.
Kennan relied on the "tectonic plates" model, in which there many other non-state actors, the world is not "zero-sum," and there is often opportunity for mutual cooperation. Nitze relied on the billiard ball model, which sees the international system as "composed solely of egoistic sovereign states interested in maximizing their relative power capabilities at the expense of others," and sees "world politics is a 'zero-sum' game in which national security conceived of in military and territorial terms is the one and only states' national objective."
As a result, Kennan favored a strategy of containment that emphasized strengthening the West socially, economically and culturally, addressing its flaws which the Soviets exposed. In contrast, Nitze ignored issues of the Wests internal flaws, and focused almost exclusively on military force to combat the Soviet Union.
It's my own observation, based on this analysis, that we fought Nitze's Cold War, but we won Kennan's. It was not, in the end, our military strength that defeated the Soviet Union, it was the appeal of our culture of openness and freedom. The history of Eastern European resistance movements, especially in Checkoslavakia and Poland, makes this abundantly clear. Through their influence on dissident culture, Frank Zappa and Lou Reed did more to win the Cold War than any division of tanks ever did-or even a wing of nuclear armed B-52 bombers.
Post 9/11: The "War On Terror" Response, And It's Invisible Alternative
9/11 was a terrible crime, but it was not an act of war. Simply put, al Qaeda was incapable of waging war against the US. But Bush and Cheney were simply too frightened-not to mention perversely inclined-to realize this. And so they gave al Qaeda exactly what it wanted-a dramatic over-reaction that made America seem exactly like al Qaeda's cartoonish propaganda said we were.
Within days of 9/11, Gallup International conducted a poll 35 countries on 5 continents. It gave people a choice between supporting military action or a legal response-extraditing the terrorists and putting them on trial.
Given this choice, only 54% of the American people supported military action, 30% supported extradition and trial, while 16% were undecided. (The US was one of just 3 countries where more people favored a military response-India and Isreal were the other two, both with spectacular records of failure based on doing exactly what they recommended we do.) During the same time, elite opinion was far more bloodthirsty and monolithic.
In the first three weeks after the attack, the New York Times and the Washington Post ran 46 op-eds that dealt with the issue of how to respond; they were overwhelmingly in favor of war, by a margin of 44 to 2 (32-2 in the Post, 11-0 in the Times) according to a analysis done by the media watch group FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting). The two columns supporting non-military responses were both by guest writers. Thus, neither the Times nor the Post, both long assailed by conservatives as bastions of the "liberal media" had a single staff writer representing 46% of the population-much less the overwhelming majority of people around the world, except for Israel and India.
More than 6 years later, the failure of the war option is undeniable, and yet there is barely any discussion of a truly, fundamentally different approach-one that might actually have a chance of success. And this, quite realistically, is what we might reasonably expect from a candidate like Barack Obama, who tells us that our politics is broken, that we have to transcend outmoded ways of thinking, and that promises us "The Audacity of Hope." Looking back at the examples I've sited in this diary, we might expect a vision that
(1) Recognizes--ala Jihad Vs. McWorld-- that globalization without democratic regulation feeds terrorism, and talks about the need to create a more humane world order, in which people have the means to collectively control their own destinies.
(2) Appreciates==ala Misreading The Public-- the American people's desire to engage the world multilaterally, takes responsibility to inform them accurately, and takes seriously what they have to say about foreign policy, rather than relying on myths.
(3) Embraces and enthusiastically articulates the moral norms approach to foreign policy, and lays out a thematically unified approach that places the struggle against global terrorism in a larger context together with addressing other vital concerns including: - the environment,
- human rights,
- women's rights,
- children's issues,
- global public health and the spread of disease,
- poverty and the powerlessness of the impoverished,
- fair labor practices,
- violent ethnic conflicts,
- the rights of indigenous people to preserve their traditional ways of life, and crucially
- an economics of sustainability that promotes quality of life rather than an unsustainable economic growth.
(4) Has the courage to re-examine the Cold War, and learn from our mistakes last time to avoid repeating them this time.
(5) Recognizes that while our enemy is far too weak to defeat us militarily, it can illuminate flaws in our own system, and that the best way to combat it is to do our best to eliminate those flaws, and strengthen the political, cultural and social virtues that are our greatest strength.
In short, what we want in the way of an alternative progressive foreign policy vision is one that expresses America's core values, and continues the struggle to overcome her flaws, instead of one that contradicts the very core of our being as a nation. |