( - promoted by Chris Bowers)
Chris' analysis around the idea of creating a long-term progressive majority coalition made up of non-white, creative class, LGBT, non-Christian, unmarried women, and labor union members has always been one that makes sense to me. It is a realistic and numbers-based approach to a winning coalition, and as Chris points out, every one of those demographics except members of unions is a growing instead of shrinking one (and union membership is finally starting to stabilize after decades of decline). In the decades to come, that progressive coalition is going to be a dominant one in American politics.
The one thing that has always made me nervous about this kind of analysis has been amplified in recent days by some conversations I have been having with some of my friends in the wake of the Obama primary victory. There is a feeling among some of them is that since Obama won a primary against a tough candidate like Clinton without ever really expanding beyond this basic African-American, youth, and creative class coalition, that maybe we don't need to worry so much in the general election about more traditional white working class voters.
Now, the two kinds of thinking I've mentioned in paragraphs one and two are not exactly in sync, as Chris includes two heavily working class demographics in his winning coalition: labor union members and unmarried women. But both of them downplay the importance of appealing to white, married, working class families who are not in labor unions.
There have been versions of this view in Democratic politics for as long as I've been in politics (28 years full-time now), ironically one on the left and one on the DLC side of the party. The one on the left says that all we have to do to win is to register and turn out higher numbers of African-Americans, Hispanics, and the poor. The one on the right/DLC side says that who we really need to target are not those scary populist working class folks, but the "office park dads" and "security moms"- the comfortable, suburban managers and professionals who are more pro-business, pro-free trade, and uncomfortable with populist talk. I have a number of problems with this:
1. I know there will be OpenLeft.com readers who disagree with this in terms of the lefty version of this strategy, but I've seen both of these approaches tried in both national and local elections and neither of them has really worked. In terms of the mass voter registration/GOTV strategy, in both 2000 and 2004 massive amounts of money went into registration and GOTV, and millions of new voters came to the polls as a result. That was a good thing, as Gore carried the popular vote and many targeted states as a result, and we won some close Senate and House races those years as a result. But it certainly didn't give us the clear national victories we were looking for.
DLCers will argue that their approach worked for Clinton in 1992 and 1996, but that's not really true either. Clinton won in 1992 because of the bad economy and the right-wing's abandonment of George H.W. Bush over the breaking of the no-new-taxes pledge- plus. If you look at Clinton's actual rhetoric and platform in 1992, it was pretty populist overall. In 1996, he broke open the Presidential race when he stood up to Gingrich on the budget in 1995, which certainly wasn't a very DLC thing to do (and which folks in the DLC were advising against).
2. There are a lot of swing voters among those white, married, working-class folks, and they tend to be concentrated in Presidential swing states. If you go back over the exit poll numbers over the last 30 years of Presidential races, virtually all of the sub-categories of white working class voters, including union members and unmarried voters, have gyrated all over the place, sometimes bouncing over 20 points difference between one election and the next. And where do the heaviest concentrations of this demographic tend to reside? States like PA, Ohio, WV, MN, MI, WI, MO- those states that always end up being Presidential swing states.
3. If we are looking to build a long-term, broad-based progressive coalition, one that we don't just squeak by with 51% and 280 electoral votes, one that consistently has more than 250 votes in the House and 55 in the Senate instead of 225 and 51, we're going to need those working class white voters in the heartland. In order to make consistent gains in the progressive agenda we are all fighting for, we have to have bigger majorities than we are currently operating with.
Some people who agree with me on the need to appeal to these kinds of voters believe that we have to move to the right to win them over. I don't believe that is true. On economic issues, they are far more populist than what passes for "centrism" in Washington, D.C. And while they are more conservative on social issues, I like to remind people that Bill Clinton in 1996- after a term where he pushed for gays in the military, enacted a ban on employment discrimination against gays and lesbians in federal government employment, vetoed a partial-birth abortion ban, and signed two gun control bills- won the highest percentage of both working class and rural voters of any Democratic Presidential candidate of the last 44 years. He won those voters by reaching out to them politically, and by speaking their language. The second best percentage among those voters in this period? Clinton in 1992.
So I'll conclude on this note: I am a big believer in a high prioritization on registration and turnout of African-American, Hispanic, young, and unmarried women voters. That's our base, and we can't win without boosting their numbers dramatically. But Barack Obama, and the rest of us progressive Democrats, can't win the general election without really working on those white working class voters. This can't be an either/or, it has got to be both. Obama is perfectly capable of doing it, he just has to have a very conscious and aggressive strategy for political outreach in that demographic: do lots of events in small towns, shake hands at factory gates, revive the bus tour idea from 1992 (which was fundamentally a rural and white working class strategy on our part), and keep talking about the real bread and butter issues that matter to hard-pressed working class voters. If he does all that and the campaign invests heavily in mobilizing base group voters, we will win this election going away. |