| In a lengthy article just published in the journal Foreign Policy, John Edwards really opens up against the "war on terror" frame:
The "war on terror" approach has backfired, straining our military to the breaking point while allowing the threat of terrorism to grow. "War on terror" is a slogan designed for politics, not a strategy to make the United States safe. It is a bumper sticker, not a plan. Worst of all, the "war on terror" has failed. Instead of making the United States safer, it has spawned even more terrorism -- as we have seen so tragically in Iraq -- and left us with fewer allies.
There is no question that we are less safe today as a result of this administration's policies. The Bush administration has walked the United States right into the terrorists' trap. By framing this struggle against extremism as a war, it has reinforced the jihadists' narrative that we want to conquer the Muslim world and that there is a "clash of civilizations" pitting the West against Islam. From Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib, the "war on terror" has tragically become the recruitment poster al Qaeda wanted. Instead of reengaging with the peoples of the world, we have driven too many into the terrorists' arms. In fact, defining the current struggle against radical Islamists as a war minimizes the challenge we face by suggesting that the fight against Islamist extremism can be won on the battlefield alone.
For these reasons, many generals and national security experts have criticized the president's "war on terror" approach. Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni has said that the "war on terror" is a counterproductive doctrine. So has the government of one of our closest allies; the new British prime minister, Gordon Brown, has distanced himself from the term. Admiral William Fallon -- President George W. Bush's new chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) -- has instructed his staff to stop saying that we are in a "long war." These leaders know that we need substance, not slogans.
Leading Republicans have echoed such views. The president's own former secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, said last March that the doctrine was one of his regrets. "It is not a war on terror," he flatly told an interviewer. Meanwhile, former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani curiously seems to have forgotten that he said in March that we should abandon the "war on terror" approach because, in his words, "America is seen as a country by too many that wants to have war, or exercises its power too much, pushes its weight around too much."
Yet the politics of fear remains tempting. Some have chosen to pillory those who dare question the concept of a "war on terror" as somehow weak. But these attacks unmask the slogan for what it is: a political sledgehammer used to stifle debate and justify policies that would otherwise be utterly unacceptable.
To longtime readers, it should come as no surprise that I cannot applaud this passage enough. Fully three years ago, in an article entitled Democrats Must Abandon the War on Terror, I wrote the following:
- The War on Terror is a conservative frame. It is a phrase that was invented by Bush speechwriters after 9/11 for the sole purpose of casting the upcoming shift in foreign policy in terms that would evoke the conservative worldview in both the majority of the nation and the majority of electorate.
- The War on Terror evokes specific conservative ideas that include, but are not limited to, all of the following: the need for continuing escalation of the size and influence of the military industrial complex; a simplistic conceptualization of identity revolving primarily around the notion of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West; a view that threats can only be countered and tamed through the use of force; justification of any United States military action overseas, whether unilateral or pre-emptive.
Those two quotes matchup pretty well, I have to say. This is the sort of thinking I have been looking for from Democratic politicians on this issue for several years now. Bravo, Senator Edwards.
However, I should also note that electoral campaigns are not an easy platform from which to lead change on broad ideological outlooks. For one thing, candidates are looking to differentiate themselves from one another. If a candidate shows leadership on an issue, it is not likely that other candidates will emulate them, lest they look as though they are being led around by the nose. Thus, we see Edwards focusing on repudiating the war on terror, Richardson focusing on "no residual forces," and Obama focusing on "better judgment" based on the rejection of pre-emptive war, an international upbringing, and the 2002 vote authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. The problem here is that while I like all three of the niches these candidates have carved out, it seems increasingly unlikely that anyone will start trumpeting all three positions as long as the nomination campaign is undecided. While it would be better if every candidate was simultaneously rejecting pre-emptive war, the war on terror frame, and talking about "no residual forces in Iraq" (I know some may disagree with me on that last one), it seems that the nature of campaigning itself will prevent that from happening over the next few months.
This is actually something of a catch-22. It is unlikely that Edwards, Obama and Richardson would be touring the country making speeches about rejecting the war on terror, rejecting pre-emptive war, and the need for no residual forces in Iraq unless each of them were running for President. In fact, that all three candidates are running behind Clinton in the polls probably hastened their desire to find a solid progressive foreign policy niche, and sharpened their tone in delivering messages based on that niche. In this way, the campaign both made it possible for prominent Democrats to take such great stances, while simultaneously making it virtually impossible for any first or second tier Democrat to adopt all of these stances.
I think one clear way to get around this catch-22 was demonstrated by Howard Dean in 2004. When he carved out a niche for himself as opposed to the Iraq war from the start, rather than in simply when and how the war was waged, he received a huge amount of support and upward movement in the polls as a result. From that point, once front-running candidates like John Kerry needed to adopt a more anti-war tone in order to try and blunt the momentum Dean was receiving from the issue. In other words, electoral campaigns can be used to create broad change on an issue, but only if long-shot candidates are able to use an issue niche to swing an election, or at least propel themselves to top-tier status.
Right now, that isn't happening in the 2008 Democratic campaign, but I wish it would. If Hillary Clinton does in fact become the nominee, but she talks about rejecting the war on terror frame, rejecting pre-emptive war, and no residual forces in Iraq during the general election, I would be pretty happy. However, that will probably only happen if she starts feeling real heat from Edwards, Obama and Richardson in national and early state polls and activist support. Right now, she is doing fine in both categories, and so her desire to adopt either the rhetoric of the foreign policy stances of other candidates is minimal. |
