This past week, over at Salon, Thom Schaller conducted two conversations with a trio of different experts on the House and Senate races respectively. Both panels came up with relatively consistent predictions, which is hardly surprising given who they were: on the Senate, Jennifer Duffy of the Cook Political Report, Nathan Gonzales of Rothenberg Political Report, and Amy Walter of Hotline, and on the House, Stu Rothenberg himself, Tim Sahd of House Race Hotline and David Wasserman of Cook Political Report. With similar sorts of methodology and data, the Senate predictions averaged a Democratic gain of six, which is right in line with what Chris has been cautiously predicting since at least May 20, and the House predictions centered around 15.
But, of course, this is still pretty far out from election day, and Rothenberg himself said that while they were all in the same ballpark,
I say that with the caveat that the ballpark may get torn down and rebuilt with a very different range three or four months from now.
The two-fold question is, quite simply, (1) what are the chances of that? And (2) how can we know?
I want to begin by reviewing what Shaller's panels had to say, to get a flavor of how they see things, which I think reflects a fairly solid level of professionalism subject to the limits of normal politics. I then want to move on to the question of what is arrayed against the process of normal politics, how that might play out, and how much we can know about it.
I just want to do a brief review here of some of the recent signs pointing to an ever-more-likely landslide victory scenario this November, with special emphasis on the House.
I'm combining information from three sources: Rasmussen, Democracy Corps and Cook Political Report.
First, there's the latest information on Partisan ID from Rasmussen, based on their daily tracking polls. Here's the chart I generated from their data. It shows how Democratic Party identification jumped sharply from the beginning of the primary season, after falling into the doldrums during 2007, when the Democratic Congress basically failed to deliver much of anything. It's remained fairly steady the last few months, but at record high levels:
A bit explanation and the table the chart is based on can be found on the flip, along the goods from Democracy Corps and Cook Political Report.
The last time a Democrat won this congressional district was 1973. LA-6 has a Cook PVI of R+7. As Cazayoux won by 3 points, does that mean that every congressional district with a PVI of R+10 is in play this year?
Basically, I would say, "Yes." They may not be in play yet, but every last one of them could be, come election day, provided we've got someone in the race. Because, in all likelihood, it's only going to get progressively worse for the GOP. They've already shown their utter ineptitude in playing defense, and they're going to be playing defense all the way to November, which is only going to compound their current woes.
Here's a chart from a diary about three weeks ago, "House 2008: Realigment Guy Adds His Two Cents" showing 49 seats that are GOP PVI 10 that were on Swing State Project's "Battleground" list at the time:
But with the way things are going now, we ought to be looking at the other 54 seats that PVI 10 or better that aren't on Swing State's "Battleground" list.
We all want more Democrats in the Congress, but how many more is realistic? Senator Chuck Schumer has suggested as many as 8 Senate seats (Dems are ahead in 5 already: VA, NH, NM, CO and AK). The Cook Political Report has been quoted as predicting 5-10 House seats and 3-6 Senate seats. I'll say right now that I think 20 House seats is realistic. How?
First, as the SF Chronicle noted on Monday, 29 House GOPers have announced their retirement, and only 6 Dems plus Tom Lantos' vacant seat (CA-12). So the GOP has many more open seats to try to defend, so many that in their straitened financial circumstances, they can't expect to do much offense.
This creates a historic opportunity for the Dems. Normally, after a "wave" election such as 2006, when 33 House seats changed party, the winners lose at least a few seats in the next election. The Dems won 8 seats back in 1996, following the stunning 1994 election, when the GOP took a net 54 seats and control of the House from the Dems.
But this year is different. The big Dem retirements occurred in 1994, and were a big reason why the GOP took the House that year. In 2006, there were only the normal few retirements; the big GOP defections are occurring this year, as the GOPers consider another 2-4 years in the minority.
Secondly, 1996 was the midpoint of Clinton's first term, while in 2008 the public is clearly fed up with George Bush and the GOP, and may well sweep a Dem into the White House with the help of a swell of new voters, or new Dem voters. And then there is the money issue. The NRCC is dealing with an apparent embezzlement scandal on top of the loss of power, recruitment is down and their candidates just can't get any traction.
While I deeply appreciate this sort of analysis-along with the more detailed look at specific seats that followed-every time I see something like this, I can't help but bring up the issue of realignment. For one thing, I've been aware of relignment for a long time, and have been especially keen on it since reading Democracy Heading South, by Azugustus Cochrane III, back in 2001, prior to 9/11. But it wasn't until shortly before the mid-terms last year that I sumbled on the realization that, historically, two consecutive House wave elections are the key to Presidential realignment. Yes, it's true that normally one wave election is followed by either a counter-wave, or at least a slight correction. But when this doesn't happen, that's when real, profound political change becomes possible.
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