In the earlier diaries I posted today a number of issues have come up that I think deeserve further reflection and response. So I'm going to deal with several of them.
First up, some folks argued that the Stupak Amendment was no big deal, really, or at best overblown as an issue, even a red herring. But Digby had is exactly right --the Stupak Amendment is establishment payback for getting uppity [emphasis added]:
One of the things that those of us who follow politics from afar tend to see that those who are involved in the minutia often understandably miss, is the over arching themes that guide the politicians and the villagers. I don't suppose that they are necessarily aware of it, although some of the influential strategists may be, but it's there nonetheless.
I knew that after all the sturm and drang over the past few months over the public option, the number one liberal priority in the health care debate, there would be a price for its success. The ruling elite could never allow an unambiguous liberal victory. It would endanger their narrative that says fealty to business, religion, military and other authoritarian structures is democratically inspired. They have to maintain the fiction that the people prefer to be subjects. If politicians aren't convinced that there will be a price for being liberals, they might get the idea that they can actually govern liberally.
Second, another major issuse concerned the efficacy of challenging and defeating reactionary Democrats. For the most part, this concern is either born out of chronic cynicism (in which case, I have to ask, why are you posting at Open Left?) or misunderstanding. Challenging and defeating reactionary Democrats is not a silver bullet. It's just one task among many. In Digby's post just referred to she essentially talks about hegemonic struggle, and about why the establishment can't tolerate allowing a clean liberal victory. Extracting a penalty in response to their penalty is just one part of the larger struggle we need to be engaged in. And even if candidates do lose, their campaigns represent an opportunity to educate voters. As I wrote in one of my comments, this is precisely how Bernie Sanders moved, over time, from getting 1% of the vote in his election to being a US Senator.
Third, some have complained that this is bad strategy. That (a) it's already too late in the cycle, (b) we should be targetting other issues--such as economic ones, (c) we should be postitively supporting existing progressive challengers instead. Both (a) and (b) have some truth in them--but this simply reflects the numerous ways in which the system protects itself. The point is that this pair of votes--the Stupak Amendment and final House passage--have provided a rare opportunity in which points that are usually intentionally muddied for the general electorate have become strikingly clear. And just because the timing is not optimal, and issue is not squarely in the middle of where voters are suffering most does not mean we should ignore this opportunity. Sieze whatever opportunity you can grab hold of--especially the opportunity to strike back at the sort of move that Digby describes. As for (c), it's most certainly true, but a case of walking and chewing gum at the same time.
To begin the process of focusing our anger toward productive corrective action in next year's elections, I've compiled a table with some relevant information about Democrats who voted for the Stupak Amendment.
In the wake of House passage of the health care bill & the Stupak Amendment, we clearly have our work cut out for us. Yet, at the same time, we have a tremendous opportunity: a very sizeable number of bad Dems have very publicly identified themselves in a way that average voters can readily grasp. Whether or not they can be defeated in primaries next year, they can clearly be organized against, and that means that progressive infrastructure can be built in their districts, to increase pressure on them in the future. And in some cases--where their general election margins are small--independent progressive candidates in the general election can be enough to defeat them. Newly drawn districts in 2012 will mean that more progressive replacement candidates will have a much better shot as a result. It's quite clear that we need to do this. There is really no other way to ensure that House members will show any loyalty whatsoever to those who elected them. And so here is a preliminary list of those who voted for the Stupak Amendment, along with some pertinent information for gauging who might be the highest priority to concentrate on getting rid of.
Some of these people--such as Stupak himself--have designs on higher office next year. Making sure that they fail should be a top priority for us. Narrow general election victories and low Progressive Punch scores indicate vulnerability to general election challenges and disappointed core constituencies, respectively. Crucial vote scores for this current session are particularly salient in terms of potential for recruiting activists to work against them. Another re-sort according to general election percentages is presented on the flip.
Some House Republicans are boasting about their chances of regaining control of the House in 2010 and relegating Democrats led by Speaker Nancy Pelosi to minority status for the second half of President Obama's term.
"I have no doubt that we will," said Representative Tom Price, the Georgia Republican who leads the conservative Republican Study Committee. "The American people want checks and balances, and the way to do that is to put Republicans back in charge."
Publicly and privately, Republicans have been upbeat about the midterm outlook, saying voter unrest demonstrated at meetings this summer coupled with strong candidate recruitment have them highly optimistic about capturing 40 or more Democratic seats and resuming command of the House. They are talking confidently about knocking off such old bulls as Representatives David R. Obey of Wisconsin and Ike Skelton of Missouri, the chairmen of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees.
FYI, Obey, who's been in Congress since 1969, won re-election last year with 62% of the vote, while Skelton, there since 1977, won with 66%--in a district that McCain carriedwith 61%.
Foolish trash-talk much?
But of course! What else are Versailles stenographers going to write?
Meanwhile, DKos started asking the generic ballot question, and has crosstabs, most notably by region:
QUESTION: Would you like to see more Democrats or Republicans elected to Congress in 2010?
DEMS REPS NOT SURE
All 34 28 38
NE 50 7 43
South 20 46 34
MW 36 25 39
West 35 27 38
How many more seats does the GOP think it can win in the South, anyway?
Still, the fact that Reps do better when matched against the Dems than they do standing alone is something that really ought to worry the Dems, but somehow it doesn't. As reported in this piece and elsewhere, the Dems vow not to be caught flat-footed as they were in 1994, and avoiding that probably won't be too hard. But learning the real lesson--to stop being such corporate tools, and rediscover the bottom 90% of American families--that's a bit beyond them.
Last weekend, I wrote a diary, "2010 Election Prospects & Strategic Organizing", in which I paid a lot of attention to the declining volatility of House elections, and the virtual disappearance of "swing-back" or "counterwave" elections, wave elections in one direction that follow and counter previous wave elections in the opposite direction. Looking at swing-back elections by the decade since 1900, I presented this revealing chart, showing how they've virtually vanished:
Once they were incredibly common, because elections as a whole were far more competitive, and the seats won in one wave election were particularly vulnerable to being lost in the next election, particularly if national fortunes changed... or failed to. But the fact that these elections are now so rare reflects the more basic fact that elections tend to be much less competitive, with relatively few incumbents ever losing compared to previous historical eras.
This was only one set of figures I presented, but it gets to the very heart of the matter--the once commonplace swing-back elections that Versailles still thinks are routine are not to be expected--though of course, they aren't impossible, either. Just rare as hen's teeth is all. In my conclusiuon, I wrote:
What the above figures strongly suggest is that the Dems are in no real danger of losing control of the House in 2010. That makes conditions ideal for progressives to shift their focus almost entirely from a "more Dem" to a "better Dem" strategy--up to and including letting some bad Dems lose this time around, to help send a message that there are consequences for lack of loyalty to those who elected you in the first place.
In this diary, rather than look at how things have changed in a historical trend of declining volatility, I want to take a look at the cycles of realignment, starting all the way back in 1800, if you'll join me on the flip.
In the last three "wave elections," the party that lost a large number of seats has been hampered by incumbents not running for reelection. But so far in the 2010 cycle, not a single House member has announced his or her retirement, though 18 - seven Democrats and 11 Republicans - have said they will run for higher office.
Given that ten Senators have announced their retirement, this is very odd and probably just a statistical quick. Even if it is just a quirk, it is helpful to Democrats, as Republicans need these open seats to gain ground.
I just wrote a post on Friday comparing the number of open seats Democrats will have to defend in 2010 to those they had to defend in 1994 and the GOP had to defend in 2006 and 2008, and it's MUCH lower. And we can already say it will bear no resemblance to anything that happened over those three cycles, which is one huge reason Democrats are not just walking off the cliff.
Added to these two observations, I have one more historical note to add along a somewhat different line of attack: Swing-back wave elections (a wave election in one direction following a previous wave to the other side) have grown increasing less common and less decisive over the decades-as have clusters of swing elections, regardless of which way they go. (Indeed the last time there were three 20+ seat wave elections in a row was 1942-1952, when there were six such wave elections in a row, with the largest wave peaking at a 75-seat Democratic gain in 1948, following a 54-seat GOP gain in 1946-the first time the GOP captured the House since before the Great Depression.) While none of these observations in itself should be taken to prove anything, especially this far out from November 2010, together, these three observations point to a very strong likelihood that the GOP is not going move any mountains next year. Indeed, this is clearly what the historical patterns point to. And maybe it's time we started strategizing with that in mind, including a an increased strategic focus on getting rid of some bad some Dems, as well as promoting some good ones.
More on my swing-back election argument and some thoughts about strategy on the flip.
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