In January of 1998, the news about Monica Lewinsky exploded in the Washington media world. It was 24-7, and red hot intense. Within 72 hours, Republicans were calling for Clinton's resignation or impeachment, and some Democrats- even some liberal ones like Paul Wellstone- were on the verge of doing the same. Clinton survived the first barrage of calls for him to step down, but as that long year wore on, and more and more salacious news came out- topped off by the stained dress in August- it looked worse and worse for both Clinton and the Democratic Party.
Republicans were salivating at their prospects in the November elections, and Democrats were running scared. Pundits were predicting big losses for the Democrats in Congress: 30 plus seats in the House and five or six in the Senate. It didn't turn out that way, though. For the first time in 176 years, the party with a President in office in his 6th year actually picked up seats in the Congress (we picked up 5 in the House, while staying even in the Senate.) Without going into detail as to why (if you want to know more about that, you can go here), the bottom line is that progressives outside the party structure helped chart a bold strategy for winning that made all the difference.
Instead of avoiding the President's problems, we made the case that it was time for the country to move on, that all the Republicans wanted to do was wallow in the mud, and instead the country needed to focus on solving our problems. After initially resisting this approach, Democrats ended up embracing it, and we shocked the political world by picking up five seats instead of losing 30.
2010 is a very different kind of year, but it also looks bad for Democrats right now. It feels a lot like 1994 right now, with a weak economy, an impassioned right wing movement, and a discouraged Democratic base. We didn't do very well in the 2009 elections, and forecasts of ugly job numbers for a long time to come are making a lot of voters feel angry and discouraged. But I am convinced that there is a strategy that can turn the 2010 election around. That strategy needs to be built around health care, jobs, and taking on the big banks. None of these things are easy, but I am convinced that they are by far the best hope Democrats have.
The two major problems that Democrats face in the 2010 elections are:
Voters who supported Democrats in 2008, but who are shifting toward Republicans (or other parties) in 2010;
Voters who supported Democrats in 2008, but who will not vote in 2010.
Determining which of these problems is most severe will help determine Democratic strategy in not only the 2010 elections, but in the legislative season leading up to those elections. Should Democrats appeal more to a progress-leaning base unimpressed by Democratic accomplishments so far, or should they turn toward a conservative-leaning swing vote that is slowly finding Republicans more appealing?
Over at Pollster.com, Charles Franklin looks at the data in New Jersey and Virginia. He concludes that a shift of Democratic-voters toward Republicans was a bigger factor in the Democratic defeats in those states than was the lower turnout among (mostly young) Democrats.
Franklin's conclusions are not entirely convincing, because it is difficult to separate the two variables from each other. For example, the large shift among Independents toward Republicans was partially caused by lower turnout among young, Democratic-leaning Independents. The pro-Republican shift among Independents was not just caused by Independents switching their vote from Democrats to Republicans.
However, even if it is not possible to definitely prove whether lower Democratic turnout or voter shift to Republicans is the main problem facing Democrats, even attempting such a determination may present a false choice. First, both of these problems exist, and so addressing only one is always only a partial strategy. Second, there may well be ways to appeal to both disillusioned voters and to swing voters at the same time.
Too often political analysts look at the electorate in the same way that they look at winning a majority of votes for a piece of legislation in Congress. There is an underlying belief that appealing to progressives will lose conservative voters, and vice versa. However, that is not necessarily the case among voters, for whom delivering on promises, objective economic conditions, and the apparent cultural orientation of politicians are often just as important as abstract ideological considerations.
Obviously, improved economic conditions will be one way to simultaneously appeal to disillusioned voters and to swing voters. There might be other ways as well, including an improved national image in the rest of the world, or even success in major 2010 international sporting events (Olympics and World Cup). Clamping down hard on corruption within your own party couldn't hurt, either. Whatever the best paths might turn out to be, the best strategies will reject an either / or of exciting the base and appealing to swing voters as an unnecessary false choice.
This just in--Ned Lamont is looking to run for Governor in Connecticut:
NED LAMONT ANNOUNCES FORMATION OF EXPLORATORY COMMITTEE
Norwalk, CT - Ned Lamont, successful businessman, co-founder of the state policy center at Central Connecticut State University, and Democratic nominee for US Senate in 2006, announced that he will be filing papers today with the State Elections Enforcement Commission establishing an Exploratory Committee for statewide office:
"As I have continued to meet with citizens across our state over the last three years, as co-chairman of President Obama's Connecticut campaign and on behalf of health care reform, I have been constantly reminded that Connecticut is not living up to its potential and that too many of our families are being left behind," said Lamont.
"Like businesses, states thrive with strong executive leadership, and they fall behind with weak leadership. As measured by the loss of jobs, young people leaving our state, and the never-ending budget crisis, Connecticut's Chief Executive is simply not getting the job done."
There is no polling on Lamont in this campaign. Republian Governor Jodi Rell is able to run for another term, and was popular as of February. However, that could easily change in the current, anti-incumbent climate.
A couple other Democrats have announced they are running, as well.
There are not many progressive Democratic Governors. Lamont's entry into this campaign could change that.
We can sit around and complain that the post-election spin is not properly giving credit to Democratic and progressive victories in the House, in mayoral campaigns, and in many ballot initiatives outside of the painful defeat in Maine. Or, we can realize that in this instance, given the magnitude of the problems facing the country, spin is insignificant compared to the power of the force economic conditions facing the average American.
When you are highly engaged in political news and activism, there is a tendency to overestimate the importance of winning the messaging war. However, there probably isn't a single American who will vote in 2010 based on how well one side or the other messaged after the 2009 elections. The post-election spin is distant, abstract horse pockey compared to the job market, the health care market, the housing market, and other very real economic problems people are facing in their everyday lives.
As Mike wrote this morning, Democratic performance in the 2010 elections will be based on whether Democrats "deliver the goods," aka, the economic improvements they were hired to produce. If economic conditions still suck in 2010, then Democrats are toast no matter what sort of spin or other abstract positioning in which we engage.
We can already see that in the outcome of the elections last night. Democrats were reduced in the two states where they had been in power for eight years during the economic difficulties (New Jersey and Virginia), but were still able to make gains at the federal level (swept the House seats), where they have really only been in charge for one year. The lesson is clear: if you are in power during an economic catastrophe, voters will replace whoever you are with just about anything.
For now, at the federal level at least, voters still blame Republicans. However, that will no longer be the case by 2010. By that point, we will own either the continue economic slump or the ongoing economic recovery. As such, in both political and human terms, it is imperative that there is an substantial improvement in the economic livelihood of average Americans over the next year. To do this, Democrats are not only going to need to make sure that the health care bill contain benefits that will kick in during 2010 (something which Democrats in Congress are increasingly aware of and delivering), but that there can be additional stimulus spending over the next year.
There is no going to be any way to pass a second omnibus stimulus bill. Support simply is not there for it, either in Congress or in the public at large. However, there are two things that can be done (more in the extended entry):
The first part of this series discussed how Perot voters formed roughly two-thirds of the Republican gains in the national House popular vote from 1992 to 1994. While certainly there were multiple factors, including the 1994 health care debacle, polls strongly suggest that NAFTA was their primary source of Perot voter dissatisfaction with Democrats. While the bailout could potentially serve a similar function in 2010, we live in a more polarized era with nowhere near the same percentage of the electorate up for grabs as 1992-1994. As Such, a similar swing in 2010 is unlikely.
In the second part, we looked at how dissatisfaction with President Clinton among the American left was substantial, and led to low liberal and labor turnout in 1994. So far, the American left is significantly more satisfied with President Obama and the current incarnation of the Democratic Party. However, there are still worrying signs that Democrats will experience significant drop-offs in turnout in 2010.
This article looks at the third main piece of the puzzle for Republicans in 1994: southern whites. That year, for the first time, Republicans extended their strong performances among southern whites from the presidential level to the congressional level. Not only was this an essential in helping Republicans find enough seats to take over Congress in 1994, but it also gave their "revolution" enough stability to last for twelve years.
In terms of seats, 1994 was not dominated by the South While the current incarnation of the Republican Party is heavily associated with the South, at least in terms of seats won, the Republican wave in 1994 was not disproportionately southern.
In 1994, the eleven states that once formed the Confederacy represented 28.7% (125 of 435) of the seats in the House. That year, 29.6% of the Republican net gain in House seats (16 of 54), came from those eleven states. In the Senate, only three of the nine Republican pickups were from former Confederate states. Fueled by southern whites in the South, and Perot voters everywhere else, 1994 was a national victory for Republicans, not a regional one.
Much more, including a cool historical graph, in the extended entry.
President Obama's approval ratings are, as was probably inevitable in this type of economic climate, declining. The Democratic advantage in the generic congressional ballot is eroding (I see no reason to exclude Rasmussen from that average). Job ratings for congressional Democrats are also going down. Fewer Americans are self-identifying as Democrats, too.
At the same time, Republicans are not showing an increase in support. Fewer Americans are also self-identifying as Republicans, and the GOP has made up no ground in partisan self-identification. Republicans have not increased their numbers in the generic congressional ballot, even though they are closer to Democrats than before. The Republican Party is viewed as, or more, unfavorably than it was in late 2008. Further, congressional Republicans have not seen any increase in their job approval during 2009.
Overall, what we are seeing so far is not a shift toward Republicans from Democrats, but rather an increase in the number of people who dislike both parties and have become "undecided" as a result. As such, if 2010 was a presidential election year, I would say this environment was ripe for a Perot-style, third-party challenge to once again break into the double-digits of popular support. The best bet for such a challenge would be an anti-Wall Street General, given the extremely low popularity of Wall Street and the high favorability maintained by the military.
For such a challenge to reach 15%-20% national support, the American exceptionalist, Perot line of anti-trade, anti-immigrant, anti-war, and now, in our own era, pro-coal is probably the best bet. It wouldn't win, but it would temporarily shake a lot of voters loose. Such voters would mainly come from the Republican coalition.
However, 2010 is not a presidential election. As such, given the consistently poor performance of third-parties in congressional elections, it is highly unlikely that increasing dissatisfaction with both parties will lead to a third-party breakthrough in the midterms. Here are the national popular vote totals for all third parties, combined, in House elections since 1978 (more in the extended entry):
It doesn't take much political analysis to conclude that the state of the economy in the fall of 2010 will largely determine the outcome of the 2010 midterm elections. In areas of the country where economic conditions are improving for most people, Democrats will likely do extremely well. In areas of the country where economic conditions are either stagnating or continuing to deteriorate for most people, Republicans should see improvements from their 2006 and 2008 performances. No amount of spin, or strategic improvements, or even progressive infrastructure can do much to change this dynamic.
Also of note, there is very little in the way of new economic policy that will change this dynamic. This is because federal economic policy for the period between now and October-November of 2010 has largely already been passed and implemented. The policy battles in which we are currently engaged will mainly impact economic conditions in 2011, 2013, and even further down the road. Here is why:
Trains that have already left the station
Bailouts: Don't expect much, if anything, in the way of new, congressionally mandated bailouts to financial institutions or automakers between now and 2010. Such bailouts highly unpopular, and will not take place in another election year.
Stimulus: Don't expect a second, large-scale stimulus, either. Given low public support for a second stimulus plan (only 27% according to a recent CBS poll), the current stimulus is the only plan we should expect to get. Discussions about whether or not we should have another one are entirely academic. Personally, given that I think we needed a larger stimulus, I also think we need a second stimulus, but it just ain't going to happen.
Budget. The non-health care aspects of the federal budget are also a done deal. The votes to pass the budget are already in place, and the budget will cover federal spending until September 30th, 2010. That is only five weeks from the 2010 elections.
Health Care: Major provisions of health care legislation, including a public option and requiring insurance companies to accept all applicants, will not take effect until 2013. So, even if health care reform passes, it isn't going to have much impact on economic conditions for not only the 2010 elections, but even for the 2012 elections.
Collectively, this means that federal spending plans from now through the 2010 elections is already in place. Given that Democratic electoral fortunes are largely tied to the state of the economy come election time, in the short-term, the policy mold for the midterm elections has largely been cast.
While the mold has largely been cast, in the extended entry, I look at the areas where Democrats can still nibble around the edges to improve economic conditions for most people by 2010.
I have been involved in national politics in one way or another for about 25 years now, and have been part of literally thousands of national discussions on political targeting. For most of that time, the state of Texas sticks out as the great oddity, the exception to all other demographic trends that seem to hold true around the rest of the country. At the beginning, people in targeting meetings are always saying things like "If you look at the demographics in Texas, it ought to be winnable." By the end of every cycle, none of us at the national level is targeting the state and the state-wide Democratic candidate loses by 10-12 points.
It wasn't always this way. In the 1960s, a President from Texas led the way in getting civil rights legislation, Medicare and Medicaid, and many of the other progressive reforms of that decade. Even as the rest of the south was turning to the right and the Republican Party in those years, Texas elected crusading liberal Ralph Yarborough in 1964. A couple of decades later, Democrats - including legendary populist progressive Jim Hightower - swept to power in the 1980s, culminating with Ann Richards historic victory in the 1990 Governor's race.
But that was a while ago now. The Rove-DeLay machine has been remarkably effective over the last couple of decades. Democrats have not won a gubernatorial race since Richards' victory (and they haven't won a Presidential race since Carter in 1976). Republicans have controlled both Senate seats since Lloyd Bentsen stepped down in 1993. They have had the majority in both legislative chambers since 2003. And this has all happened as the number of Hispanics in Texas has steadily, inexorably risen year after year.
I explain why that's so important, and what I think the future of Democrats in Texas looks like, in the extended entry.
When Ellen Tauscher announced she was headed for the State Department it seemed there would be no shortage of Democrats running to replace her in this safe district, including California's Lt. Gov, John Garamendi, who ducked out of the race for governor when he got no traction and decided not to contest Republican held CA-03. Recently though, CNN's Campbell Brown (bleck!) interviewed a candidate I hadn't heard anything about until now, and after watching the clip I walked away impressed.
Last October, Representative Michele "Crazy as Steve King" Bachmann (MN-06) disgraced herself on "Hardball" and sparked a ridiculously successful fundraising drive for her Democratic opponent, El Tinklenberg. I was impressed by the enthusiasm and kicked in a few bucks for Tinklenberg myself, but I was dismayed to see bloggers continue to help him raise money even after he'd raised more than $750,000 and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee had promised to spend an additional $1 million in his district. Within a few days of Bachmann's notorious comments, Tinklenberg had more money than he needed to run a solid media and GOTV campaign during the final two weeks before the election.
A fellow Iowa blogger sent me this piece from CQ Politics about how Tinklenberg's campaign committee was the largest donor to the DCCC in March, giving a total of $250,000:
You may recall that his Republican opponent was Rep. Michele Bachmann, whose mid-October comment that Obama "may have anti-American views" angered Democrats nationwide and spawned an avalanche of contributions to Tinklenberg in the waning days of a campaign that Bachmann won by 46 percent to 43 percent, with a third-party candidate taking 10 percent.
Apparently the money was coming in too fast for Tinklenberg to spend completely: he raised $3 million for his campaign, of which $1.9 million came in after October 15, and had $453,000 in leftover campaign funds at the end of 2008 and $184,000 at the end of March.
(Via Jane Hamsher) Back in mid-February during the fight over the stimulus package, Senator Chris Dodd was pushing for retroactive restrictions on bonuses paid to employees of financial companies receiving bailout money. This measure, which would have applied to AIG bonuses, was opposed by both Wall Street and the Obama administration:
As word spread Friday about the new and retroactive limit -- inserted by Democratic Sen. Christopher Dodd of Connecticut -- so did consternation on Wall Street and in the Obama administration, which opposed it.
Both Larry Summers and Tim Geithner personally asked Senator Dodd to remove the retroactive provision, because they thought it meant banks would give the government its money back:
The administration is concerned the rules will prompt a wave of banks to return the government's money and forgo future assistance, undermining the aid program's effectiveness. Both Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers, who heads the National Economic Council, had called Sen. Dodd and asked him to reconsider, these people said.
Word of the bonuses last week stirred such deep consternation inside the Obama administration that Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner told the firm they were unacceptable and demanded they be renegotiated, a senior administration official said.(...)
The administration official said the Treasury Department did its own legal analysis and concluded that those contracts could not be broken. The official noted that even a provision recently pushed through Congress by Senator Christopher J. Dodd, a Connecticut Democrat, had an exemption for such bonus agreements already in place.
Don't forget that Chris Dodd is the most endangered Democratic Senate incumbent in 2010, as he currently trails his Republican challenger Robert Simmons. Hard to imagine how Dodd's re-election chances will be helped by a senior White House source telling the New York Times that Dodd is to blame for the AIG bonuses.
We have spent the last three months feverishly dissecting and working on Obama administration appointments and policy. Now, with House and Senate dotting the i's and crossing the t's on the jobs / stimulus package, and with the President's Day congressional recess coming up in a few days, let's take a short break and return to elections for a moment.
The first principle we must keep in mind for the November 2nd, 2010 elections is that if we lose seats next year, we will be in serious danger for 2012 and 2014. While we are in no real danger of losing the Democratic trifecta in 2010, if we lose seats then it is virtually a guarantee the trifecta will be gone in 2012 or 2014. In the extended entry, I explain why.
Looking through recaps of last night's defeat in the Georgia Senate election, I agree with a lot of what Matt, Kos and Nate Silver have written.
Matt argues that it the country hasn't shifted so far to the left that a progressive has a decent shot in a statewide election in Georgia. Rather, we all knew it was always a longshot campaign, and people didn't want to invest in such a difficult election both after big wins in November and with so much other positive news for Democrats. Even Obama didn't invest himself too strongly, not wanting to risk political capital so recently after his election. So, Democratic turnout and activism were both down, making an already underdog campaign virtually impossible to win. I agree: we have moved the country, but a large, stable leftward shift has not yet materialized. We have more work to do.
Kos makes similar points to Matt about the lack of Democratic activist and voter enthusiasm, adding that special election and runoff elections have frequently swum against the dominant political tide. For example, Democrats won the Louisiana runoff in 2003, while Republicans won it in 2007. Republicans won the CA-50 special election in June 2006, but Democrats won the SD-AL and KY-06 special elections in early 2004. In all of those cases, the next federal election turned in the opposite direction. So, perhaps this result doesn't really mean much at all nationally, and is simply local. Again, I agree.
Nate brings up a more disturbing possibility: Democrats are already in the hot seat in the mind of the electorate, and will lose seats in both 2010 and 2012 unless they make real progress turning the country around. In other words, if Democrats can't fix the nation's problems, the country will actually turn back toward Republicans, and there will be no two to four year grace period as I have previously surmised. The reason Nate's thesis is so disturbing is that a new Democracy Corps poll shows he is probably correct.
