From our analysis of the Current Population Survey post-election supplement, here are our estimates for voter turnout in 2008: 76.4% white, 11.9% black, 7.4% hispanic, 4.3% other, with the categories defined as mutually exclusive (for example, if you're white and hispanic, you count as "hispanic"). The exit polls say 74% white, 13% black, 9% hispanic, and 5% other (not adding to 100% because of rounding error), but I think CPS is more trustworthy.
Now we can take the Dukakis numbers and plug them into the 2008 turnout numbers, as long as we make some estimate for the votes of "other." I'll assume 55%, halfway between his performance among whites and among hispanics. (By comparison, we estimate from the Pew pre-election polls that Obama got 45% of the two-party vote among whites, 96% among blacks, 68% among hispanics, and 59% among others.)
Plugging in Dukakis's percentages by ethnic group and using the turnout numbers of 2008, we get a national adjusted Dukakis vote of .40*76.4% + .89*11.9% + .70*7.4% + .55*4.3% = 48.7%, which is better than the 46.1% he actually received but not quite enough to win.
My counter argument is that even if Andrew's numbers are correct (they do contradict the exit polls, but those polls have a margin of error), then while my 50%+1 claim was slightly off, Dukakis still would have won an electoral college victory and become President.
According to Dave Leip's Atlas of Presidential Elections, Barack Obama received 52.87% of the national popular vote, and 365 electoral votes. Had there been an even, nationwide shift of 4.17% away from that total in all 50 states, and even if all 4.17% of those voters had shifted to McCain, it would not have flipped enough electoral votes to put McCain over the top. Only Florida (27), Indiana (11), Nebraska-02 (1), North Carolina (15), Ohio (20), and Virginia (13) were decided by 8.34% or less, flipping 87 electoral votes to John McCain. However, that would have still left our temporally-relocated Dukakis with 278 electoral votes, due to narrow victories in Colorado (8.95% minus 8.34% = 0.61%), Iowa (9.35% minus 8.34% = 1.01%), and New Hampshire (9.61% minus 8.34% = 1.27%). Further, even with 2012 reapportionment, in 2012 the "Dukakis" states would still have, in all likelihood, either 270 or 271 electoral votes, and still enoguh to win.
The one place were I would quibble with Andrew's numbers (which are extremely useful, especially the more specific turnout estimates), would be with his estimate on voting trends for "Asians" and "others." He puts this vote halfway between whites and Latinos, but that is a low-end estimate. In 2006, the Asian and "other" vote was halfway between whites and Latinos, but in in 2004, Asians and others were within 2% of Latinos, and 14% of whites. In 2008, according even to the numbers that Andrew sites, Asians and "others" are within 9% of Latinos, but 14% of whites. So, while it is possible that the Asian and "other" vote could be halfway between Latinos and whites, it is more likely that the Asian and "other" vote would be closer to Latinos. This would up an estimate of Dukakis's performance among Asians and "others" to something more like 60% (twice as close to Latinos as whites), thus adding another 0.25% to his total. Given current trends, and given that at least 1% of the country voting for third-parties in ten of the last eleven elections, that would lead to a Dukakis popular vote vitory in 2012.
(Then again, given that Bill Clinton lost the Asian-American vote twice, it is likely that Dukakis lost as well. However, to push this counterfactual to a truly absurd level, 2008 Dukakis would have benefited from the Asian-American backlash against neoconservative foreign policy, just as current Democrats have done. But, if I start making arguments like that, then I am straying from my original point.)
No matter what the specific amounts are (somewhere between a net of 6% and 8%), roughly half of the Democratic electoral improvement since the dark days of 1988 has come from demographic change, rather than from either infrastructure / strategy / activist improvements, or from poor Republican governing performance. Further, this demographic change is actually more problematic for Republicans than the other two areas, because it requires changing the coalitions rather then developing better infrastructure or simply hoping that Democrats can't get the economy going again. It is an underlying problem Republicans face, and which requires them to break out of the ongoing Nixon-McGovern framework of American political coalitions. From now on, the McGoverns are just going to keep winning, even if they were to nominate another Michael Dukakis.
Update: Ugh--how embarrassing. I orginally credited Nate Silver for this response, not Andrew Gelman. As someone who was mistaken for Jerome Armstrong for about two years, I know how annoying that can be. My apologies.
Barack Obama was no better a candidate than Michael Dukakis.
That sentence sounds absurd, right? Obama defeated Hillary Clinton in the primaries, and went on to win the highest Democratic vote percentage since 1964. Dukakis, by contrast, barely emerged from a primary field of--at least when their 1988 political statures are compared to Clinton's in 2008--relative minnows, and then went on to squander an enormous polling advantage in the general election. Surely, Obama and Dukakis are not comparable in terms of their ability as campaigners.
However, as I discuss in the extended entry, virtually all of Obama's, and really all of the Democratic Party's, improvement on Dukakis's performance over the past twenty years is not the result of superior candidates, superior campaigning, or even really a superior political environment. Instead, it is primarily the result of three major cultural shifts that have taken place over the past twenty years: the rise of the network neutral Internet, the increasing number of non-Christians in America, and ethnic / "racial" shifts toward a less white America. Without these trends, Obama would have suffered the same electoral fate as Dukakis, and Democrats would be experiencing the 1994 midterms the same way that Bill Murray experienced Groundhog Day. While many people did excellent work this year, in order to secure long-term victory, we need to maintain and foster these trends rather than believing our recent successes have been the work of a small group of wunderkinds.
The usual caveats apply, lots of time to win this thing, etc, but this mashup is worth watching.
Update: Look, get mad at Obama, he's the one running a campaign that is entirely bent on weak reaction. Here's Joe Biden.
John McCain is my friend," said the loquacious Blue Hen. "I admire John McCain. I know of no man or woman I have ever met that has more personal courage than John McCain. We have been friends for over 33 years. We have traveled together. When John was Navy liaison he staffed me for three or four years everywhere I traveled in the world."
Biden's the one campaigning for McCain, not me. Incidentally, I do enjoy the character attack that I want McCain to win because then I will be able to look at more pictures of my crush, Sarah Palin. That's a new one.
I guess I should be clear that the reason I'm putting this up is because I want to point out that Obama is running the playbook of the Dukakis campaign. The incredible anger in the comments basically confirms that the criticism is on point.
Update: Patrick Ruffini at the Next Right makes some really good points about the contours of an attack and response driven campaign. I don't agree with Ruffini most of the time, but he seems on point here.
Lots of people remember the tank ad against Michael Dukakis in 1988 (particularly Digby, who first noticed this parallel). What very few people remember (because of Survivorship bias) was Dukakis's response. The ad is here.
MICHAEL DUKAKIS: I'm fed up with it. Haven't seen anything like it in 25 years of public life. George Bush's negative TV ads, distorting my record, full of lies and he knows it. I'm on the record for the very weapons systems his ads say I'm against. I want to build a strong defense. I'm sure he wants to build a strong defense. So this isn't about defense issues. It's about dragging the truth into the gutter. And I'm not going to let them do it. This campaign is too important. The stakes are too high for every American family. The real question is, will we have a president who fights for the privileged few, or will we have a president who fights for you? George Bush wants to give the wealthiest one percent of the people in this country a new tax break worth $30,000 a year. I'm fighting for you and your family, for affordable housing and health care, for better jobs, for the best education and opportunity for our children. It's a tough fight, I know that. Uphill all the way, but I'm going to keep on fighting because what I'm fighting for is our future.
I am loathe to write this, since it smacks of growing old and crotchety. However, to a certain extent I can understand some of the insider exacerbation with the arguments coming from some Obama supporters. Specifically, the ideas put forth by the Obama campaign on a wide range of process issues such as how to defeat Republicans and how to successfully govern are not new ideas from Democrats, but the sort of thing that many Democrats have been saying for at least twenty years. Where the Obama campaign has had the most success so far is not when it incorporates an original strategy or original rhetoric, but instead when it executes extant ideas and rhetoric more successfully than earlier campaigns. Consider all of the following:
Led by maverick folksters Peter Stampfel and Steve Weber, the Holy Modal Rounders were a blend of Greenwich Village strum, Kentucky bluegrass and Appalachian drone -- topped off with enough mind-altering chemicals to derail the Wabash Cannonball. The Rounders' 1968 masterpiece, The Moray Eels Eat the Holy Modal Rounders, spotlights "The Bird Song," an infectious ditty used in the Easy Rider soundtrack, the squealing majesty of "Werewolf" and drug-addled ramblings like "My Mind Capsized" and "The STP Song" (it wasn't about that slippery engine oil). Sam Shepard, the Rounders drummer (and soon-to-be-acclaimed playwright), even muffs the words to the pledge of allegiance, transporting you to the era as surely as a truncheon to the head at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.
And now, on with the diary:
As expected, Barack Obama struck hard on themes of unity in his victory speech in Iowa on Thursday, and while all Democrats can-or at least should-join in enthusiastically when unity means inclusion of all people, the further theme of bi-partisanship, trying to include hostile political views, remains deeply problematic. It's not just an attitude of willful intransigence that stands in the way. It's historical memory.
Democrats have been trying to make nice-nice with Republicans in order to put an end to polarization and divisiveness at least since the days of Jimmy Carter. The results have been quite satisfactory... for the Republicans. Barack Obama says that this time it will be different. If he means to inspire us, that's one thing. But if that's really his game plan, then he is reading from speeches given by Lucy to Charlie Brown: this time, for sure, she won't pull that football away at the last moment.
Okay, folks, there are so many examples, it's impossible to choose. Should we look at:
(A) Jimmy Carter takes "bipartisan" advice from Henry Kissinger , lets the deposed Shah into the country, and precipitates a hostage crisis that costs him the presidency-with a little help from the 1980 Reagan/Bush team, which is not above a little bit of treason, if that's what it takes to get elected.
(B) Michael Dukakis refuses to get down and dirty. "It's about competence, not ideology," he explains-perhaps the most incompetent thing a presidential candidate has said since Hebert Hoover adopted the theme song "Happy Days Are Here Again" in the midst of the Great Depression. In Ohio, Senator Howard Metzenbaum ran as a full-throated economic populist and cruised to a 57-43 victory, while Dukakis ran away from the "liberal" label, and lost badly, 55-45. [Ohio SOS Raw Totals]
(C) Bill Clinton ignores a whole raft of Republican scandals [Iran-Contra, Iraqgate , October Surprise, etc.] in an attempt to make peace with the Republicans. He caves on a whole series of issues, and-voila!--the Republicans win control of Congress for the first time in 40 years, and launch a scorched earth campaign to drive him from office.
(E) John Kerry refuses to fight back when swiftboated, then starts to think better of it, until John McCain tells him "no fair hitting back." Then he reverses his earlier pledge to fight to ensure that every vote is counted.
Spin the magic wheel, jump the flip, and see which one it is we'll be examinig today...
How complicated are electoral politics, really? For political writers like myself, it certainly is a help to act as though it is an extremely complicated business, since otherwise we would not have as much to write about. However, consider the following:
In 1988, George Bush Sr. won the popular vote by 7.72%. In 2004, George Bush Jr. won the popular vote by 2.46% (source).
Michael Dukakis is widely viewed as having lost by a major landslide, while John Kerry is widely viewed as having lost a narrow election. However, looking through exit poll data, it appears that the two candidates performed almost identically among one of the larger demographic groups in the electorate: white voters. The only real difference between the outcome of the 1988 and 2004 elections does not seem to be that Kerry did any better among particularly demographic groups, but rather that demographic groups more favorable to Democrats formed a larger share of the electorate. In fact, Kerry actually did worse than Dukakis among Latinos. If John Kerry had won Latinos by the same 70%-30% margin that Dukakis did, then he would have at least pulled to within less than a percentage point on Bush, and possibly even won the popular vote. Further, whatever small gains Kerry made on Bush within white voters were possibly entirely due to sharply increasing secularism within the white electorate. Overall, it seems quite likely that Kerry would have won the 2004 election had he just performed as well as Dukakis among every ethnic and religious demographic in the electorate. Since he did not, it seems reasonable to assume that John Kerry was not a better candidate than Michael Dukakis.
Broad demographic changes that rendered the electorate both less white and less Christian had a significantly greater impact on the changing outcomes of the 1988 and 2004 election than did the quality of the candidates running, the issues of the time, or the strategies employed by the campaigns. Outside of these demographic shifts, everything else was pretty much a wash from 1988 to 2004. As I have repeated numerous times in the past, this trend will only continue. By 2012, when self-identified white Christians will probably only make up about 55-56% of the electorate (down from their current 63-64% total), unless ethnic and religious demographic groups start voting differently, the electorate will have shifted roughly another 3-4% in favor of Democrats. With that electorate, even a Democratic candidate with the skill of Michael Dukakis or John Kerry could win, and no Iraq war or economic downturn would be necessary.
This massive, underlying shift has a Republican precedent. Despite virtually no change in ideological self-identification among the electorate over the past forty years, Republicans were able to rise to electoral power basically just by swinging the once solid Democratic south into their column. More than half of all Republican gains in the House, Senate, Governors and electoral votes from 1964-2004 came from the eleven states that once formed the confederacy. Consider, for example, that after the 1964 elections, there were only 32 Republican Senators, but only one southern Republican Senator. After the 2004 elections, there were 55 Republican US Senators, and 18 southern Republican Senators. Only six of the twenty-three seats that shifted over those forty years came from the thirty-nine states outside the south, and even that small difference was wiped out in the 2006 elections. After 2008, Democrats will probably be doing even better outside the South than they were after the 1964 elections. Overall, apart from white southerners switching their partisan voting habits at the statewide and federal level, and the relative high population growth in the south compared to the rest of the country during that time period, not much else really changed in American electoral politics to cause the Republican rise to power. Pretty much the rest of the Republican gains can probably be chalked up to the collapse of union density in the American workplace.
Whenever I think about the southern shift of 1964-2000, and the more recent non-white and / or non-Christian shift from 1996 and on into the future, I wonder how much more there really is to say about American electoral politics. Or, at least, I wonder how much more there really is to say about American electoral politics in general elections for federal and statewide office. Outside of these mega-trends and major events that are localized either in time (such as a war or the economy) or in a given region (such as a corruption scandal or a favorite son candidate), everything else sometimes seems as though it might be playing with very, very narrow margins. In the end, what is actually really the agent of change, broad demographic shifts or strategic use of political machinery? For us activists and writers, we really want to think it is the latter, but in all likelihood it is probably the former. It is certainly somewhat disturbing and disempowering to think about politics this way, but in a country of this massive size, how can a small industry of only $10 billion a year--aka, the political industry--really make that much of a dent in our collective political attitudes? Politics makes up les than one-tenth of one percent of our national economy. I'm going to guess that the other 99.9% has slightly more impact on how we understand the world.
All of this makes me wonder sometimes if the most useful role the political activist can take is to do whatever possible to bring the broad trends that favor your coalition to fruition, while making sure that you don't do anything to increase your opponent's chances of the doing the same. In other words, just don't spit into the wind by, say, running electoral campaigns specifically targeting rising demographic groups like Latinos, Asians and non-Christians with negative, bigoted messaging. Perhaps, as I have wondered in the past, the more transformative, ideological activist is always working to change the culture of our schools, our workplaces, our media, and our modes of religious practice. A smart strategy might be to go along with the trends at the top, while always working to change the institutions that cause the trends at the foundation. None of this is probably as simple as I am making it out to be, but for those progressives out there who are disheartened by the 2008 presidential primary, or by the meager legislative consequences that seem to have come from the 2006 elections, perhaps it is useful to remember that there are other areas where it is possible to make a bigger impact on the ideological makeup of this country than in elections or even issue advocacy. Instead of playing in the electoral margins, perhaps it is more effective and stimulating to take direct aim at our larger cultural and ideological institutions. After all, if changes within those institutions can make an even less effective Democratic candidate than Michael Dukakis come within one state of the Presidency, they can't be simply shrugged away.
Led by maverick folksters Peter Stampfel and Steve Weber, the Holy Modal Rounders were a blend of Greenwich Village strum, Kentucky bluegrass and Appalachian drone -- topped off with enough mind-altering chemicals to derail the Wabash Cannonball. The Rounders' 1968 masterpiece, The Moray Eels Eat the Holy Modal Rounders, spotlights "The Bird Song," an infectious ditty used in the Easy Rider soundtrack, the squealing majesty of "Werewolf" and drug-addled ramblings like "My Mind Capsized" and "The STP Song" (it wasn't about that slippery engine oil). Sam Shepard, the Rounders drummer (and soon-to-be-acclaimed playwright), even muffs the words to the pledge of allegiance, transporting you to the era as surely as a truncheon to the head at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.
And now, on with the diary:
As expected, Barack Obama struck hard on themes of unity in his victory speech in Iowa on Thursday, and while all Democrats can-or at least should-join in enthusiastically when unity means inclusion of all people, the further theme of bi-partisanship, trying to include hostile political views, remains deeply problematic. It's not just an attitude of willful intransigence that stands in the way. It's historical memory.
Democrats have been trying to make nice-nice with Republicans in order to put an end to polarization and divisiveness at least since the days of Jimmy Carter. The results have been quite satisfactory... for the Republicans. Barack Obama says that this time it will be different. If he means to inspire us, that's one thing. But if that's really his game plan, then he is reading from speeches given by Lucy to Charlie Brown: this time, for sure, she won't pull that football away at the last moment.
Okay, folks, there are so many examples, it's impossible to choose. Should we look at:
(A) Jimmy Carter takes "bipartisan" advice from Henry Kissinger , lets the deposed Shah into the country, and precipitates a hostage crisis that costs him the presidency-with a little help from the 1980 Reagan/Bush team, which is not above a little bit of treason, if that's what it takes to get elected.
(B) Michael Dukakis refuses to get down and dirty. "It's about competence, not ideology," he explains-perhaps the most incompetent thing a presidential candidate has said since Hebert Hoover adopted the theme song "Happy Days Are Here Again" in the midst of the Great Depression. In Ohio, Senator Howard Metzenbaum ran as a full-throated economic populist and cruised to a 57-43 victory, while Dukakis ran away from the "liberal" label, and lost badly, 55-45. [Ohio SOS Raw Totals]
(C) Bill Clinton ignores a whole raft of Republican scandals [Iran-Contra, Iraqgate , October Surprise, etc.] in an attempt to make peace with the Republicans. He caves on a whole series of issues, and-voila!--the Republicans win control of Congress for the first time in 40 years, and launch a scorched earth campaign to drive him from office.
(E) John Kerry refuses to fight back when swiftboated, then starts to think better of it, until John McCain tells him "no fair hitting back." Then he reverses his earlier pledge to fight to ensure that every vote is counted.
Spin the magic wheel, jump the flip, and see which one it is we'll be examinig today...
Led by maverick folksters Peter Stampfel and Steve Weber, the Holy Modal Rounders were a blend of Greenwich Village strum, Kentucky bluegrass and Appalachian drone -- topped off with enough mind-altering chemicals to derail the Wabash Cannonball. The Rounders' 1968 masterpiece, The Moray Eels Eat the Holy Modal Rounders, spotlights "The Bird Song," an infectious ditty used in the Easy Rider soundtrack, the squealing majesty of "Werewolf" and drug-addled ramblings like "My Mind Capsized" and "The STP Song" (it wasn't about that slippery engine oil). Sam Shepard, the Rounders drummer (and soon-to-be-acclaimed playwright), even muffs the words to the pledge of allegiance, transporting you to the era as surely as a truncheon to the head at the 1968 Democratic National Convention.
And now, on with the diary:
As expected, Barack Obama struck hard on themes of unity in his victory speech in Iowa on Thursday, and while all Democrats can-or at least should-join in enthusiastically when unity means inclusion of all people, the further theme of bi-partisanship, trying to include hostile political views, remains deeply problematic. It's not just an attitude of willful intransigence that stands in the way. It's historical memory.
Democrats have been trying to make nice-nice with Republicans in order to put an end to polarization and divisiveness at least since the days of Jimmy Carter. The results have been quite satisfactory... for the Republicans. Barack Obama says that this time it will be different. If he means to inspire us, that's one thing. But if that's really his game plan, then he is reading from speeches given by Lucy to Charlie Brown: this time, for sure, she won't pull that football away at the last moment.
Okay, folks, there are so many examples, it's impossible to choose. Should we look at:
(A) Jimmy Carter takes "bipartisan" advice from Henry Kissinger , lets the deposed Shah into the country, and precipitates a hostage crisis that costs him the presidency-with a little help from the 1980 Reagan/Bush team, which is not above a little bit of treason, if that's what it takes to get elected.
(B) Michael Dukakis refuses to get down and dirty. "It's about competence, not ideology," he explains-perhaps the most incompetent thing a presidential candidate has said since Hebert Hoover adopted the theme song "Happy Days Are Here Again" in the midst of the Great Depression. In Ohio, Senator Howard Metzenbaum ran as a full-throated economic populist and cruised to a 57-43 victory, while Dukakis ran away from the "liberal" label, and lost badly, 55-45. [Ohio SOS Raw Totals]
(C) Bill Clinton ignores a whole raft of Republican scandals [Iran-Contra, Iraqgate , October Surprise, etc.] in an attempt to make peace with the Republicans. He caves on a whole series of issues, and-voila!--the Republicans win control of Congress for the first time in 40 years, and launch a scorched earth campaign to drive him from office.
(E) John Kerry refuses to fight back when swiftboated, then starts to think better of it, until John McCain tells him "no fair hitting back." Then he reverses his earlier pledge to fight to ensure that every vote is counted.
Spin the magic wheel, jump the flip, and see which one it is we'll be examinig today...
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