The Democrats have plenty of strong VP picks this cycle. Amongst those who get a lot of blogosphere attention I'm particularly partial to Sherrod Brown, Brian Schweitzer, John Edwards, Chris Dodd, Kathleen Sebelius and Bill Richardson.
Nevertheless, the blogosphere doesn't make the decision. And we have less influence than the media. The conventional wisdom in the media is that Obama needs to pick a moderate elder statesman with defence and foreign policy credentials. A lotofpeople seem to be backing Sam Nunn.
This would be a truly appalling choice. He's been good on nuclear non-proliferation issues and is no doubt a dab hand at negotiating with banana republic despots, but he's terrible on economic issues and routinely favoured regressive social policies.
He supported the Iraq war and he mulled an independent run this year. The only saving grace is that he's too old to run as Obama's successor.
Thankfully such a choice appears unlikely at present. Obama's decision to interview Patty Murray suggests that he's not fooled by the beltway consensus that Unity 08 was a great idea.
Nevertheless, there's still an outside chance that Nunn, or similar wastes of space like former Indiana congressmen Lee Hamilton and Tim Roemer. And even if that doesn't happen, this kind of media discourse pushes the Overton window leftward, so figures like Feingold are not perceived as remotely plausible candidates.
This diary combines two streams of thought. One comes from Chris's diary yesterday, "The Mutual Distrust Of Insider and Outside Rebellions", dealing with Obama's support among the foreign policy rank and file, the other comes from my ongoing series, "The Political Duality of Rep v. Dem" and its current sub-series "Questioning vs. Reinforcing Conventional Wisdom." I've already posted a diary ("The Elite/DFH Progressive Foreign Policy Split") more directly oriented to following up on Chris's discussion. This one seeks to draw on both streams.
I'm in basic agreement with Chris's view:
for the rank and file of professional, progressive foreign policy types who were opposed to the Iraq war from the start, the Obama campaign is the equivalent of the 2002 Nancy Pelosi leadership, 2003 Howard Dean presidential, and 2006 Ned Lamont Senate campaigns were for much of the activist rank and file. However, while this rebellion is analogous to those earlier rebellions of an anti-war rank and file against a pro-leadership, the cultural gap between wonks and hacks, between insiders and outsiders, and between professionals and the grassroots have prevented it from gaining the same traction as those earlier campaigns.
There is, however, something more that's missing. Quite simply, Obama is missing a counter-hegemonic position that challenges the "war on terror" narrative. He is not the leader here. Edwards was the leader in challenging the narrative frame, and Richardson was the leader in making a decisive commitment to withdraw from Iraq. This is not a minor matter. While the "war on terror" is a disastrous policy, one that does much more to help our enemies than ourselves, Democrats cannot run successfully against it without have an alternative vision-which they do not yet have. They have alternative strategies, but this is not the same thing.
On the flip, I go through a rapid-fire review of some examples in recent history of missed opportunities for challenging foreign policy hegemony at the level of vision, in order to give a better sense of what the missing elements might look like, and thus, what is needed.
In my last diary, I drew a distinction between "cultural hegemony" and "conventional wisdom", with reference to how they function in terms of Kegan's model of cognitive development:
Conventional wisdom can be thought of as the rationalization of specifc roles and relationsihps [things which define the Level 3 self], while hegemony is the rationalization of the entire level three subject of realm-the totality of all roles and relationships. The way that one moves from Level 3 to Level 4 is not by one big jump, but by gradually becoming aware of of specific roles and relationships-at first, only in specific situations, then gradually more generally, and finally as part of a larger structure that eventually encompasses all of Level 3-at which time you have evolved to full Level 4 consciousenss.
I'm now going to turn my attention to something that has a bit of the character of both--that is, the myth of the GOP as the "Daddy Party." I'm going to start with the more concrete, specific aspects of this, which are more in the way of conventional wisdom--that the GOP is the party of "real men," while the Democrats have nothing but "girly-men."
In one sense, this is a very broad notion, more on the order of hegemony. But when you see it specifically invoked, enacted or represented in various concrete instances, it is much more like conventional wisdom. Certainly, the idea that Bush--who ducked out on his National Guard service--was more of a man and more of a warrior than Kerry, who had gone to war and won a number of medals, was a very concrete piece of conventional wisdom.
Because the myth of the "Daddy Party" has this dual character, it is particularly useful to take on. What's more, it's very much in the news lately, with heightened attention to Hillary Clinton's gender, Obama's play to black homophobia, and increased attention to the military policy, Iraq and the "war on terror." I'm going to touch on some of these issues in future diaries, but in this diary, I want to focus specifically on the notion of "real men," and just how phony the Republicans are.
Last weekend, I did a couple of diaries about how Democrats could challenge the customary rules of the game without becoming "just like them." This was part of the longer series constrasting the policy ineptitude and political prowess of conservatives with the policy prowess and political ineptitude of liberals. I did this under the rubris of "'Breaking The Rules' To Fix The System." The first one used the example of Thoreau's civil disobedience (going to jail rather than helping to finance the Mexican-American War) as a touchstone, and considered how it might have been applied in response to the lawlessness of Bush v. Gore. The second one, looked at how impeachment could have been used to delegitimize Bush-and conservatism more generally-if removing Bush from office had been set aside from the beginning.
This weekend, I'm taking a doubly-related tack-talking about conventional wisdom. First, this is directly related to what I was suggesting should have been the primary purpose of impeachment proceeding, to delegitimate Bush and conservative rule. Second, I want to discuss how conventional wisdom functions as part of the Level 3 infrastructure that liberals and Democrats allow themselves to be trapped and defined by. The irony here is particularly deep, since the term "conventional wisdom" was originally coined by John Kenneth Galbraith, one of the great liberal public intellectuals of the last half of the 20th Century. He first recognized and articulated the concept, but over time it increasingly became a tool of conservative power. So we'll start with a brief look at some of Galbraith's ideas, and how they've been messed with, then we'll take a look at what it means today.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) are calculating that it is futile to continue their months-long campaign to force an immediate end to the war, particularly after Republicans and a few Democrats returned from the summer recess intent on opposing legislation mandating a strict timetable for pulling out U.S. troops.
The change is both rhetorical and substantive. Reid and others are increasingly talking of "bipartisan compromise," while top Democrats are reworking legislation erasing a date certain for ending the military operation. The strategic shift is certain to anger some war critics, but it reflects the reality that Democrats lack the votes to force President Bush's hand.
"We are trying to manage expectations that we can't end the war today or next week or next month," said one Democrat involved in the discussions. "We have to make sure everyone understands that."
Rather than making up ground this summer, we lost ground, and the antiwar movement has lost political credibility as all bark and no bite. We didn't break down the Republicans, but allowed the Republicans to split our base on the war.
Polls show that a majority of voters everywhere support an exit from Iraq. That means that there isn't a single Democratic member of Congress whose constituents don't want to bring our troops home. Representatives who vote with President Bush on Iraq are voting against their districts.
