When Reagan was first elected, only one percent of voters (and six percent of the population) were Hispanic. Just five years previously, jurisdictions with Hispanic voters had been added to the list of areas covered by the Voting Rights Act.
In 2008, after a rapid increase in participation, the Latino proportion of the electorate had increased almost tenfold (in part because of immigration) to 9% (compared to 15% of the population). Here's a comparison of 2004 and 2008:
Click to enlarge.
The most striking feature of the map is the increase in the Latino electorate in the South and other areas outside the Southwest.
The national exit polls showed nearly two-thirds of those identifying themselves as Asian voted for Obama, a strong majority. Let's use the census data to find some neighborhoods with heavy concentrations of Asian Americans and examine the election results.
Here's a promising place to start:
Click to enlarge.
This map shows percent Asian by precinct; there is a nice variation from none (yellow) up to about three-quarters (dark blue).
We should see a corresponding pattern in the precinct results then - here, dark blue shows strong support for Obama:
Click to enlarge.
Oops...
There's certainly a pattern there, but not what we might have expected from the nationwide exit polls.
It's easy to shift into shorthand when looking at demographic data and start talking about how Group A or Group B 'votes for Obama' or 'is Democratic.' Generally we all know that we really mean only that a majority of said population behaves that way, but the words still leave behind a bit of the impression that all people in Group A vote the same way. Especially if we hear in the media over and over and over and over and over that, for instance, white working class voters won't vote for Democrats anymore.
Perhaps the most justified statement of this sort is "African-Americans voted for Obama." When the exit polls say 95% did, indeed, vote for Obama, that seems to be pretty safe.
I'm going to start off even more extreme though - here's a map of election results from Chicago: there were a whopping 87 precincts where Obama had exactly 100% of the vote (shown in pink). They were generally located in African-American neighborhoods.
Click to enlarge.
Follow me below if you're wondering where I'm going with this.
(One year out from the 2010 elections, this is a continuation of a two-week series dreaminonempty is conducting on the demographics of the American electorate - promoted by Chris Bowers)
In 2008, 90% of John McCain's votes came from white voters. However, while the Republican relied primarily on white voters, only 55% of them voted for him.
Coincidentally, 55% is also the percent of babies born in the US in 2008 that were non-Hispanic white, according to Census estimates.
That just doesn't bode well for Republicans.
Here's how it looks:
Click to enlarge.
On the left, results from the 2008 exit polls. On the right, the decreasing share of the US population that is non-Hispanic white. Explanations below the fold.
(In confluence with Chris's thesis about the growing demographic Democratic base, here's the latest from Project Vote. - promoted by Paul Rosenberg)
The United States saw dramatic increases in voting from traditionally underrepresented groups, including minorities and young voters, according to a new analysis released this week by Project Vote. If borne out by systematic analysis of the voter rolls, this change in the electorate is evidence of the power of successful voter registration drives and an indication of the strong inclination of voters to participate in the process when candidates address their issues.
As Media Matters pointed out, Brent Bozell is a little confused over whether Obama is a socialist or a Reaganite Conservative.
Socialist (From the October 27 edition of Fox News' Fox & Friends):
BOZELL: This is the arrogance, I think, of the Obama campaign, but it's a well-placed arrogance in the sense that they've gone through this entire campaign without being questioned seriously by anyone except for this news network, the Fox News network, which is why they studiously avoid the Fox News network. But when you go through the entirety of the campaign saying the kind of things that you're saying in the debates, where on, for every question, you've got a redistribution of wealth answer, where you've got socialism, where you've got the government controlling every aspect of life. You don't expect a reporter to ask you, "Is this socialism?" Because the media don't ask that question. Well, some uppity reporter did -- and look what happened, they cancelled her. And, by the way, she won't be going to the ball, either.
Reaganite Conservative (From the November 7 edition of Fox News' America's Newsroom):
BOZELL: There's a lot of work that needs to be done. But here's the key thing, Bill, that really isn't being reported: Anyone who looks at the exit polls this year will find two fascinating results. Number one, this country remains every bit as center-right as it's been for a generation. And number two --
HEMMER: You don't think that's changed -- you don' think that's changed at all?
BOZELL: No, it hasn't. Look at the exit polling. The number one issue was the economy, nothing came close. The American people are fiscally conservative, and the fascinating thing, Bill, is that Barack Obama ran as a Reaganite and won over the fiscal -- the public as a fiscal conservative. That's what the polling data shows.
HEMMER: You said there were two things. What was number two?
BOZELL: Well, number one is that the public is conservative; number two, Barack Obama won as a conservative. That means that Barack Obama does not have the mandate to enact the left-wing agenda he wants to enact. He didn't run on it, he ran from it. So, this is not necessarily bad news for conservatives.
But what happens if we just ignore the confusion, and go with #2? What does a Reaganite Conservative look like these days?
The 2006 and 2008 national exit polls show an overall pro-Democratic margin within 1% of each other. However, they reach this margin in very different ways. Specifically, Obama heavily under-performed 2006 Democrats among white voters, losing that group by 12% compared to only a 4% Democratic defeat two years ago. However, he won the campaign anyway, and did so with a margin nearly identical to 2006.
How did he do so? In the extended entry, I discuss the long awaited rise to power of the pluralist coalition.
I voted at about 8:15 this morning. Took twenty minutes or so. Given reports from my friends, the lines were huge everywhere in Philadelphia early in the morning, but tapered off after 9 a.m. Lots of hard-core voters out early. Lots.
The best part about my voting experience was when the judge of elections claimed a young woman in line ahead of me wasn't on the rolls, and was about to send her to another division. I quickly pulled out my street list, confirmed she was a registered voter in the division, and told the judge to look again (as a certified poll watcher, I can do this). The judge looked again and found her. Turns out the page the voter was on was just stuck. So, I helped someone else--a registered Democrat--vote, too. Cool.
Obama people are all over the neighborhood, pulling people out to vote. I don't remember any Election Day canvassing in the area ever before.
This is an open thread. How was your voting and / or activist experience?
Obama has inched up in the tracking polls for the third straight day, and he now leads by 6% according to Pollster.com with less than 77 hours before the polls close in all swing states. (Iowa is the last "swing state" to close, if you can call Iowa a swing state, anyway. Part of Montana closes at 11:00 p.m. eastern). So, McCain has to gain a full 1% on Obama every thirteen hours between now and then in order to win. That means that McCain has to flip about 100,000 voters every hour, or three every second, in order to tie Obama. Best of all, he can only target 70% of the electorate for these votes, because 30% is already spoken for.
In accordance with current Republican messaging, Rasmussen's top political story right now is a poll that argues only 34% of the country thinks one-party rule is a good thing:
As Election Day 2008 approaches with the prospect of a Democrat in the White House and Democratic control of the Congress, only one-third (34%) of U.S. voters think rule by one political party is better for the country.
Forty-five percent (45%) say it's better if the White House and Congress are each run by a different political party, according to a new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey. Twenty-one percent (21%) are undecided.
With 21% undecided, and neither answer reaching a plurality, clearly this isn't a subject that the electorate has every put much thought into. This is much to the chagrin of both the McCain campaign, and concern troll, elitist "bi-partisan" pundits everywhere.
However, let's leave abstract questions about "one-party rule in D.C." aside for a moment, and actually look at how people vote in federal elections. This is not, after all, an abstract question. The same people who vote for President also vote for House and Senate. Maybe, rather than asking poll questions, we should actually check to see how people vote across these three offices. The percentage of people who do not vote for the same party in a single Presidential, Senate and House elections would be the actual number of people who oppose one-party rule in D.C.
In 2000, according to the Presidential exit poll, 85% of all voters chose one party for both President and Senate (no numbers were available for the House). In 2006, only 16% of the participants in the national House exit poll indicated that they were neither Kerry voters who voted Democratic for U.S. House, nor Bush voters who voted Republican for U.S. House (I can't find any comparable numbers for 2004).
So, there you have it. Only about 15%-16% the country is actually opposed to one-party rule in D.C., in that only about 15%-16% of the country doesn't vote straight party line for President, Senate and House. Five in six Americans have no problem with one-party rule, in that they vote for the same party for President, Senate and House.
That's not a very bi-partisan, anti-"one party rule" country, is it? Too bad that facts like these won't stop pundits from crowing about the supposed hatred of one-party rule in D.C.
Remember back in June, when Barack Obama "clarified" his positions on a whole raft of issues-including warrantless wiretapping-all in a rightward direction?
At the time, I felt there were three things worth noting:
(1) Some shifts away from majority positions to rightwing minority positions were presented as shifts "to the center". Most notably, even most Republican voters now see "free trade" as more bad than good.
(2) We were told that this was a "political necessity."
(3) We were told that this "always happens."
(1) and (2) were particularly dubious when Obama backed away from his criticism of NAFTA, given how crucial Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan are to winning the White House, and how hated NAFTA is among the very blue collar voters that Obama needs in order to beat McCain there. But #3, at least, seemed plausible to those who don't recall the elections of 1968 and 1980. Even those who do recall those elections are likely to insist that they, too, followed the standard pattern of running away from the center in the primaries, and towards it in the general election. And now, at least, I'm not inclined to argue with them, because now we clearly have a counter-example on our hands: John McCain ran center in the primaries, and now is running right.
Selective anecdotes can be used to support any thesis. However, a broad, quantitative analysis of long-term trends typically points to far more narrow conclusions.
This is the case with American politics as much as it is the case with any other area of investigation. Despite repeated claims by journalists, pundits and politicians that America is becoming less partisan and less ideological, and embracing bi-partisanship and centrism, every marco-trend in American politics indicates the opposite is occurring.
If America really were embracing centrism, then we would see the following:
Americans would not be at their all-time peak of liberal policy mood;
Moderate self-identification would be increasing, not decreasing;
More moderate challengers would be defeating less moderate challengers in primary elections, not the other way around;
More moderate members of Congress would have a higher retention rate than less moderate members of Congress, not the other way around.
Also, if America really were becoming less partisan, then we would see the following:
More voters would be selecting the nominee of an opposing party, not less;
More voters would be choosing third-party candidates, not less;
More voters of all types would be self-identifying as Independent, not just Republicans.
Instead, what we see across all seven of these trends are either a movement toward an increasing embrace of partisanship and non-centrist ideology, or simply a movement away from Republicans and toward Democrats. Yerterday, I covered three of these trends in detail. Today, in the extended entry, I cover the other four (one of which was not mentioned in yesterday's post).
I'm not sure if this is a rule of thumb, but I've noticed that exit polls tend to show the more liberal candidate outperforming the eventual results.
Bet half your life savings on these numbers, the other half on Zogby. This is an open thread.
More exits (Chris): There are some other exits out there that show even more favorable numbers for Obama:
Indiana: Obama: 50.5%--49.5% Clinton
North Carolina: Obama 60%--38% Clinton
Since this obviously won't happen, and once again the exits appear to be skewing heavily toward Obama, I'm inclined to go with the "more liberal candidate exit poll" skew theory. That is, liberals tend to vote earlier, probably because many are young (in school), many live in cities (can walk to the polling place), and many are creative class (flexible work hours makes for easier voting time). Also, conservatives tend to use early voting more, and exits only measure the election day vote.
The Obama campaign expects to net seven or eight delegates out of the night from winning Vermont... they expect, delegate-wise, RI and Ohio will tie, and Texas, because of the caucus, will be a wash.
The Clinton campaign, having recieved leaked exit polls showing slim leads in both Texas and Ohio, is already challenging, in the press, the aggressiveness of Obama's caucus operation but is generally happy with early reports that turnout in Texas is high.
Early exit polls show independents are a sizable chunk of the electorate in presidential primaries in Ohio, Texas, Rhode Island and Vermont.
In all those states except Rhode Island, Tuesday's primaries were ``open,'' meaning all voters could choose which party's contest to vote in. In Rhode Island, only registered independents could choose between parties.
The surveys for The Associated Press and television networks found self-described independents were about one in five voters in Ohio's Democratic primary, one in four in Texas, a third in Rhode Island and four in 10 in Vermont.
And yet more exit poll information can be found here. No specific head-to-head numbers, but I'm not really sure how useful those would be, anyway. Early voting has been huge, and that is not included in the exits. Also, early exit polls tend to shift quite a bit from final exit polls.
We have a wealth of data from exit polls over the last few months. Staring at tables of data isn't the easiest way to get the big picture, though. So, seeing as this is my blogosphere niche, I've made some maps. Here, for instance, is a map of Obama's support among those who made up their minds the day of the election:
Click to enlarge.
The other thing about the exit polls is that it's easy for discussion to degenerate into statements like 'Clinton's voters are white women and Latinos.'
But did you know that without the votes of Latina women, Obama would have lost New Mexico by 12 points? Didn't hear much about that in the media, didja?
Follow me below as we explore the exit poll data in more detail and bury some of the myths that have caught my attention.
One of the questions I was most frequently asked about the online aspect of the Democratic presidential nomination campaign during 2007 was why the progressive blogosphere had such clear differences in preference than Democrats as a whole. Or, more specifically, I was often asked to explain why Hillary Clinton did so poorly in straw polls at Daily Kos and MyDD, even though she usually had a comfortable lead most national and state polls.
My first theory was based mainly on demographics. Almost every single one of Clinton's worst demographics is over-represented in the progressive blogosphere relative to the Democratic Party as a whole. Men are something like 55%-60% of the progressive blogosphere, while they are only 40%-45% of the Democratic electorate. Seculars are something like 40-45% of the progressive blogosphere, while they are only 20% or so of the Democratic electorate. Those with post-graduate degrees are something like 40-50% of the progressive blogosphere, and only around 15% of the Democratic electorate. The median annual income of a progressive blog reader, at about $75-80K, is much higher than the Democratic electorate as a whole. Self-identified liberals and progressives make up 80-90% of the progressive blogosphere, and only 50-55% of the Democratic primary electorate. The average progressive blog reader is about 12 years younger than the average Democratic primary voter. And so on. For a long time, these were Clinton's six worst demographics relative to Obama, and the progressive blogosphere was overloaded with them.
While good for a partial explanation, the demographics of the progressive blogosphere were always inadequate as a full explanation for the outcome of straw polls at Daily Kos, MyDD and other blogs. For example, at Daily Kos, Clinton would receive around 8-9% support, Obama would be in the mid-twenties, and Edwards would be in the mid-thirties, practically inverting the standings nationwide. The relatively small African-American population in the progressive blogosphere, about 5% compared to 20% in the Democratic electorate as a whole, can partially explain this, but not fully explain this.
Another piece of the puzzle is that one needs to consider the blogosphere the equivalent of a state like Iowa or New Hampshire. Like residents of early states, blog readers pay much more attention to the process early on (only we do so intentionally instead of having it forced upon us). As such, it should be pointed out that the more focus the candidates gave to a state, the less presidential preference in that state looked like national polls. In particular, during 2007 Iowa was the most-focused upon state, and it often showed a three-way campaign, and sometimes a four-way campaign, that looked very different from national polls. Iowa is also a useful comparison because, as a caucus, it tends to draw a higher percentage of activists, die-hard partisans, and ideologues than would a primary. In fact, if one looks for blogosphere demographics in the Iowa exit poll, Clinton usually finishes third. Clinton came in third among men, the "somewhat liberal," those who make $75K or more, and those under the age of 45. Also, note that Edwards won boomers in Iowa, and that the average age of a progressive blog reader is 42, right at the tipping point between boomers and Gen X. So, among its demographic cohorts in Iowa, the progressive blogosphere actually held pretty similar presidential preferences.
From that point, what little variation that remaned can simply be chalked up to the different campaign messages and the differing quality of their blogosphere outreach. It seems perfectly reasonable that running on anti-corporate platform should be appealing to people who consume large amounts of independent media, as every regular participant in the progressive blogosphere does simply by a matter of definition. It also isn't surprising that the idea of unity, post-partisanship and post-ideology will not be as appealing to people who participate in an overtly progressive medium because they are disgusted by the supposedly bi-partisan, non-ideological news outlets that already exist (if "bi-partisanship" means Hannity and Colmes, as it did in just about all media back in 2002, then count me out). And, it is even less surprising that a message of a "experience" will do even less well than "bi-partisanship" in a grassroots medium that was founded because of repeated failures of Democratic elites on impeachment, the 2000 stolen election, the Iraq war, and much more. In other words, the progressive blogosphere is a form of largely non-corporate, small business, and hobbyist media that was founded because of the perceived failure of experienced Democrats to stop conservatives from taking over the country, and which thrived because of the lack of progressive voices in other media. As such, should anyone be surprised that an anti-corporate message did better online than a message of "experience" or "unity?" I'm not. These are messages that run to the very heart of the progressive blogosphere as a medium, and do so in very different directions.
The bottom line is this: the progressive blogosphere had very similar presidential preferences to its demographic cohorts in the Iowa caucuses, and what little difference remained can easily explained by the reaction of campaign messages to the fundamentally outsider, partisan, and anti-corporate nature of the progressive blogosphere.
Looking at exit polls from Iowa, New Hampshire and Michigan, I am left with several questions about the coalition many of the candidates seem to be building:
In all three states, Clinton lost the under 40 vote, but won the over 60 vote. Considering the amounts involved in these swings, sometimes as much as 30%, age is shaping up to be an even bigger divide in the Democratic primary than gender. Why do older and younger Democrats have such sharply divided preferences of Clinton and Obama?
In all three states, McCain has done better with voters who say they are either "dissatisfied" or "angry" with the Bush administration. He has lost those who are "satisfied" or "enthusiastic" with the Bush administration in all three states. If McCain has really made his comeback on the surge, then why are his voters so unhappy with Bush? Also, he has also virtually swept newspaper endorsements. Would McCain have any chance at all without the established media?
Ron Paul does much better among younger voters, and among those who are "angry" with the Bush administration. In fact, if you are a young Republican who is "angry" with the Bush administration, you seem almost guaranteed to be a Ron Paul supporter. Is there a new generation of Republicans coming through the ranks that is very different from the current generation?
There does not appear to be any divide in the Democratic primary between union members and non-union members. As such, do union endorsements mean anything outside of the resources they provide for campaigns?
There is simultaneously an income gap, education gap, and race gap in the Democratic primary. Lower income, lower education voters prefer Clinton, while African-American voters prefer Obama. This means that Clinton is really racking it up among low-income, working class whites. Why is this, and why isn't Edwards doing better among this group?
Anyway, I have to run, but these and other questions about the emerging coalitions in the primary are very interesting. A lengthy primary campaign should provide us with continuing insights to the intra-party coalitions for both Democrats and Republicans, something we have lacked for quite some time the recent string of primary season blowouts.
By the two most common measures--family income and education--Hillary Clinton appears to have eeked out her narrow victory in New Hampshire by taking a populist advantage, according to exit polls. Although it certainly wasn't the overt thrust of her campaign, it certainly was a distinct, if not overwhelming result, while Edwards, he did run an overtly populist campaign, showed no appreciable class difference, and Obama skewed wealthier and more educated:
Vote By Income
Family income:
% Total
Clinton
Edwards
Obama
$15-30,000
9
51
14
30
$30-50,000
18
44
16
32
$50-75,000
23
33
19
40
$75-100,000
16
36
18
42
$100-150,000
17
33
17
44
$150-200,000
6
46
15
34
$200,000 or More
6
37
12
43
Vote By Income
Family income:
% Total
Clinton
Edwards
Obama
Less than $50,000
33
47
15
32
$50,000 or more
67
35
17
41
Vote By Education
Last grade of school completed
% Total
Clinton
Edwards
Obama
No High School
3
61
9
28
High school graduate
17
46
17
31
Some college / associate degree
27
40
16
40
College graduate
29
38
18
37
Postgraduate study
24
31
16
43
Vote By Education
Last grade of school completed
% Total
Clinton
Edwards
Obama
High school graduate or less
19
49
16
30
More than high school grad
81
37
17
40
As Chris noted:
Over the last twenty-four hours, there were media character assassination attempts against Clinton because she showed emotion, or something. That simply must have been what put Obama over the top. Seriously--nothing else really happened in the last twenty-four hours, so that must be the cause. Looks like that attempt to take Clinton down completely backfired.
These are the people who are most familiar with the unearned humiliation and contempt that was heaped on Clinton with such evident glee, and they are the ones who gave her the edge. I am not a Clinton supporter, but I totally get the logic of their vote, and fully sympathize. Maybe the best possible outcome of this election would be a series of different, unexpected blows against the Versailles punditalkcrazy and their "conventional wisdom."
