On the Meet The Press yesterday, David Brooks reminded us all just how completely loaded with bullshit most cultural criticism actually is in America:
MR. BROOKS: I always look at passionate outsiders. Who are the passionate outsiders who are going to come into the mainstream? Because the people with passion really can control the decade--the feminists in the 1970s, the evangelicals in the 1980s. And so when I look around the world at who are the real passionate outsiders, one, the people that we've already talked about, which are the, the democracy protesters in Iran. But two, and I have to say that I'm not a huge fan of them, but the tea party people. They have real passion. They're now at the outside. If they can merge with responsible leadership and become a real movement--there's real disgust at government, there's real disgust about fiscal issues--they could become maybe a destructive force in the Republican Party, maybe a positive force. But, to me, those are the people with real passion who may play a much larger role in the coming decade and so forth.
WTF does any of this actually mean? Define "passionate." Define "outsiders." For that matter, define "mainstream." And, while you are at it Mr. Brooks, please provide some justification for how any single group "controls" a decade, and what causality mechanism allows a qualitative group to do this.
Everything Brooks says here is purely bullshit masquerading as knowledge. It reminds me of why I like to ground my writing in actual facts, rather than subjective, vague, qualitative terminology that doesn't actually mean anything.
To that end, here are some things that are actually going to happen over the next decade:
1. Continuing, gradual identity changes The people of the United States are going to become:
Higher voter turnout rates (due to aging population)
Higher public spending as a % of GDP (partially due to older population, largely because that never really drops)
More tolerant (because, generally speaking, more tolerant people tend to be younger)
Equal, or greater, overall income inequality (because that has been happening for so long, and current policies will only slow the trend, not reverse it.) However, economic inequality between ethnic and gender groups will probably continue to decline.
The European Union will continue to pull away from the United States as the #1 economic region in the world. While China will not catch up to the USA, they will firmly establish themselves as a third world Superpower in this regard. These three Superpowers will dominate the world for decades.
Even as China and the EU gain on the United States economically, and even as the rest of the world gains on all three of those regions in terms of population, the Anglophone world will become an increasingly larger percentage of the wealthy world. This is because per capita income in China remains very low, and because Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom all sport population growth rates far exceeding Japan and Western Europe.
The world will get hotter.
That's all stuff that is actually going to happen. After a month of maddeningly vague and meaningless predictions of the sort quoted above, I thought this would provide a useful counterweight.
Today is "Young and Future Generations Day" here at the International Climate Negotiations in Copenhagen, and I'm here with my wife Wahleah and our two-year-old daughter Tohaana. Along with thousands of other young people, we're doing everything in our power to convince world leaders to commit to a fair, ambitious, and legally binding international agreement based on a target of 350 parts per million (ppm), which is the safe upper limit of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Less than 400 miles away in Oslo, Norway, President Obama is accepting the Nobel Peace Prize "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples." If ever there was a time and place to live up to that honor, now, in Copenhagen is it.
Four former Nobel Peace Prize winners have endorsed a target of 350ppm. On December 12th, 2008, at the international climate talks in Poznan, Poland, Al Gore (2007 winner) said to a huge crowd: "Even a goal of 450 parts per million, which seems so difficult today, is inadequate. We need to toughen that goal to 350 parts per million."
In the past few years, the economic relationship between the United States and China has changed dramatically. As Tim Fernholz writes in the American Prospect: "Chastened U.S. officials who once lectured their counterparts in [China] on financial liberalization are now humbled in front of their largest creditor, reduced to offering promises of fiscal responsibility." It's a strange state of affairs. Fernholz rightly argues that:
"The common interest of the peoples, rather than the economic elite, ought to be the driving motivation behind the two countries' interactions. There is no doubt that economic openness has brought wealth to both countries, and the Obama administration is happy to laud the Chinese for bringing millions out of poverty. But in a relationship between "capitalism with American characteristics" and "socialism with Chinese characteristics," sometimes the people-whether they be workers losing jobs in the United States or the millions of Chinese living without political freedom or prosperity-have interests other than the elites. Today, we're in an economic crisis, and pragmatism overrides all else. But as recovery continues, the U.S. will require more thought on the strategic track, and perhaps in a few years our discussions with China, as they should be with all our friends, will be more frank."
But our current economic relationship with China pre-dates President Obama's "talk first" style of diplomacy. As Robert Scheer of The Nation writes: "Don't blame any of this on peacenik liberals. The new conciliatory-nay, deferential-tone toward China precedes the Obama administration, having begun in bilateral talks during the last years of the Bush administration as the U.S. economy began its ignominious downfall. It was George W. Bush's treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, who set the course when the former Goldman Sachs chairman realized how dependent were his Wall Street buddies on Chinese goodwill."
Strange relations with China aside, things aren't going so well at home. Rick Wolff, an economist from the New School, says the stimulus package has big problems in a discussion with The Real News. Wolff also notes that we shouldn't take Wall Street chatter about an economic upswing too seriously. "I think the first thing to remember is the people who are celebrating where we are now are the same people who could not imagine, did not imagine, did not foresee the problem we had last year," Wolff says.
But what's going on with our favorite bailout recipients? Talking Points Memo takes on the case of former Federal Pension Guarantor Charles Millard, who exploited his personal ties with employees at BlackRock Capital and Goldman Sachs while choosing firms to manage the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. At this point, both firms "may have run afoul of federal contracting rules in how they courted Millard."
Goldman Sachs and BlackRock are also on the lookout for the next big economic bubble. Salon reveals that both firms are diversifying their portfolios to include agriculture, in addition to government contracts. "Food is becoming the new oil," especially since the world's population is expected to crest nine billion by 2050. And a lot of land is necessary to grow enough food for nine billion people. Phillipe Heilberg, founder of American investment firm Jarch Capital, is hedging his bets on farmland in distressed countries. "Instead of buying stocks, the former banker is now speculating on the political future of South Sudan, which he insists will be an independent country in 10 years, at which point land will be far more expensive than it is today."
It's abundantly clear that we can't rely on the economic elite to represent the people's interests. Tomorrow's economic structure must be drastically different if the United States is going to thrive. Put simply, we're going to have to seriously reevaluate our economic priorities and decide who calls the shots. Here's hoping that everyday people have a say.
When Democrats lost their House and Senate majorities in 1994, polling for organized labor showed that the top issue for union members voting Republican for Congress was guns, something that had nothing to do with unions.
In 2000, when Al Gore lost West Virginia, Gore's state manager later said that the top three reasons for Gore's defeat there were guns, guns and guns. Guns probably played a factor in not only Gore's loss of his home state of Tennessee but in every state that even touched Tennessee.
It was the presidential loss in 2000, on top of the congressional losses in 1994, that convinced the Democratic Party to simply shut up on guns. As much as many Democratic elected officials wanted to legislate the issue, they realized that they couldn't get re-elected if they kept offending so many union members, white males and rural and small-town voters on the gun issue.
Gun-control advocates had plenty of other reasons to support Democrats, so remaining silent on the issue didn't hurt the party that much. Rather, it enabled it to have a conversation with voters who otherwise would not listen as long as guns were on the table.
The problem with this conventional wisdom is that Democrats have not improved their share of the vote among gun owners since 2000. Whatever "conversation" Democrats ended up having with gun owners, it did not translate into votes. What did happen, however, is that the percentage of gun owners in the electorate dropped:
Gun Households In Presidential Elections, 2000-2008
Year
% of Electorate
Dem %
2000
48%
36%
2004
41%
36%
2008
42%
37%
Gore and Kerry received identical percentages of the overall vote, and identical percentages of the gun household vote. Obama improved among gun owners, but only by 1%. Given that he improved the Democratic share of the overall vote by 4.5%, that means that his increased vote percentage came disproportionately from non-gun owners.
Democratic outreach to gun owners failed to result in new votes. However, Democrats did benefit from a long-term decline in the percentages of Americans who live in a gun owning household. The change is rather striking (more in the extended entry):
Today's look at the future of the electorate focuses not on cultural demographics, but rather on reapportionment of the Electoral College and U.S. House seats. Here are three possible outcomes for the post-2010 reapportionment, which will first be used in the 2012 elections for both President and U.S. House:
2010 Reapportionment
State
Guaranteed
Possible
Outside Chance
AZ
+1
+2
+2
CA
0
0
-1
FL
+1
+1
+1
GA
+1
+1
+1
IA
-1
-1
-1
IL
0
-1
-1
LA
-1
-1
-1
MA
-1
-1
-1
MI
-1
-1
-1
MN
0
-1
-1
MO
0
-1
-1
NC
0
0
+1
NJ
-1
-1
-1
NV
+1
+1
+1
NY
-1
-1
-1
OH
-1
-2
-2
OR
0
+1
+1
PA
-1
-1
-1
SC
0
+1
+1
TX
+3
+4
+4
UT
+1
+1
+1
Here are the different electoral changes for 2012, based on these models:
Guaranteed: Obama 361-177 McCain.
With Republicans winning Florida, Indiana, Nebraska-02, North Carolina, and Ohio (the "low hanging fruit"), it becomes Obama 287-251 Republican. The key states for Obama to hold would be Virginia (13), Colorado (9), Iowa (6), Minnesota (10), New Hampshire (4) and Pennsylvania (20). Republicans would need 18 electoral votes from that group in order to tie, and 19 to win outright.
Possible: Obama 359-179 McCain.
The same scenario as above, but the low-hanging Republican fruit makes it Obama 285-253 Republican. They would need 16 electoral votes from the key swing states to tie, and 17 to win.
Outside Chance: Obama 359-179 McCain
The same scenario as above, but after the low-hanging fruit Republicans would need 15 electoral votes to tie, and 16 to win.
In the extended entry, I look at the 2020 and 2030 reapportionments, which are more positive for Democrats.
Determining the percentage of the LGBT population has long been a difficult task for demographers. Several methodologies have yielded widely varying results from between 2% and 13% of the overall population. However, despite these wide variations, for the purposes of determining the LGBT percentage of future electorates, key pieces of data make it clear that the self-identified LGBT population is already 4% of the electorate (2004 and 2008 exit polls both confirm this), and will rise to at least 6% by 2028 at the latest. Further, it is possible that the electorate could become 7% self-identified LGBT at some point in the 2030's. Given the widely differing partisan tendencies of the LGBT and non-LGBT population, this 2-3% increase represents a not insignificant impact on national election results.
It is clear that the self-identified LGBT population is increasing, both as an overall percentage of the population and the overall percentage of the electorate. First, in terms of the overall population, Joseph Fried's 2008 analysis of the General Social Survey confirms that, over the past twenty years, an increasing percentage of men indicate they have recently had same-sex relationships. He also presents this data in terms of partisan affiliation:
If applied across both genders, this chart matches up closely with the percentage of self-identified LGBT population in the 2004 and 2008 exit polls (4% overall, breaking roughly 3-1 Democratic). The increase found in this research is highly likely due to changing societal views of homosexual relationships, rather than to an actual increase in the number of people with homosexual feelings. Gallup has found that, since the early 1990's, the percentage of Americans who view homosexuality as "an acceptable lifestyle," rose from 38% in 1992 to 57% in 2008. This shift has either resulted in--or been caused by--an increasing number of people to acting upon, and then admitting to have acted upon, homosexual feelings. The number of people with homosexual feelings has, in all likelihood, not increased.
The rise in homosexuality identified by Fried will continue in the future, due to the age distribution of the self-identified LGBT population. The Gay and Lesbian Census conducted by Syracuse University in 2001 found that the LGBT population skews much younger than the voting population as a whole:
LGBT population by age, 2001 (2008 percentage of electorate in parenthesis) 18-24: 16% (10%)
25-34: 32% (17%)
35-44: 32% (20%)
45-54: 15% (19%)
55-64: 4% (18%)
65+: 1% (16%)
In future elections, assuming that the percentage of self-identified LGBTs between the age of 18-44 does not change, the self-identified LGBT percentage of the electorate will inevitably rise as a result of this age distribution. Over time, the currently young and out population will age, thus making the 45+ demographic just as self-identified LGBT as the under-45 demographic was in 2001. This will result in the electorate as a whole becoming more self-identified LGBT.
More in the extended entry, including the specific projections.
The comparison between the 18-29 demographics and the 65+ (in Pew) and 70+ (in ARIS) make the trends clear. Across the two surveys, Mainline Protestants are declining rapidly, Evangelicals and Catholics are declining very slowly, and non-Christians are going to continue to increase as a percentage of the population. For example, among seniors, there are more than twice as many Mainline Protestants as "Nones," (people who don't list a religion, but not necessarily aethists). However, among the under-30 population, there are more than twice as many "Nones" as Mainline Protestants.
Evangelicals and Catholics have done a bit better among younger generations than Mainlines, but are still slightly underrepresented within the under-30 set according to Pew. As such, they are also likely to decline as a percentage of the population over the long-term.
Since both surveys have age crosstabs, they make it possible to forecast future religious affiliation with reasonable accuracy. However, before we make such a forecast, since we are looking at the future of religious from an electoral perspective, it is necessary to sort the numerous religious affiliations into coherent units of partisan preference. The Pew survey allows us to do this, given their far more detailed demographic crosstabs. Looking at the Pew survey, and at exit polls, there are four clear partisan categories:
White Evangelicals / Born Agains: This is a group that breaks 3-1 Republican. It includes white evangelicals, but also white Mormons and white "other Christians." It is declining from its current 24% of the electorate, but only slowly.
White Traditionals: This is a group with a slight Republican lean, favoring John McCain by about 7% in the most recent election. It is includes mainly white Catholics and white Mainline Protestants (whose voting habits have very similar partisan splits), and also a smaller amount of white Orthodox Christians. While it is the largest group, forming 37% of the electorate and nearly one-third of the over-18 population, it is also, by far, the fastest shrinking group.
Non-Christians: This is an overwhelmingly Democratic group, breaking 3-1 for the blues. It includes all self-identified non-Christians, whether they are white or non-white. This group is (very) slightly whiter, and vastly more Asian, than the rest of the population. At 21% of the over 18 population, and 20% of the electorate, it is the smallest group, but it is increasing in size rapidly, mainly due to the growth of Asians and "nones."
Non-white Christians: This is the most Democratic group of all, favoring President Obama by a 4-1 margin in 2008. It is the second smallest overall group (22% of the over 18 population), and the smallest voting group (representing 19% of the electorate). It is increasing in size, but not quite as quickly as non-Christians. It is also the most ideologically diverse group, given that it has large populations of African-American Christians (20-1 Obama) and Latino and Asian Christians (just under 2-1 Obama).
From now until 2032, these four groups should make up the following percentages of the electorate (or something very, very close to these percentages):
Projected Ethno-religious % of Electorate, Presidential Elections 2008-2032
Group
2008
2012
2016
2020
2024
2028
2032
White Evangelicals
24%
24%
24%
24%
23%
23%
22%
White Traditionals
37%
35%
33%
31%
29%
27%
26%
Non-Christians
20%
21%
22%
23%
25%
26%
27%
Non-white Christians
19%
20%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
The increasing trend toward political polarization in this country is largely the result of this ethno-religious trend. The only one of these groups that is even close to a 50-50 split, "white Traditionals," is quickly declining as a percentage of the population. The increasing polarization in America can thus be understood as largely a result of the end of a white Catholic / white Mainline Protestant era of bi-partisanship. As that group undergoes a rapid decline, all that remains are ethno-religious demographic groups that break overwhelmingly in favor of one party or another. The end result is a more culturally, and thus ideologically, divided country. White Catholics and white Mainline Protestants just have more in common with each other than, say white Evangelicals and non-Christians.
This chart also further emphasizes the long-term electoral trouble the current Republican coalition faces. Combined, the two strongly Democratic groups, non-Christians and non-white Christians, should increase from 39% to about 52% of the electorate between now and 2032. A shift like that would add another 10% to the Democratic margin if partisan preferences within the groups remain the same. (The preferences won't remain the same, of course, but I don't intend to predict how they will change.)
The troubles for Republicans don't end there. Tomorrow, as "the future" series continues, I will discuss why the country will keep becoming gayer. Or, at least, more openly LGBT.
Following up on today's earlier article on the future racial / ethnic makeup of the electorate, here are three possible projections for future election results. The projections include a Democratic high-end track (2008 margins among whites, Asians, and others, plus 2006 margins among Latinos and 1984 margins among African-Americans) a competitive projection (2004 margins across the board), and a Republican high-end (1984 margins among whites, plus 2004 margins among all other groups).
Three-track Democratic Margins Among Racial / Ethnic Groups
Group
Dem High
Competitive
Rep High
White
-12%
-17%
-32%
Black
+82%
+77%
+77%
Latino
+39%
+9%
+9%
Asian
+27%
+13%
+13%
Other
+35%
+14%
+14%
Three-track Democratic national margins, 2012-2032
Track
2012
2016
2020
2024
2028
2032
Dem High
+8%
+8%
+8%
+10%
+11%
+12%
Competitive
0%
-1%
0%
0%
1%
2%
Rep High
-11%
-12%
-11%
-10%
-9%
-8%
The purpose of these three tracks is not to forecast what will happen, but rather to show what needs to happen for Democrats to remain nationally dominant, for elections to once again become competitive, or for Republicans to gain national electoral dominance.
What will the electorate look like in twenty years? This is a question I have set out to answer this week, with a series of articles forecasting future demographic trends in the American electorate. Using historical voting data, exit polls, and population projections from the census, it is actually possible to develop a detailed and reasonably accurate view of what the electorate will look like from 2012-2032.
First, here are the projections for race / ethnicity as a percentage of the electorate, from 2012-2032:
Projected Race / Ethnicity % of Electorate, Presidential Elections 2012-2032
Group
2008
2012
2016
2020
2024
2028
2032
White
74%
72%
71%
70%
68%
65%
63%
Black
13%
14%
12%
13%
13%
13%
14%
Latino
9%
10%
11%
12%
14%
15%
16%
Asian
2%
2%
3%
3%
3%
4%
4%
Other
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
(Numbers may not add up to 100% due to rounding)
The overall trend is pretty clear: the white percentage of the electorate is decreasing, while the Latino percentage rising rapidly (plus slower rises within the Asian community, and a slow, uneven rise within the African-American community). There is nothing revelatory or controversial about this, given that the self-identified "white" share of the electorate has already dropped from 87% in 1992 to 74% in 2008. This table actually forecasts a slightly slower rate of decline for the white percentage of the electorate over the next twenty-four years (-11%) than was witnessed during the previous 24 years (-12% since 1984). This difference is primarily due to exceptionally high African-American turnout for President Obama in 2008 (for the first time ever, in 2008 African-Americans turned out at slightly higher percentages than whites), which I forecast will repeat in 2012 but then revert to a normal pattern of growth in 2016 based on 2004 turnout numbers.
I will have more on this projection later today, but for now here are some salient points to consider:
Voter Turnout Will Rise Indefinitely: One thing I noticed while constructing these charts is that it is highly likely voter turnout will continue to rise for the foreseeable future. Every indication points toward increasing voting. As the population ages, it will vote more often. As the population ages, crime will be reduced, and the voting ineligible population will drop. (Many states are rolling back voting restrictions on ex-felons, too). As the country (hopefully) becomes more prosperous per capita, it will vote more often. As a higher percentage of the Latino and Asian resident communities become citizens and native-born, turnout rates will increase among those groups. Overall, it is highly likely that voter turnout is on a long-term, one-way, upward growth pattern.
Obama Coalition now equal to Reagan's. A look at the race / ethnicity cross-tabs from 1984 shows that Reagan would have won by 8% in 2012 according to his levels of support among each racial / ethnic group. For the sake of comparison, in 2012 Obama will win by 9% if he maintains his 2008 level of support in each racial / ethnic group. As such, demographic shifts have now made Obama's coalition the equal of Reagan's.
Republicans can stay competitive with 2004 Bush coalition: For the next twenty years, Presidential elections will be decided by 1% or less if Republicans can rebuild the 2004 Bush coalition. However, that still means they must return to their peak performance of the last twenty years just to stay competitive during the next twenty years. That is not a good forecast for them.
As I said, later this afternoon I will follow-up this post with more data. Also, every day this week I will examine the future of the electorate from another demographic perspective (religion tomorrow). The data used to make these projections can be downloaded in an Excel file here.
You'll have to forgive me in advance - I'm a bit of an amateur on this issue, but I think I understand the broad trends. If I'm factually off somewhere or conceptually a bit incoherent, please do correct me.
There are a lot of things that progressives and the MSM discuss in terms of progressive policies - protecting the environment, health care, the right to organize, etc. However, beyond noting repeatedly that Americans are in a "mountain" of debt (latest example), I haven't seen very many stories on policy responses to this massive problem that is at the heart of the current economic crisis. This is an issue not just for the countless people who have debt problems, but also for the global economy, and so it should be winnable, in some form or another, and be extremely popular politically within the United States. It even has Christian roots. This debt forgivess MUST be packaged with debt forgiveness for other countries as well, if it's going to be advocated by progressives, because otherwise it's not going to help the hundreds of millions - if not billions - of people that are going to be damaged by the global financial crisis, and is more broadly going to endanger world security, including for Americans.
Some policies, like expanded health insurance coverage or a revision of the draconian bankruptcy bill that was passed recently or reducing the possibility of deportations of undocumented people, would reduce the possibility of danger incurred with existing debt, but they won't fundamentally redress the power that debt gives banks over people in the United States and everywhere else. This principle is true whether it's a loan from the IMF to Bangladesh or whether it's a credit card bill from Bank of America to John Q. Public.
Now, banks and the banks that bought their debts are not stupid (now). They know that in order to avoid going belly up, they need to make sure that as much of the income stream they're counting on comes in. Which means that they'll support something like a federal bailout, as happens everytime a company goes bankrupt, and they'll support one for consumers as long as they get their debt written off by the government. However, this is where their interests and the interests of citizens of the United States and every other country that is in debt to finance capital as well as other sectors of big business diverge.
Whereas banks will want the government to assume the debt and have people pay them or some other mechanism that will displace the risk from them to the government, what this will not do is liberate people from the actual debt. More succinctly, it doesn't matter to an individual company if you're broke - as long as you get you debt paid off by taxpayers or government borrowing. However, this does nothing to increase the spending power of the American consumer - which in turn contributes strongly to the global economy's prospects. And so this is an area where big business can be split in half and part of it allied with ordinary people (i.e. how "progressive policies" get implemented in the U.S.).
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