In Part One, I presented the argument for viewing conservatism as a form of identity politics, showed how differences on issues between liberals and conservatives are much smaller than differences on candidates, and showed that conservatives--even self-identified extreme conservatives--support welfare state spending. In Part Two, I examined two cognitive models that distinguish liberalism and conservatism., both of which show reasons why conservatism is associated with a constricted notion of identity, while liberalism is more diffuse.
Now, in Part 3, I address how to construct a diverse liberal identity. The key to doing so lies in weaving together issues, values and narratives, and doing so with a diversified messaging and organizing strategy. To bring things solidly down to earth, I will focus on two key concepts that I believe have tremendous potential for liberal politics, both in 2008, and for decades to come. These concepts can be expressed in a simple pairing: "dignity and security for all."
As I will explain, there is more than just a rhetorical echo of another famous liberal formulation, "liberty and justice for all." In a very real sense, dignity is the lived foundation for justice, just as security is the lived foundation for liberty (this is a key aspect of Locke's social contract theory). What's more, when these concepts are presented together, they represent a fuller and more robust expression of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" --freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear.
Thus, what I am arguing for is a new articulation of core liberal values in a form that pro-actively responds to 40+ years of rightwing slander, as well as the realworld challenges of the 21st Century. To accomplish a lasting political realignment--along the lines seen in 1930/1932--we will need to change the basic contours of the politically possible, which means the politically imaginable. Fortunately, we've done it before. We can do it again.
[Note: Ooops! I lied! There's going to be more than two parts to this....]
In Part One, I presented the argument for viewing conservatism as a form of identity politics, showed how differences on issues between liberals and conservatives are much smaller than differences on candidates, and showed that conservatives-even self-identified extreme conservatives-support welfare state spending.
In this part, I will begin to address the task of creating a countervailing liberal identity politics by developing a clearer picture of liberal and conservative identity. I will look at two different models from cognitive science, and what they tell us about the differences between liberalism and conservatism.
In his post-2004 election analysis, Chris Bowers concluded in "Conservatism Is Our Enemy" that the parties had become ideological coalitions, and the preponderance of conservative self-identifiers was a key factor in Republican victories. Conservatism had grown faster than liberalism between 2000 and 2004, and that had been the difference in the 2004 elections.
Since then, the tides have turned, creating an opening for us ("Democratic Party is growing more liberal" [McClatchy/Pew]). But the underlying problem remains--even with a recent shift toward liberalism, far more people self-identify as conservatives. Here, I want to present the core of an idea about how to radically change the structure of the political universe in a few short years--precisely the sort of restructuring that typically accompanies classic realigning elections such as 1860, 1896 and 1932.
I begin with the observation that liberal/conservative split in candidate support is wildly out of line with attitudes on specific issues, and proceed from there to the idea of conservative identity politics as the core of what we are up against. I then ask what it would take to create a counter, liberal (or progressive) identity politics, which naturally engages us in diversity issues as well as questions of unifying narratives and defining values.
Because of length, I'm splitting this into two parts. Part one is the setup, ending with conservative identity politics. Part two starts with what the challenge of creating a liberal identity politics.
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