I don't know why people are so shocked that McCain's lies are working. We've been over this before. Here's John Bullock, and commentary from Ezra Klein and Matthew Yglesias from December, 2007.
Much work on political persuasion maintains that people are influenced by information that they believe and not by information that they don't. By this view, false beliefs have no power if they are known to be false. This helps to explain frequent efforts to change voters' attitudes by exposing them to relevant facts. But findings from social psychology suggest that this view requires modification: sometimes, false beliefs influence people's attitudes even after they are understood to be false. In a trio of experiments, I demonstrate that the effect is present in people's thinking about politics and amplified by party identification. I conclude by elaborating the consequences for theories of belief updating and strategic political communication.
There's a lot we don't know about political persuasion, and we're particularly in the dark about how to combat systemic dishonesty. Gossip as a social tool, true or not, works, and attaching reputations to gossip-mongers has an effect both positive and negative, as does repetition from multiple sources. Simply calling out lies doesn't work, you have to explain why someone is lying and it has to be attached to a larger frame.
One thing that we have known for a long time is that just saying 'she/he's lying' doesn't work. People will elect dishonest politicians, knowing they are dishonest.
Among other things, the discussion thread of my diary "Obama Praising Reagan--An Echo, Not A Choice???", again surfaced the confusion that falsely jumbles together framing, spinning and lying. Because framing is so fundamental, so important, and still so badly misunderstood, I felt compelled to address it, with yet another attempt to set the record straight.
Here's the basic picture:
Framing:
A: "The glass is half full."
B: "The glass is half empty."
Both are objectively true, but represent different views.
Spinning:
A: "The glass is half empty."
B: "Why didn't you say it was half full?"
A: "But that's what I DID say! They're both the same, you know."
Objective truth is involved, but it's being played with. You don't lie outright, but you clearly mislead. The sense in which what you say is true is not the sense in which you intend and expect to be taken.
Lying:
A: "The glass is half full."
B: "Why are you saying it's half empty? You're such a pessimist! Liberals are all pessimists!"
B is simply lying, and then generalizing from the lie.
The false equation of framing, spinning and lying comes in two particularly pernicious forms-those who make the false equation in order to attack framing, and those who make the false equation in order to support spinning and lying. A couple of years back, I stopped posting at Booman Tribune, because Booman dogmatically insisted on this false equation, irrationally rejecting repeated solid arguments, not just from me, but also from a number of other diarists and commentators.
Now, here at OpenLeft, I'm getting it from the other side, from folks who are defending Obama's parroting of rightwing lies about Ronald Reagan as simple acts of "reframing." Well, yes, technically, that's true, since lying is a form of framing, and recasting a lie in a somewhat different form is a form of reframing.
But there are important differences between the essence of lying and framing, and when you obscure those differences, what you're doing is spinning. The best way I can think of to defend framing, and distinguish it from lying and spinning, is talk about where it comes from, and what it's all about-and then to show how deeply contradictory the arguments against it generally are, once you understand what it really is.
One of the reasons I'm looking into lying as a sociological force is because we know so little about how dishonesty as a political tactic applies to political liberalism. I sat in on a session with Drew Westen yesterday, an expert who talked about networks in the brain and how they make connections, and I asked him about how comedy changes neural pathways. His answer was that he didn't know since there was not a lot of data on humor. That is stunning, as comedy is a pervasive cultural tool that obviously has strong evolutionary consequences, and intersects deeply with dishonesty. In fact one of the key element that makes something funny is hypocrisy, which is why the Daily Show was at its best during the Iraq War, why the WGA's videos have been so amazingly successful, and why Colbert's White House correspondent's dinner was stunningly powerful.
Much work on political persuasion maintains that people are influenced by information that they believe and not by information that they don't. By this view, false beliefs have no power if they are known to be false. This helps to explain frequent efforts to change voters' attitudes by exposing them to relevant facts. But findings from social psychology suggest that this view requires modification: sometimes, false beliefs influence people's attitudes even after they are understood to be false. In a trio of experiments, I demonstrate that the effect is present in people's thinking about politics and amplified by party identification. I conclude by elaborating the consequences for theories of belief updating and strategic political communication.
Last week Matt Stoller asked for information on lying in our culture, and our culture of dishonesty. I came across a study about gossip yesterday and thought it interesting. In short, the study indicates that people are likely to believe gossip even when hard facts contradict that gossip.
I've become fascinated by the effects of honesty/dishonesty in a culture. I live in DC, and I'm beginning to think that there are characteristics of those in power that are more reflective of a mass psychological disorder or strange cultural affinity for self-deception than 'money in politics', bribery, or corruption can explain.
If you know of any books, papers, blogs, or experts I should talk to dealing with honesty/dishonesty as a cultural phenomenon, I'd really appreciate recommendations.
You can put them in the comments or email me at stoller at gmail.com.
UPDATE: There's plenty of stuff out there about why people lie. I'm interested in that, but I'm also intrigued by the effect of bad faith on the recipient(s). I want to know how different cultures prevent/promote dishonesty, and it's as important to understand the effect of lying on the victim and the system at large.
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