What is particularly irritating about crank complaints against "political polarization" is how utterly ineffective their proposed solutions to the "problem." The best available political science on the topic (PDF) suggests a major factor (the rise of a two-party system in the South) and a minor factor (increased income inequality):
Using National Election Study data from 1952 to 2000, we explore the relationship between income and voter partisan self-identification. We find that partisanship has become more stratified by income. We argue that this trend is largely the consequence of polarization of the parties on economic issues and the development of a two-party system in the South. The trend is much less a reflection of
increased economic inequality.
If the main cause for increased political polarization is the rise of a two-party system in the South, then a straightforward option to reduce polarization would be to entirely wipe out one of the two major parties in a large region of the country. I presume the pundits and pols who complain about polarization would not actually advocate for a one-party system in a large swath of the country (at least in public). Anyway, moving to a one-party system in one-third of the country is probably impossible anyway. As such, those complaining about this "problem" better get used to levels of polarization elevated above the 1932-1980 period indefinitely.
However, the secondary cause of political polarization, elevated income inequality, is actually a problem that many pundits and pols, including those in the center would desire to solve:
The problem is that both parties are not advocating for reduced income inequality. Barack Obama's call to "spread the wealth around" when he was a candidate became the most prominent attack ad used by John McCain in the 2008 campaign. This is some thick irony, given that John McCain has long been one of the favorites of anti-polarization pundits (McCain was the third most common guest on Sunday talk shows even before he ran for President in 2008) and anti-polarization pols, such as Joe Lieberman, who complain about political polarization.
To put it bluntly, the poster child for anti-polarization used an attack on the very concept of reducing income inequality as one of the main messaging points of his campaign, even though a reduction in income inequality is the only course of public policy that has been demonstrated to reduce political polarization.
In fact, one entire party isn't even advocating for reduced income inequality. The Blue Dogs, the exalted bearers of bi-partisan in the Democratic Party, prominently proclaim fiscal conservatism--which is largely synonymous with income inequality, and thus polarization--as their core value.
Until the cranks who complain about political polarization start actually advocating for a policy course that would reduce political polarization at its root cause--income inequality--then it is difficult to consider them anything except charlatans. Right now, most of the most prominent anti-polarization scolds take opposing a reduction in income inequality as their core value.
In light of yesterday's Senate condemnation of the progressive netroots via MoveOn.org, I think it is more appropriate than ever to see rigorous, well-researched work documenting the impact of the progressive blogosphere and progressive netroots on the American political scene. This is why I am happy that Professor Matthew Kerbel of Villanova University has agreed to share some of his preliminary research on that very subject here on Open Left. Professor Kerbel is a friend of mine with whom I have frequently discussed this topic, ever since we worked together on a book project more than two years ago: Let's Get This Party Started. His current work seeks to be one of the first, full-length studies of the impact of the progressive blogosphere on American politics, and its rigorous, quantitative basis will serve as a useful counter to the frequent anecdotal, elitist dismissals we often receive from the political and media establishment. He has modified a section of a paper he recently presented at the American Political Science Association for Open Left, which you can read here:
I have also reproduced this piece in the extended entry, though without the charts and table. This section focuses on the success rate of "netroots funded" candidates at the federal level in the 2006 midterm elections. Here is a key graph:
Within each tier save for two online-funded toss-up races, recipients of online funding kept pace with or marginally outperformed traditionally-funded campaigns in terms of overall won-loss records. Perhaps more importantly, online-funded races were overwhelmingly competitive, suggesting that there is value in netroots funding to candidates who accept it. Most long-shot candidates receiving online money were able to finish within four points of their opponents. Seven of eight Democrats in "Lean
Republican" districts ran competitive races, while all three "Likely Republican" districts and five of ten "Safe Republican" districts were competitive. Apart from the value to the individual campaign, competitive races increase the costs of competition overall, forcing opponents to expend resources to contest seats that otherwise would not be endangered.
These figures attest to the value of online funding methods, particularly as they apply to underdog campaigns. But, fundraising is only one portion of hybrid campaigning, which includes message dissemination and grassroots mobilization. In my next post, I'll address how well hybrid campaigns exploited the two-way communication potential of the Internet by engaging supporters with interactive features and hyperlinks from their campaign sites to other Internet websites such as blogs like this.
I had a political epiphany a while back, and someone said I should post it in a diary. It will follow after the jump, but first, some caveats. This was written before the Iraq vote occurred, so that has not been factored in. To be honest, I don't know how to factor it in just yet. Second, it was written while I was in the hospital and merely transcribed afterwards. As such, please excuse any minor historical mistakes I may have made in my theorizing. I would appreciate any corrections people might like to offer. Third, in no way do I want this to weaken the principles of the Democratic Party. It is merely a way of viewing the current system and what I believe to be its coming change. I still stand behind the plan of action detailed below and will do so until the Democratic Party fails to support progressive values entirely. I pray to God that today is not that day.
P.S. Sorry about the length, and I assure you, I'm not a Naderite.