Public expenditures on social programs--health care, pensions, transportation, housing, education, unemployment assistance--have risen sharply as a percentage of GDP over the past two years. In fact, for the first time in history, public social spending in the United States has surpassed 30% of GDP.
Here is a chart with the details on the spending. The figures taken from usgovernmentspending.com (which is unfortunately a teabagger site, but still has good data). The chart includes figures for all levels of government--federal, state and local. It only looks at social investment programs, rather than things like defense and interest on the debt:
Social safety net spending as a percentage of GDP, by category, 1970-2010
About 30% of the increase over the last two years comes entirely from increased public expenditures on unemployment. Another 15% comes from an increase in public spending on pensions. A bit more comes from the recession itself, as GDP has not increased much even in absolute terms over the past few years.
Still, the chart suggests that progressives are making real advancements in expanding the social safety net in America. About half of the increases come from non-recession, non-demographic related areas like health care, education, and the "other spending" category that focuses on a wide variety of public services (environmental protection, scientific research, housing, water, communications, waste management, etc) Further, even with the projected end of the stimulus, the end of the recession (at least in GDP terms), and increase in employment, the long-term forecast is for social investment spending to stay above 30% indefinitely.
The New Deal regulatory structure has indeed been gutted, and union density has declined markedly since the mid-20th century. These twin developments have played major roles in the rise of wealth inequality in the U.S.. However, conservatives not only failed to gut Great Society and New Deal social safety net programs, but those programs continue to expand.
In 1940, under FDR, public social investment spending was less than 14% of GDP, far less than it is today. No matter how frustrating the fights may be, we are indeed making progress.
This week, Jimmy Carter came out and stated the obvious--that racism plays a part in fueling the often nonsensical, incoherent, contradictory, hysterical, fact-free conservative attacks on President Obama and his modest, centrist agenda. The rightwing racists who've been running this game are furious, of course. But the role of racism in building the conservative movement, and the modern Republican Party is indisputable. What's more racist attitudes remain quite widespread in America today, often below the level of consciousness, because consciousness has been shaped to repress and deny awareness. More on this later this weekend. But to start things off, I want take up a long-delayed diary focused on the impact of racist attitudes toward support for social spending.
The specific racist attitudes involved are: (1) blaming blacks for their continued lower incomes and lack of wealth, and (2) denying that discrimination plays a dominant role in holding blacks back. Of course, some will deny that these are racist beliefs, but white supremacists have always insisted on the sole right to define everything. Suffice it to say that both beliefs are race-based, and both are factually false. If race-based lies that help preserve white privilege aren't racist, then one has to wonder, "What is?"
That said, one can--and should--legitimately distinguish between having some racist attitudes--particularly given their currency in mainstream political discourse--and being a racist. Especially if one is interested in so identifying such attitudes in order to help get rid of them.
This is particularly true for those who may think that discrimination is a problem, but who minimize its impact. Indeed, such a mindset among whites is part of the construct of "color-blind racism," as described by Eduardo Bonilla-Silva in Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. At the same time, such a mindset among individual blacks may be key to individual success, even as it helps preclude broader advances for the black community as a whole. It seems both accurate and fair to describe this as internalized racism that is nonetheless individually beneficial--precisely the kind of double-bind that has been a recurrent feature of the psychic baggage that blacks have been made to bear since first being kidnapped and brought to America. While there is a great deal more one can say about how to view such beliefs, the point of this diary is to focus on their political significance, which turns out to be quite considerable.
More than one-third of all Americans hold both these beliefs, while a similar number hold one of the two beliefs. Only about one quarter reject both. The following chart--drawn from the concluding section of this diary--shows the widespread impact of such attitudes. From a battery of seven spending items, support for increased spending on 4 or more items is half as high among those who hold both racist beliefs (30.1%) as it among those who reject both (62.2%):
A further point: The number saying that we're spending too much on these seven items, net (i.e. those who indicated "too much" on more items than they indicated "too little" on), was four times as large among those who express the racist attitudes (14.6%) compared to those that reject them (3.6%).
On the flip is refresher on the context that this diary originally derived from, followed by a detailed examination of the impacts of these beliefs on nine social spending priorities covered in the General Social Survey. Seven of those come from one sub-sample, and the combined data from that group is examined at the end of the diary. A followup diary will look at this same data in terms of the differences between the White South--the core of the GOP today--and the rest of the nation.
This is a follow-up to my diary yesterday, "Obama Quandary Comes Into Sharper Focus: Part Two, Economic Substance", in which I faulted Michael Lind for misperceiving the role of race in the story of New Deal liberalism. But I originally began pulling it together several months ago. I was too slow to catch the window I was original aiming for, and now a new window has opened for it. A follow-up diary will look at the related phenomena of how attitudes towards blacks influence attitudes towards social spending.
In his diary "The Public Option and The Grand Arc Of American Politics", Chris presented data showing US social spending is roughly comparable to most other advanced industrial nations, but that a good chunk of ours is private, rather than public. He went on to write [emphasis added is mine]:
It is not a coincidence that United States public sector social spending stalled at around the same time that the modern conservative coalition came together under Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972 (we are still living under this coalition even now, but forty years of demographic changes have made the Nixon coalition a national minority). While we wanted more social services, we eschewed increasing our public sector social spending over the last 30-35 years because we didn't want that social spending to go to everyone. More specifically, the majority of the country wanted more social services, but the white majority didn't want to pay for social services for racial and ethnic minorities. As such, we continued to increase social spending, but we did so in the private sector, where people had to pay on their own, rather than in the public sector, where people collectively paid for each other.
Although a bit over-simplified--since another factor was our WWII-vintage system of health-care, retirement and other fringe benefits in the industrial sector, the point Chris makes here is an important one, which deserves to be backed up with additional information about the extent to which racial & ethinc divisions undercut social solidarity & thus, support for an inclusive welfare state.
I've actually written about this before, in passing, with less than a month to go during the election last year, in a diary, "It's The Democracy, Stupid!", where the main thrust was the difference in composition and attitudes between voters and non-voters--a difference that's one of the main reason for conservative hatred of ACORN. However, I did quote from a story I'd written for Random Lengths News in the run-up to the 2006 elections, which included this passage:
A 2001 paper from the Brookings Institute, "Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?" found a direct correlation between welfare state spending and the size of minority populations-the more minorities, the lower the levels of spending. This held true both internationally (comparing more then 60 different countries) and nationally (comparing all 50 states).
I'll expand on that on flip, and reproduce the charts showing the national and international relationships I just mentioned.
Contrary to popular belief, the United States actually spends just as much on social programs (pensions, health care, education, etc.) as just about any other country in the world. The key difference between the United States and other wealthy democracies is where the money comes from. Specifically, in the United States, many people pay for social services straight out of their pockets, rather than having the public sector (aka, the government) provide the services.
From the OEC, here are 2005 figures on social spending, by country, broken out by private and public sources:
The United States actually spends an above average amount of its GDP on social programs. The difference between the United States and other wealthy democracies is not the total amount of spending on social programs, but that we place an abnormal burden--over 35%--for such spending on private consumers.
This difference developed entirely over the past forty years. In 1960, the United States was equal to other wealthy democracies in terms of overall social spending from the public sector. During the 1960's, we continued to increase our nationa level of public sector spending through programs like Medicare and Medicaid. However, since that time, while other wealthy democracies experienced a vast increase in public sector social spending, the United States has experienced little change (PDF, page 4). What has changed in the United States is a vast increase in private spending on social programs. In 1980, the 4.4% of the United States GDP was private expenditure on things like health care and education, but by 2005 that number had increased to 9.4% (source: OECD). While other wealthy democracies increased their public sector spending on social programs, the United States increased its private sector spending on social programs.
As I explain in the extended entry, this really is the grand arc of American politics over the past forty years. A public health care option would be the first major deviation from that arc in a long time.
Obama's sudden lurch to the right is all in accord with one of Versailles' most treasured, and most bogus narratives, the claim that America is a "center-right" country, and thus that it's both natural and necessary for any Democrat to attack the party's base and trample the things it believes in. After all, they're just a bunch of DFHs, whose views are hated and despised by real Americans (who read David Brooks religiously to know what they should think).
I'll have more to say about the center-right premise in another diary, but here I want to dramatically illustrate quite the opposite conclusion--that it's not the DFHs who are out of touch with the American people. It's the movement conservatives who are so far out there that even the vast majority of day-to-day conservatives are opposed to their fundamental agenda.
I will do this by looking at just two areas--albeit fairly crucial ones: social spending and abortion, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), the gold standard of public opinion polling. (The GSS is cited by social scientists more often than any other data source except the US Census.) In both cases, it turns out, conservative doctrine has little mass support.
Abortion
First, we take a look at a combined measure of support for abortion in three cases where a pregnant woman is under duress--in the case of rape, potential birth defect(s) or threat to her health. The hardline conservative position is that abortion is murder, period, and therefore cannot be allowed for any reason. This is, however, a clear minority position:
Well, 7.5%. That sure makes Mr. 23% seem like a popular guy, now doesn't it?
But we're just getting started!
Social Spending--Round 1
Next, we look at another combined measure, which measures support for social spending on aix national priorities:
A. Improving and protecting the environment.
B. Improving and protecting the nation's health
C. Solving the problems of the big cities
D. Improving the nation's education system
E. Improving the conditions of Blacks
F. Welfare
Again, the movement conservative position is clear: none of this is any of the government's business. Just to be merciful, I'm going to start off with a measure that lumps things together into big chunks. That way, conservatives can claim anyone who wants to cut more than they want to hold steady or increase spending--a much bigger group of people than those who want to cut everything. But even being exceedingly generous, the number of conservative believers is a tiny minority--again, even less than the 23% Bush dead-enders:
When Obama praised Reagan, he was echoing the elite, Versailles conventional wisdom, as he all too often does, rather than challenging it, and presenting the American people with a true, substantive choice for a real change of direction. How much change of direction is possible while still clinging to the myths of the past?
NObama! Reagan Did NOT Change The Trajectory Of America
"I think Ronald Reagan changed the trajectory of America in a way that Richard Nixon did not and in a way that Bill Clinton did not. He put us on a fundamentally different path because the country was ready for it. I think they felt like with all the excesses of the 1960s and 1970s and government had grown and grown but there wasn't much sense of accountability in terms of how it was operating. I think people, he just tapped into what people were already feeling, which was we want clarity we want optimism, we want a return to that sense of dynamism and entrepreneurship that had been missing."
Reality:
Reagan was a figurehead, a rallying point for the conservative movement that has taken over many of the elite institutions of America, but it has not changed the heart of America. In particular, the notion that "government had grown and grown but there wasn't much sense of accountability" is directly refuted by the most-respected, and most-cited public opinion survey in America, the General Social Survey , which is cited by social scientists more often than any other data source, except for the US Census.
Here's how attitudes toward spending on the environment were not changed by Ronald Reagan:
Charts for seven more spending categories on the flip...
Everyone knows that the West is a land of free spirits, full of cowboys and cowboy wannabess, where the national anthem is "Don't Fence Me In," and nobody wants no big government mucking around, no way, no how.
Only, not so much.
In fact, when it comes to levels of support for spending on domestic government programs, there is very little difference between the regions, as one can tell from just a cursory glance at the following table, based on combined measure of suport for eight domestic spending items tracked by the General Social Survey:
Domestic Spending Preferences By Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
MUCH TOO LITTLE 5-8 Items Net
20.8
19.6
20.4
20.7
TOO LITTLE 1-4 Items Net
56.8
54.6
53.2
54.6
ABOUT RIGHT Net
8.9
9.7
10.1
8.8
TOO MUCH 1-8 Items Net
13.5
16.1
16.3
16.0
Now, you might object that the "West" jams together California with all its coastal elites alongside the "true Westerners" from states like Idaho, Montana and Nevada. So here's a breakdown of the West into its two sub-regions:
Domestic Spending Preferences Within The West
MOUNTAIN
PACIFIC
MUCH TOO LITTLE 5-8 Items Net
18.4
21.7
TOO LITTLE 1-4 Items Net
55.8
54.0
ABOUT RIGHT Net
8.7
8.8
TOO MUCH 1-8 Items Net
17.1
15.5
As you can see, there's a slight difference between the two, but the big picture story is exactly the same: there is much more support for spending more than for spending less.
Now, I'm not for a moment suggesting that there's nothing at all behind the perception of a libertarian West. But I am suggesting that it's a good deal more complicated than your average would-be pundit supposes. And these figures offer indisputable proof.
This matters for a very significant reason: As the GOP shows signs of fracturing during this primary season, Mike Huckabee is the figure touting a form of economic populism that naturally encompasses more government spending. But he comes from a religious context that is much more deeply rooted in the South, and for that reason alone, he has distinctly less resonance in the West. Yet, these figures stongly indicate that if enough different factors combine to energize economic populism generally, there is as much potential for a shakeup in the West as there is anywhere else. And this becomes important because of Tom Schaller's thesis in Whistling Past Dixie: How Democrats Can Win Without the South.
Before saying anything more, though, let's take a quick peek at conservatives alone, just to make sure that they don't have any geographic peculiarities. Well do that right after the jump.
The problem for old school, laissez-faire conservatism was evident as far back as 1936, when the GOP thought that it was going to sweep back into office in a landslide, when people saw the government taking money for Social Security right out of their paychecks!
Didn't happen. People liked Social Security. In fact, so many people liked it that it was obvious that even conservatives liked it.
Oh, and the 1936 elections? Biggest landslide defeat ever for the GOP.
Fast forward to 1964, and another landslide defeat for the GOP. That year, two giants in the history of public opinion research, Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, fielded a comprehensive survey via their good friend George Gallup's operation. Published three years later, one of it's most stunning findings was that self-identified conservatives were strong supporters of domestic (welfare state) spending. A clear majority of them either wanted to increase or maintain existing levels of spending.
In 1972, the General Social Survey began comprehensive surveys of the American Public, once every year or two (every two years regularly since 1994). It's findings have consistently confirmed Free and Cantril's findings. Using an aggregate measure of all domestic spending items initiated at that time, and the 7-point scale for ideological self-identification, here is the cumulative record of support for welfare state spending:
Domesetic Spending Preferences By Ideological Self-Identification
Ext Lib
Lib
Mod Lib
Mod
Mod Con
Con
Ext Con
MUCH TOO LITTLE 5-8 Items Net
43.2
33.3
25.3
19.2
15.1
11.8
12.5
TOO LITTLE 1-4 Items Net
43.8
51.9
57.5
57.3
55.5
49.7
39.7
ABOUT RIGHT Net
5.4
6.8
7.8
9.9
10.6
11.4
10.3
TOO MUCH 1-8 Items Net
7.7
7.9
9.4
13.7
18.8
27.1
37.2
(Note: The table uses a "net" measure--meaning that it subtracts the number of programs a respondent thiks we're spending "too much" on from the number of programs a respondent thinks we're spending "too little" on.)
The problem for conservatives is evident at a glance. Even among self-described "extreme conservatives," barely more than 1/3 think that we're spending "too much" on domestic spending, overall. What's more, a larger percentage of extreme conservatives think we're spending too little--an absolute majority, in fact.
The problem can be seen even more starkly, if we collapse the table into three divisions: liberal, moderate and conservative:
Domesetic Spending Preferences By Ideological Self-Identification (Condensed)
LIBERAL
MODERATE
CONSERVATIVE
MUCH TOO LITTLE 5-8 Items Net
30.3
19.2
13.5
TOO LITTLE 1-4 Items Net
53.8
57.3
51.8
ABOUT RIGHT Net
7.2
9.9
10.9
TOO MUCH 1-8 Items Net
8.6
13.7
23.8
Now it's really clear. Barely more than 1/3 of all conservatives think that we're not spending too little.
Of course Congressional Democrats realize that Bush's veto of SCHIP is good for Democrats and bad for Republicans politically. But do they really have any idea just how bad it is? I doubt it. And because they don't recognize how bad it is, it won't be. Failure to capitalize on the political opportunity will largely squander it.
For example, it's a little known fact, but Bush was opposed to fully funding SCHIP when he was Governor of Texas, and Democrats failed to make an issue of that in the 2000 campaign. If they failed to fully capitalize on it then, they will surely do so again.
But what is it, exactly, that they will fail to do? Simple: They will fail to show how deeply out of step movement conservatives are with the rest of the country. And more importantly, that gap is growing, as younger voters are even more supportive of social spenging than older voters.
In my last post, I wrote about the dramatic failure of free market economics-a failure clearly documented in cold, hard statistics. Now I want to show that this ideology is also wildly unpopular-also using cold, hard statistics. There are ways of presenting it that make it more appealing. When you get down to brass tacks and ask people what they want, virtually no one wants the libertarian's "night watchman" state, no one wants to shrink goverment down to the size that Grover Norquist can drown it in a bathtub. And this is not just the result of a new progressive mood in the land. This is the way it's always been. As with so many other things, reality and the Versailles political discourse are 180 degrees opposed to one another.
