More On The Shifting Aesthetic

by: Chris Bowers

Fri Aug 01, 2008 at 15:34


My post yesterday evening, The Rise Of The Non-Fictional Aesthetic, generated more personal email then about any other article I can remember writing. Jennifer Nix should have a Right To Respond post up on the topic at some point. Also, I wanted to direct readers to Emptywheel's reaction to the piece. She argues that the shift is not so much in the types of narratives progressives are producing, which was my basic argument, but instead in the institutional location where we were producing them:

I don't so much disagree with what Chris has to say, except to object to his characterization of this aesthetic--non-fiction versus fiction. Human beings construct narratives. All narratives--whether they tell a story about an uppity black man running for President or about a prisoner who exacts the ultimate revenge--involve a great deal of artifice and and linguistic craft... In other words, the terms "fiction" and "non-fiction" are really just convenient classifications for stories that helps people sort out library shelves and legal battles. Fundamentally, narratives are still narratives, which are necessary tools for the human creature to make sense of and interact with her world.

So I would describe what has happened somewhat differently than Chris. If the Clinton wars and the Iraq War did anything, they demonstrated that the Right had a sophisticated and effective narrative industry, one that was having a dramatic effect on our governance. While we leftists were all playing with a-utilitarian postmodernism in the academy and fiction workshops, the Right was implementing a philosophy of utilitarian postmodernism--deliberately mobilizing narratives to accrue power into the hands of corporations and those who guard them. So it's not so much our aesthetic that has changed, I think, as our understanding of the battlefield.

I think that is right. The left always was producing reality-creating narratives, but before the last decade we were largely ineffective at challenging the dominant narratives produced in national media on politics and current events. Part of this may simply have been that many of us were focusing our reality-creating and narrative creating-energies, as both I and Jennifer Nix described, more in institutions like academia than in the production of political news.

Perhaps our aesthetic didn't change so much as the target institutions in which we sought to alter narratives changed. Now, we focus more on CNN than, say, the Modern Language Association. It isn't a stylistic shift so much as a shift in institutional focus, and thus a shift in our content focus, that creates the perception of a stylistic shift.

Further, going beyond Emptywheel's criticism, perhaps this shift in institutional focus did not happen because progressives were apathetic in the 1990's, but simply because it was virtually impossible for grassroots activists to play on the national narrative battlefield a decade ago. Without the vastly lowered cost of information and cultural production provided by the self-publishing capable, broadband accessible, network-neutral Internet, entering academia or the literary world was actually a rational and immediate path toward becoming a cultural producer at the time. It has become much, much easier to compete in the production of national political narratives than it was only ten years ago. In fact, it has become easier to participate in politics altogether than it was only ten years ago.

So, not only is the shift perhaps more a change of venue rather than a change in style, but the change in venue took place not because of a new desire for civic engagement, but instead because of new possibilities for civic engagement that did not exist before. Liberals, progressive and lefties were treated with as much, if not more, contempt in the 1990's. I have no doubt that if the broadband accessible, network neutral internet had come into existence ten years earlier, then the progressive netroots would have developed ten years earlier, too. As it is, we came into existence almost immediately after it was possible to do so, considering that MoveOn will celebrate its tenth birthday next month.

Food for thought. I look forward to Jennifer's response. It is frustrating to feel to utterly out of practice in discussions like this, while Emptywheel clearly hasn't lost a step. However, given how much I am enjoying this discussion, perhaps it proves Jennifer's original point, QED: we do need to talk about these things more, and we were missing something by not discussing them.  

Chris Bowers :: More On The Shifting Aesthetic

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from a somewhat dilapidated ivory tower... (0.00 / 0)
Hey Chris -- it was great to catch up with your writing on this. Of course, I think a great deal about the shifts of "my generation" (I'm 29, and I mean that in a highly fuzzy sense, but do perhaps want to cut it at 9/11, or perhaps when the insanity of the GOP became stark, 2003?  -- just because we were sort of "the last" in many ways.)

One thing I've noticed is that many of the touchstones of the "intellectual left" -- meaning, those on the left who engage intellectually as well as practically and morally -- might not have changed, but our relationship to them has. I think Adorno, for example, is read more now than ever (I see his stuff is now in cheap paperback again), as are many of the "greats" of the left.

But I think while in the past it was their hermetic aspects that drew readers-as-decoders, they're now being read in a far more "simple" fashion. People are not reading them combatively, or in a contrarian or skeptical fashion, but rather more pragmatically, taking what they need and dropping what is out of date or lost. (e.g., just an example: I think people care less that Adorno hated jazz!)

Back in the day, it was cool to be "cool": everything was up in the air, everything was indeterminate, the boundary between self and world was pretty thin and so who was to say if questioning your personal life was not actually a major political act. Now, of course -- and I really think it's just due to the experiences we've had as a country -- it's all quite different.

A prof of mine was quoted back in the 1990s as saying that she'd never voted -- she was sort of proud of it in a contrarian way, as if to say "all that matters is this problem I'm working on." Apparently now, in 2008, she rails about the GOP in the faculty lounge. Quite a change.


So what's the solution? (0.00 / 0)
How do we smoke narrative-minded intellectuals out of the ivory tower?  And, more importantly, how do we put them to use?  You've clearly found one answer yourself: use the power of the netroots to create and disseminate progressive framing narratives.  But there's only a limited amount of this kind of work to be done--and I'm sure I don't have to tell you about the huddled masses of ABDs out there ... you know, yearning to be free.

I suppose mainstream journalism is another avenue, for those less interested in direct activism.  Any other thoughts people?


Good old fashioned (0.00 / 0)
Muckraking?

What we have lost recently are good, thorough investigative pieces.  A few people do them, too few.  Most people want to be pundits, and the media want to employ them because they are cheap.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
You have to level the labor market (4.00 / 1)
As Daniel Brook so brilliantly points out in The Trap, the salaries of a CEO of a mission-driven nonprofit and a CEO of a big company used to be equivalent. People who directed community-based programs used to make the same living as stockbrokers. Lawyers who represented plaintiffs of corporate liability claims made as much as the lawyers who defended the corporations. During the 80s and 90s that all changed by-and-large through artificial manipulations of the market. The result is that well-meaning people on the Left can no longer afford to pursue the careers they want to and end up gritting their teeth and bowing to the corporate gods who control the market. Brook proposes a number of potential solutions including: Universal Health Care so small nonprofits can hire the best employees without the burden of picking up their health care, and Universal Higher Education so that college graduates don't have such huge amounts of debt that they have to go to work for the highest-paying employer.

Save Our Schools! March & National Call to Action, July 28-31, 2011 in Washington, DC: http://www.saveourschoolsmarch...

[ Parent ]
But how much is enough? (0.00 / 0)
How much do we need to pay people to do the "right thing?"  Of course the problem with debt is real, and the problem with not being able to hire anyone (especially an issue with social action groups) is crucial.  But how much is enough.

We also need some rich progressives--lots of rich progressives.  Although it's probably beaten out of them.  I'd rather have a rich progressive lawyer than yet another social worker.

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


[ Parent ]
What the "market will bear" (0.00 / 0)
but change the market by not financially penalizing people who want to do the right thing. I'm not against rich progressives, but you have to realize that any economy structured to give greater advantages to the rich than to, say social workers, is more apt to be anything but progressive.

Save Our Schools! March & National Call to Action, July 28-31, 2011 in Washington, DC: http://www.saveourschoolsmarch...

[ Parent ]
Sure (0.00 / 0)
And right now it's totally unequal.  But good luck at any effort at equalization.  

I once heard of a speaker at graduation who told the graduates that if they really wanted to make a change in the world, they should forget about being a teacher or a social worker, and instead make a whole bunch of cash and use it as a lever for power.  Good point.  Obviously I didn't listen. . . .

Yes, it sucks that this is true to some extent.  But it is.  

Great top review on Amazon about The Trap:

Just got back from Barnes and Noble where I sat with a coffee and Brook's little rant.

In some ways the book is charming because it took me back to my own days of rage after I left college and first bumped into the realities of adult life. As a community organizer I was doing important work! Why wasn't I paid more? Why did my college friends who took corporate jobs get to live in nice houses and drive reliable cars while I was in a moldy one-room apartment driving a '71 Beetle with a stuck valve? IT'S JUST NOT FAIR!

Of course, my friends had SOLD OUT. Sold their souls for the almighty dollar. The only problem was they seemed to be a helluva lot happier than the motley bunch of activists I was hanging around with.

Let's give Brooks come credit...he writes with a furious rage about inequity in a way that could only come out of the mouths of one cloistered in the ivy-covered culture of elite America. If you approach this book with a light heart, you'll recognize the self-righteous that infected many of us during our college years. It's always a b!tch when reality smacks up against idealism. Welcome to the real world, Mr. Brooks.

In other words, things are worse now than they were then.  But many of the basic dynamics are not as different as one might think.


--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


[ Parent ]
"good luck at any effort at equalization" (0.00 / 0)
Universal health care and universal higher education would make a huge difference at equalizing the labor market, and these two agendas are generally supported by most of the population (sorry, no link for this).  

Save Our Schools! March & National Call to Action, July 28-31, 2011 in Washington, DC: http://www.saveourschoolsmarch...

[ Parent ]
I mean deep equalization (0.00 / 0)
not that some equalization isn't possible.  Bummer you can't edit comments.  

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)

[ Parent ]
Yes, the target institutions have changed (0.00 / 0)
In the 80's and 90's, when you left the aesthetic of being an MFA-educated auteur, regardless of your medium, to take a position in politics or business, it was basically crossing the Rubicon. The narrative of your new world became dominated by the language of MBA and poly-sci trained pragmatists. In the eyes of your old peer group, you had sold out. Your new peer group told you to "grow up." That was my experience anyway. And yes, little by little, we on the Left gradually ceded those institutions to the Right, and with that let the prevailing narrative in those institutions be cast by the hard-hearted and greedy. Now, I too sense a swing back in the pendulum, and narratives of the Left--such as cooperation over competition, sustainability over short-term profit, mission-driven instead of bottom-line driven--are creeping into the language of business and politics much more.  

Save Our Schools! March & National Call to Action, July 28-31, 2011 in Washington, DC: http://www.saveourschoolsmarch...

Agents and Spectators (4.00 / 7)
You are all being more kind to the the Left of this time period than I would be.  It might be worth a second look at Rorty's Achieving Our Country, in particular his description of what happened to Leftist thought during the period you describe.  It wasn't just fiction or non-fiction, and it wasn't just looking at one battlefield while the right made gains on or created another.  There was an active movement on the Left in the 1980s and 1990s to replace an economic progressive politics with a cultural progressive politics, and this ended poorly.

Rorty's point is Emerson revisited, for the most part, but here it is in a brilliant and surgical description of the dynamic we are all circling (p. 9):

The difference between early Twentieth-Century leftist intellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counterparts is the difference between agents and spectators.  In the early decades of the century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception--the great abstainer from politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the first Gilded Age as a symptom of the irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse.  James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of detached spectatorship which Adams affected.

For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto-Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly.


He goes on to develop this point by way of resurrecting the 'pragmatism' of Emerson, James, and Dewey as a path forward for Leftist intellectuals weighed down by this decadence and cowardice.

Rorty was writing in the late 1990s, and if anything it is a sense that the Left suffered from an excess of spectatorship that motivated many of us to step into the arena and become agents again.  Maybe it seems at first glance that this is about genre, but I suspect Rorty's description is more to the point:  it was about the sheer number of people on the Left who were deeply entrenched in a world defined by 'disgust with American hypocrisy and self deception' but which had long given up on the 'effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future.'

And that is why we still struggle, today.  That is why we have the kind of Presidential candidate we have, the kind of internal arguments we have, and the kind of challenges ahead.  We are struggling, in a sense, to become pragmatists again--and it is not an easy transformation.  But it was not an impatience with non-fiction per se, but a realization that--whether we were in Turin, or a Ph.D. program--our continuing acceptance of spectatorship would have grave consequences for the future of this country.

It is a startling thing to see on screen/paper,  let alone admit, given where many of us began 3, 4  or 5 years ago--from locales defined by a disinterest or even a rejection of interest in the pragmatics of our country.   I don't believe Rorty is saying it's important to retain the word 'pragmatism' (although I happened to like it), but he is saying that we must be aware that part of the reason the political landscape shifted as it did was because Leftists abandon their passion for reasons to be proud of the country and stopped trying to build a path to that future. We didn't give up, he is saying, we indulged.

I have read Rorty's critique many times, in particular as I wrote Outright Barbarous.  I find it particularly interesting after going over Rorty's arguments to then go back and notice that Emerson wrote his political ideas not just in non-fiction, but in two forms: essays and poetry.

 


Excellent comment. (0.00 / 0)
Rings true.

Older Lefties did fight in the 1980's, against Reqaganism, but kind of kicked back and relaxed after Clinton came in.  Big mistake.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
Pragmatism (0.00 / 0)
Booyeah. Emmerson to Dewey to Roarty (to Feldman? ;) )

It gives me great hope to think what might be accomplished as the progressive elements within the academy, arts, and the clergy begin to re-assert themselves as participants in our national (and global) saga.

This goes far beyond direct political activism of course. Economics (both purely market/capitalist and social) are a huge factor. As we think about re-tooling the nation for the 21st century, a more meaningful role for plenty of heretofore spectating actors is absolutely vital.

Me | My Work | Future Majority


[ Parent ]
Great point (0.00 / 0)
Not much to add to it, but graet point.

[ Parent ]
Part of the Problem (0.00 / 0)
was that a lot of Boomers came up starved for insight and understanding, with only a few beacons of light.  McCarthyism had driven a lot of leftists out of the academy, and just generally sent a chill through everything.  So a lot of them became teachers and academics, because that actually looked like doing something.  And, of course, it was.  But so many people went into that, and so few into, say, labor organizing, where a different sort of reactionary mentality had taken hold.  And then, once you've been in academia for a little while, you're not doing anymore so much as, well, spectating, even though you're doing with a critical attitude, don'tcha know!

And the fact that all that happened while a glut of trained intellectuals was being produced, so that their labor could much more easily exploited.  Well, I'll just say that I think your description is accurate, but it's also somewhat lacking in the materialist side of things, the nitty-gritty of the situations that caused folks to go in this kind of direction.

Skipping a track on the old CD: The fact that we can now communicate the way we are communicating is an incredible breakthrough out of the relative isolation that people lived in, generally without even realizing it.  The insularity was an unconscious physical fact of life long before, several various mutations later, it became a hip psychic pose.

Now we're getting a chance to live that in reverse, and the question is, "what will we do with that chance?"  I think it's a very healthy sign that conversations like this one are taking place.  People are groping their way towards asking the right sorts of questions.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
Taking Meaningful Action (0.00 / 0)
I've always wondered if the Right has an easier job creating their narrative, because it's not difficult to appeal to the base instincts of the electorate.  Pushing the homophobia, greed, and nationalism buttons is not as challenging as appealing to the higher instincts.

Also, there's always greed (0.00 / 0)
A pretty big motivator.

Altruism and a desire to promote the common good have their rewards, but they are subtler.

John McCain--He's not who you think he is.


[ Parent ]
the poetry of campaigns (0.00 / 0)
Campaigns set stories in motion, to be sure, but they do so with the aid of tropes and images. Take, for example, the notorious Britny-Paris ad. One scene of Obama, looking dashing and friendly, ends with his mouth opened, in a perfect oval. Freeze frame on that image, the last thing we see in the sequence. The mouth is that of a ghoul or banshee. Obama is no longer smiling but howling or about to howl, as if the monster within had momentarily exposed itself. This menacing mouth resonates the Joker's damaged and hypertrophied smile. Without the frame being frozen, Obama's howling mouth passes just below the level of consciousness, but it lingers in the unconscious anyway, a terrifying warning of what will be let loose on the land if we vote for him.

The ad also contains the much-noted image of Obama's face juxtaposed with the word "foreign." And we recall the final image of many McCain ads, a profile of a resolute, archetypally white McCain in the pose of God or, perhaps, a nineteenth-century Indian-killer. Such powerful, non-diagetical images, akin to those found in lyric poetry,  have great impact. They contribute to the framing narratives, yes. But they also function independently, creating or consolidating fears and desires that will sway viewers emotionally.

If advertising is the rhetoric of democracy, as Daniel Boorstin once said, then poetry--as much as narrative--is the rhetoric of political campaigns.


some things that bother me about emptywheel's response (0.00 / 0)
1. "Utilitarian postmodernism" as the right's strategy for producing political narratives? What is that supposed to mean? This strikes me as deeply misleading terminology. Her point, evidently, is that the right uses the insights of postmodern theory to accrue power. But this is the exact opposite of utilitarianism - the philosophical view that the end of ethical conduct ought to be the maximization of happiness (and not just for the acting individual!).

2. I wouldn't discount the significance of the overwhelming progressive presence in academia. Can you imagine what conservatives might accomplish if they had wholesale control of our academic institutions?

3. Emptywheel writes:


In other words, the terms "fiction" and "non-fiction" are really just convenient classifications for stories that helps people sort out library shelves and legal battles. Fundamentally, narratives are still narratives, which are necessary tools for the human creature to make sense of and interact with her world.

Well, no, I don't think so. Fiction and non-fiction are fundamentally different forms of narrative. Non-fiction purports to give an account of actual people, events, things, and processes in the real world; fiction does not operate on that premise.

Of course, it's true that there are cases when fiction and non-fiction can serve as distinct approaches to a similar goal - an essay and a novel might each serve as criticisms of an existing power structure, for example. But the distinction between them is not merely a function of their arrangement on library shelves, as emptywheel claims.

Why is this an important point? Because we approach different sorts of narratives with different sorts of attitudes. If we throw everything into some generic bin of "narratives," we deny ourselves the warrant to use different criteria in evaluating different narratives. So, if a conservative narrative-constructor wants to claim authorial license in using fictional elements in, say, a newspaper column, we don't have a critical leg to stand on. If this becomes the prevailing attitude toward narrative, it redounds strongly to the benefit of conservatives.

Why does the attitude that emptywheel espouses benefit conservatives? At least two reasons. First, conservatives are genuinely and objectively wrong about many things: global warming; the efficacy of the language of cultural conflict in the war on terror; laissez-faire economics; etc. If we forfeit the ability to claim that some narratives are genuinely non-fictional, we deprive ourselves of the ability to make the strongest possible arguments against many (objectively bad) conservative policies. Second, if we adopt the attitude that narrative classification is a matter of subjective choice, we allow existing power structures a tremendous amount of leeway to determine accepted reality. Yes, lefty bloggers and the like have some capacity to construct counter-narratives to those that predominate in mainstream political discourse; but these counter-narratives are only appealing because they are more accurate reflections of reality. Without the claim of corresponding to reality (in a loose sense of that loaded phrase), counter-narratives have nothing but emotional and aesthetic appeal, and that will never be enough to take on the Disneys, GEs, and News Corp.s of the world.

It might be that I'm importing a bit more of postmodernist epistemology into my reading of emptywheel than she intends. If so, I apologize. But it srikes me as telling that ew speaks solely in terms of achieving narrative dominance, and exhorts us to "engag[e] actively in the contest over dominant narratives". This seems to imply that the goal is to construct narratives that will justify progressive ends, rather than to counter conservatively-skewed narratives with objective accounts of reality. The latter ought to be our goal, because in the war of ideas between progressives and conservatives, reality is our greatest ally.


Charitably speaking (0.00 / 0)
But this is the exact opposite of utilitarianism - the philosophical view that the end of ethical conduct ought to be the maximization of happiness

Charitably speaking, one could imagine that many on the right see this as the only viable path. Very few committed actors in politics are motivated by base greed. Doesn't tend to last because eventually you get some cash, and then relax.

I think most committed neoconservatives honestly believed/believe in their own warped and darkened worldview, wherein the masses must be duped via a Great Lie, and a clash of civilizations is inevitable.

And in terms of how politics seems to work (maybe not how it should work, but still), fiction and non-fiction are quite often interchanged. It's the nature of the beast. Politics is at least 50% mythology, tribalism, etc, which occupies a subjective space that both immensely powerful and defies any meaningful prgamatic categorization as "true or false". People believe things.

The important point is that it's an enormous blind spot to assume that because your opponent is "objectively wrong" that you will win an argument. The left has been operating (and losing) like this for decades. Human nature and consciousness are molded around narratives. That doesn't mean they have to be false or obscure the truth, but it does mean that "the facts" sans-narrative will often lose out: "strong and wrong beats weak and right," etc.

Me | My Work | Future Majority


[ Parent ]
assumptions (0.00 / 0)
The important point is that it's an enormous blind spot to assume that because your opponent is "objectively wrong" that you will win an argument.

Right. Well, I certainly don't make that assumption. "Being right" is certainly not a sufficient condition for winning arguments. But it may be a necessary condition for the left to win arguments, in a way that it is not for the right. Since they (often) control the levers of power, they can use those levers to skew the discourse in their favor (e.g., through corporate control of certain news organizations). We can't (presently) beat them at their own game in this regard; what we can do is appeal to objective reality - and that sort of appeal can be very powerful.


[ Parent ]
I thought so too (0.00 / 0)
We can't (presently) beat them at their own game in this regard; what we can do is appeal to objective reality - and that sort of appeal can be very powerful.

I used to believe that. My evolving opinion is that while objective reality will (eventually) win all arguments, it often lags severely behind important decision-making moments.

For instance, if we wait for objective reality alone to force action on global warming, it would be far too late. That's why creating narratives around future projections and possibilities is very important.

I also think it's limiting to think of working with narratives, myths and fantasies as "playing their game." It doesn't have to be lies or even propaganda, just moving, evocative and inspiring. Human beings want to be a part of something. They want to believe in a better future. Facts don't really do that.

And anyway, corporate-dominant information sources are (gradually) losing their hammerlock on the national consciousness. Carpe diem! Viva progressive fantasy!

Me | My Work | Future Majority


[ Parent ]
Response (0.00 / 0)
First, wrt my use of "utilitarian postmodernism," note "utilitarian" is the adjective, not the noun. Not sure if you clicked through to my description of what I was talking about, but I in no way intended to invoke utilitarianism. Mostly I just used what I had used when I took on the inherently post-modern practices of the Neocons.

As to your suggestion that non-fiction and fiction are separate--I appreciate what you're saying about truth, which is what you're actually talking about, and agree with it. BUt you seem to be ignoring my very historical statement that non-fiction and fiction are historically and culturally contingent things; fiction means more as a legal concept than anything else. Remember, too, that I was responding to the notion that there was a "fictional aesthetic;" the aesthetics of our time, I think, haven't changed in the least, whereas the choice for a lot of people to engage in truthful narratives did. Your example about a conservative columnist using "fictional elements" (ignoring of course that even crappy AP style pre-Fournier itself ALWAYS uses "fictional elements"--omniscient third person narrative form is itself a "fictional element" that has as much to do with the history of the novel as it does with journalism and is itself a historically limited stylistic practice; there has been some excellent academic work in recent years about the "fictional elements" in standard journalism) really refers to whether people use facts or whether they misrepresent facts. That has nothing to do with how they present those facts.  


[ Parent ]
thanks for that (0.00 / 0)
This clarifies things for me a good bit; the way you describe the "fictional elements" of journalism, for instance, points more towards an approach to criticizing various forms of narrative, which could be quite helpful towards the end of legitimizing the views of the "reality-based community;" whereas I had read your original response to Chris as being more indifferent to the justifications for given narratives - as being interested mainly in narrative dominance for the sake controlling political discourse, regardless of whether given narratives are supported by the state of things in the world.

But one other point, about your "very historical statement that non-fiction and fiction are historically and culturally contingent things." This is definitely true, but it doesn't mean that the distinction between fiction and non-fiction isn't a real one. (Other real things that are only culturally and historically contingent: money, property, marriage, jobs, slaves, classes, schools, prisons, baseball teams...) Regardless of the sources of the distinction, we approach fiction and non-fiction with different attitudes, and different expectations about the responsibilities of fiction/non-fiction writers. So there's that.

But I also want to mention that I do truly think there is a danger in a certain line of thinking, which sometimes seems to be associated with postmodern literary theory, which, confronting the inadequacy of a correspondence theory of truth, denies truth altogether (rather than accepting, e.g., pragmatic or contextualist theories of truth). This leads to relativism, and inevitably - since the right to speak of the true state of things has been ceded - to Orwellianism, in which meaning is wholly determined by power, and then we all lose our freedom and we suffer. Anyways, clearly you weren't implying any such thing, so I'll stop typing now. Appreciate the response.


[ Parent ]
Hegemony, Baby (4.00 / 1)
Emptywheel:

If the Clinton wars and the Iraq War did anything, they demonstrated that the Right had a sophisticated and effective narrative industry, one that was having a dramatic effect on our governance. While we leftists were all playing with a-utilitarian postmodernism in the academy and fiction workshops, the Right was implementing a philosophy of utilitarian postmodernism--deliberately mobilizing narratives to accrue power into the hands of corporations and those who guard them.

I just want to point out that what we're talking about here is the right crafting hegemonic narratives, while the left twiddles its thumbs in various different ways.  And, of course, it hardly started with the Clinton wars.  Go back to Reagan, go back Iran/Contra. Heck, go back to Joe McCarthy.

The right is always constructing these grand narratives, because that's what they believe in.  And we believe it's more complicated.  And we're right.

But you have to hang the more complicated stuff on top of a simpler frame, so that there's something there for everyone.  That was Shakespeare's secret, and it's been out for several centuries now, and every good student learns it--but apparently only in theory.

It's time to learn it for real, this time.


"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


True (0.00 / 0)
It started long before the Clinton wars. But the Clinton wars are both what got me in--and out--of the academy. If Chris is right about timing, then that would be the proximate cause.  

[ Parent ]
Yes (0.00 / 0)
But I think we need to be honest about what art can do to create a hegemony.  What did Sinclair Lewis say?  He tried to bring the plight of the Back of the Yards slaughterhouse workers to national attention and instead ended up sparking the creation of the FDA to protect people from all that dirt.

On the other hand, something like Will and Grace, it seems to me, does really powerful things to create hegemony.

Somewhere, someone was talking about how lucky we are that right-wingers are terrible artists.  They are simply incapable, mostly, of creating compelling art.  Too damn literal and serious.  So all those right wingers running the media companies have Rush et. al., but also end up putting stuff like Will and Grace et. al. up.  A right wing version of The Daily Show?  They tried and fell on their faces, if I remember correctly.  Of course there's lots of stuff that doesn't do a thing to advance anything.  But some does.

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


[ Parent ]
"I Aimed For Their Hearts, But Hit Their Stomachs" (0.00 / 0)
And it was Upton Sinclair, not Sinclair Lewis. Easy to mix up the partners of that law firm, Upton, Sinclair, Lewis & Clark.

But, as to the creation of hegemonic and/or effective counter-hegemonic discourse, you just can't divorce the work and the material infrastructure.  That's what the right has going for it--material infrastructure.  And it's what the progressives around the time of The Jungle had going for them--if not well enough, then still going.  It's why all the magazines they wrote for eventually got bought up by the type of folks they were excoriating.

In short, as usual, multiple causality going on.  No single work is going to do it alone, even with the best supportive infrastructure.  It's a long-term cumulative process.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
I mean by "art" here (0.00 / 0)
stuff like novels.  More coherent efforts to push narratives, like the right wing think tanks etc. and advertising, etc. does seems somewhat different.  Even acknowledging emptywheel's points about the tenuousness of the fiction/fact dichotomy, different kinds of writing tend to serve different functions, regardless of their internal "truthiness."

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)

[ Parent ]
so true (0.00 / 0)
But you have to hang the more complicated stuff on top of a simpler frame, so that there's something there for everyone.

And this is where the right has the advantage - many of their arguments are based on a manichean moral theory to begin with, so they don't have to go into contortions to fit their theories to a simple model. If you start from a comlex world-view, by contrast, you necessarily have more work to do to fit it into a simple narrative.


[ Parent ]
I Know What You Mean, But This Isn't A Problem For Some (0.00 / 0)
You may start with a complex worldview, but that doesn't mean the story has to be complicated.  The opening scene of the first episode of Buffy, The Vampire Slayer is a perfect example of that.  A very simple story, but it upsets the expectations.

Or think of all the cop shows where the cops have problems, where they're not the simple Manichean heros of Dragnet.  There are countless variations of these, and they're all quite familiar to people now.

"You know what they say -- those of us who fail history... doomed to repeat it in summer school." -- Buffy The Vampire Slayer, Season 6, Episode 3


[ Parent ]
The Bard (0.00 / 0)
It would be pretty hot if we could get Shakespearian political rhetoric going on. That's setting the bar pretty high, but why not?

Me | My Work | Future Majority

[ Parent ]
Shifted Comment (0.00 / 0)
[Didn't realize the conversation had moved over here, so I'm dumping a comment from the earlier thread over here.]

I have to say that threads like this are part of the reason I read this blog.  There is space for the politics wonk with open box thinking and intellectual creativity that is rare these days.  

As someone who has an MA in creative writing and who occasionally publishes science fiction stories, who started out in my Ph.D. (in English and Education) interested in the agency of individuals and got interested in collective action and increasingly pissed off along the way, this discussion reverberated with my experience.  

As for the shift in the aesthetic, I have two thoughts.

First, I am increasingly convinced that it is illuminating (if not entirely accurate) to think of three main branches of progressivism.  First there is administrative progressivism: the "people" are too screwed up and ignorant to rule, so let us experts rule and take care of all you boneheads.  

Second, there are the democratic progressives, focused on how we can create the right kind of practices and institutions that would bring common "folk" up to "our" level and allow a truly democratic society.  

Finally, there are the "personalist" progressives with their roots in romanticism who are focused on cultural change and on releasing the imagination of unique individuals.  

The key difference between all three of these groups is one of focus.  The administrative folks focus on the outcome, the democrats focus on the process, and the personalists focus on the imagination.  The democrats see the middle class as the key model for the person of the future, and the personalists see the middle class as trapped in the "machine" of bureaucracy, even as they draw from other strands of middle class culture.  There are other odd overlaps.

Personalism emerged most strongly at two moments of apparent prosperity (1920s and 1960s), where it didn't seem like we needed to care much about the "social question"--e.g., what do do about poor people, since there wouldn't be any poor people soon.  The personalists are most interested in aesthetics, and is usually satisfied with pretty vague visions of an organic communal society.    

Democratic progressivism, in contrast, is focused on this same "social question," and much less interested in aesthetics.  

How the pomos fit into all of this, I'm not sure--which may screw up the whole schematic.

I had a second point, but I forgot it.  

Anyway, I may disagree with the last comment. A focus on the aesthetic seems to emerge at those times when (1) people seem fairly hopeless in a pragmatic sense and (2) when it seems like the social problem will probably take care of itself, so the real problem is about "us", how crappy the lives of the priveleged middle class are.

The pomos were obsessed, in part, by the idea that they were oppressed but didn't know it--what I've called "pastoral" domination, elsewhere.  They were constantly seeking oppression in places where it seemed like you weren't oppressed.

The only people who are oppressed and don't notice it are the middle class.

I talk about this in some detail in an article called "Rethinking Domination and Resistance: Challenging Postmodernism", if anyone is interested:  

https://www.aera.net/uploadedF...

--Aaron Schutz (Core Dilemmas of Community Organizing)


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